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Introduction
Motivation
The international integration of factor and commodity markets implies that na-
tional authorities are increasingly aﬀected by policy measures of other countries.
National governments’ policy making can no longer be seen in isolation. A policy
reform in one country is likely to induce policy reforms in other countries, which in
turn aﬀect the welfare in the ﬁrst country. Given the policy interdependence, each
country competes with its social security, redistribution, regulation as well as tax
systems for mobile resources. Thus, the growing concern by economists about the
beneﬁts and costs of system competition is not surprising.1 One aspect of system
competition which has received a lot of attention in the empirical and theoretical lit-
erature is capital tax competition. Under this form of tax competition governments
try to attract mobile capital by reducing tax rates. The theoretical predictions seem
to be empirically conﬁrmed by recent capital tax reforms in most industrial coun-
tries which resulted in lower capital tax rates.2 Besides increasing investments by
domestic ﬁrms the main motivation for these tax cuts is to attract foreign direct
investments. Following the theoretical and empirical research economists and politi-
cians have advocated harmonization, or at least coordination measures, in the ﬁeld
of capital taxation to avoid a “race to the bottom”.3
1Among many others, see, e.g., Siebert and Knoop (1993) and Sinn (1998) for an analysis of
system competition.
2For instance, from 1985 to 1995 Sweden reduced the corporate tax rat from 57% to 28%,
Norway from 51% to 28%, and France from 50% to 33.33% [Tanzi (1998)]. Germany followed
almost the same pattern. From 1985 to 1995 the corporate tax rate was lowered from 56% on
retained and 36% on distributed earnings to 45% and 30%, respectively. The latest tax reform in
Germany reduced both tax rates to a common rate of 25%.
3For instance, these policy measures have been advocated by Sinn (1990) and Cnossen and
Bovenberg (1997).
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So far, most of the literature analyzes the desirability and feasibility of tax co-
ordination within a system of independent countries thereby abstracting from the
institutional setting of ﬁscal federalism. However, many states have a federal struc-
ture which, in principle, does not leave the costs and beneﬁts of tax coordination
unaﬀected. Therefore, the present study deals with the issue of whether the po-
tential gains of tax coordination can be realized in a federal system. It adopts a
theoretical approach to this issue and, thereby, does not contribute to the empirical
literature on capital tax competition.
Model
Throughout the analysis the capital tax competition model introduced by Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986) serves as a point of departure.4 The basic assumptions of
this model are source-based capital taxation, perfect capital mobility, and benev-
olent governments. Since these are crucial for the subsequent analysis, the next
paragraphs provide a discussion of the assumptions and relates them to the existing
literature on tax competition.
Source-BasedCapital Taxation The two extreme forms of international capital
taxation are source-based and residence-based capital taxation. Under the former,
capital is taxed where it is generated, whereas under the latter capital taxation
occurs in the country where the owner of the capital resides. Examined from the
point of view of eﬃciency the residence-based system is superior to the source-based
system.5 However, the eﬃciency criterion is not the only one relevant for practical
tax policy. In particular, it is the administrative costs which receive attention in the
policy-oriented literature on capital taxation. Since capital markets become more
integrated, capital mobility imposes restrictions on the ability of the national tax
authorities to tax capital income. If capital income is taxed on a residence basis,
national tax authorities must have information on both domestic and foreign capital
income. However, the latter is diﬃcult to observe for national tax authorities. The
implementation of the capital tax system according to the world income principle
requires an information exchange among tax authorities concerning foreign capital
income. The necessity of a World Tax Organization responsible for information
4An overview on the literature on tax competition is presented in Oates (1999).
5See, e.g., Mintz and Tulkens (1996).
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exchange has been pointed out by Tanzi (1998). Up to now, such an institution has
not been established, and it is highly questionable if it will ever become a realistic
policy option.6 Given the diﬃculties in administering a residence-based capital tax
system, countries rely on source-based capital tax systems as well.
Capital Mobility The assumption of perfect capital mobility is a standard fea-
ture in the tax competition literature. However, most of the literature on capital
tax competition assumes rather than explains perfect capital mobility.
From an empirical point of view, the assumption of perfect capital mobility has
been heavily criticized. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) report that capital is quite
immobile internationally. In their empirical study, they examine the correlation be-
tween national savings and investment across 16 OECD countries over the period
1960-1974.7 In a closed economy savings equals investment. In an open economy
this relation is not expected to hold because, due to international capital ﬂows, addi-
tional national savings does not necessarily increase national investment. Therefore,
the correlation should be very low with perfect capital mobility. The empirical ﬁnd-
ings, however, suggest a relatively high correlation indicating low capital mobility.8
This result, which has become known as the Feldstein-Horioka-Puzzle, has been
conﬁrmed, e.g., by Penati and Dooley (1984) and Bayoumi (1990).
From a methodological point of view, the ﬁnding has been criticized as it does not
account for the so-called endogeneity problem. This means that some determinants
inﬂuence national savings and investment simultaneously and in the same direction.
For instance, one of these endogenous mechanisms is the current account solvency.9
Hence, a perfect correlation between national savings and national investment can-
not be interpreted as an indicator for capital immobility. A high correlation does
6For a discussion of the legal, technical, as well as political constraints of a world-wide infor-
mation exchange among tax authorities see Tanzi (1995, 1998).
7To be more precise, Feldstein and Horioka related the ratio of national saving to GDP (S/Y )
to the ratio of national investment to GDP (I/Y ) by estimating the equation
(I/Y )t = α+ β(S/Y )t + t
with  as an error term.
8The estimated β coeﬃcient is 0.89 with a standard error of 0.07 and R2 = 0.91.
9Coakley and Kulasi (1997) argue that a high correlation is implied by the current account
solvency condition. In the short run, current account imbalances are possible resulting from capital
mobility. But in the long run the solvency condition must hold.
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not reveal any information about the degree of capital mobility. Analogously, a
low correlation between savings and investment is a suﬃcient condition for capital
mobility.10
Recent papers take the endogenous relation between savings and investment into
account. However, the empirical results do not provide a clear answer. For instance,
Hussein (1998) analyzes international capital mobility over 23 OECD countries from
1960 to 1993. He shows that the hypothesis of capital immobility can be rejected for
most countries under consideration when controlling for the endogeneity problem.
The empirical ﬁndings support the hypothesis of capital immobility in the last 30
years for only a few of the countries examined.11 In contrast, Coakley and Kulasi
(1997) ﬁnd a correlation between national savings and investment. However, the
correlation is interpreted as an indicator for current account solvency rather than
for capital immobility.12 In sum, the empirical ﬁndings do not suggest perfect cap-
ital mobility. A low capital mobility in turn can be concluded from the empirical
ﬁndings, neither.
Based on this controversy, Gordon and Bovenberg (1994, 1996) and Razin, Sadka,
and Yuen (1998) construct a model to explain imperfect capital mobility. They
use a two-period model of a small capital-importing country (henceforth domestic
country). National output depends on capital input and a random productivity
factor. Domestic investors learn of the realization of the stochastic parameter prior
to investment. Hence, their investment decision is made under full information and
is not changed relative to previous models. Foreign investors learn of the realization
of the parameter after their investment decision is made. The only piece of informa-
tion they have is the probability distribution of the random productivity parameter.
The authors ﬁnd that foreign investors are overcharged for their domestic invest-
ments due to asymmetric information. The resulting equilibrium capital allocation
is ineﬃcient as the domestic marginal productivity is not driven down to the world
rate of interest. Additionally, the model implies real interest rate diﬀerentials across
10Alternatively, Sachsida and Abi-Ramia Caetano (2000) demonstrate that the Feldstein-Horioka
approach measures the substitutability between external and domestic savings rather than inter-
national capital mobility.
11According to Hussein (1998) one possible explanation for this result is that capital inﬂows and
outﬂows just cancelled out.
12Sinn (1992a) and Bayoumi and Rose (1993) analyze the investment-savings correlation using
regional data since the current account solvency mechanism is not present among regions within a
nation. Their estimates indicate a low correlation suggesting a high degree of capital mobility.
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countries. The latter theoretical ﬁnding is consistent with empirical regularities pre-
sented in Frenkel, Razin, and Sadka (1991) and provide an endogenous explanation
of imperfect capital mobility. In the subsequent analysis investors have perfect in-
formation. Therefore, given the information symmetry and the absence of capital
control mechanisms, there is no reason (at least on theoretical grounds) to assume
imperfect capital mobility.
Benevolent Governments The issue of tax competition can be tackled by either
adopting the neoclassical or public choice perspective.13 The neoclassical approach
assumes governments which maximize social welfare. With benevolent governments
tax competition only causes distortions in the tax systems and policy coordination
is proposed as a policy remedy.
Advocates of the public choice approach assume that this assumption is in error.
They assume that politicians have a private agenda and determine tax policy to serve
their own rather than the citizen’s interest. In general, the public choice approach
analyzes the design of institutional arrangements in which governments act and set
taxes. Following Brennan and Buchanan (1980) the institutional environment has
to be chosen so as to provide politicians with suﬃcient incentives to reduce wasteful
activities.
As pointed out, e.g., by Sinn (1992b), tax competition is one appropriate institu-
tional setting to tame the Leviathan behavior of governments. Tax competition
counteracts the distortions caused by politicians themselves. Now, tax coordination
loses its desirable properties since it is equivalent to a ﬁscal cartelization of self-
serving politicians. For this reason, advocates of the public choice approach reject
any form of tax coordination.
In the following, the neoclassical approach to tax competition is pursued. Thus,
given the ineﬃciency of this institutional setting the aim of the subsequent models
is to analyze whether the negative eﬀects of tax competition can be mitigated in a
federal economy.
Organization
The analysis is organized into three chapters.
13See, e.g., Frey and Eichenberger (1996) for a discussion of these two approaches.
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Chapter 1 Chapter 1 introduces the basic capital tax competition model as elab-
orated by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and extends basic capital tax competition
in various ways. First, besides a source-based capital tax the government is allowed
to use a labor income tax. Furthermore, the symmetry assumption is dropped in two
ways. First, regions are allowed to diﬀer with respect to their factor endowments
and, second, they are asymmetric with respect to their preferences for public goods.
Finally, the implications of household mobility are considered.
Chapter 2 In chapter 2, in addition to the regional level a central level is intro-
duced into the basic tax competition model. The rationale for this extension is to
analyze whether the ineﬃciency of decentralized capital taxation can be oﬀset by
providing unconditional grants to the regions. In contrast to the existing literature
the issue is tackled in a federal system with capital taxation at the lower and labor
taxation at the upper levels of government. The analysis allows for Nash behavior
at both levels of government and for Stackelberg behavior by the regional or central
government.
Chapter 3 In chapter 3 the eﬃciency eﬀects of tax coordination are discussed.
Two forms of tax coordination are considered. First, capital taxation still occurs
at the regional level. In this case, tax coordination is modeled by a coordinated
increase in the capital tax rate. Special attention is paid to capital tax coordination
among regions with diﬀerent preferences for public goods since this institutional
setting is largely unexplored. Second, capital taxes are reassigned to a central gov-
ernment. However, following Oates (1972) the central level is imperfectly informed
about regional preferences for local public goods and, thus, tax coordination may
be restricted by asymmetric information. Additionally, tax coordination takes place
under full and no commitment by the central government. In particular, the latter
assumption on commitment has not received much attention in the literature on
public ﬁnance in federal systems thus far.
The main results are summarized at the end of each chapter and some conclud-
ing remarks are presented at the end of the study.
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Chapter 1
Tax Competition Model
In this chapter, the basic capital tax competition model is presented. The model is
static as it is the perceived distortionary character of source-based capital taxation
which is of interest in the subsequent analysis. This eﬀect in turn can already be
analyzed within the simpler static framework.1 The chapter is organized as follows.
Section 1.1 develops the model. This is done in a rigorous fashion as the analysis
in the subsequent chapters employs the same standard tax competition model as a
point of departure. Extensions of the basic framework are presented in section 1.2.
Subsection 1.2.1 explores the implication of capital tax competition if, besides a
source-based capital tax, a labor tax is available to the local government. More-
over, the assumption of symmetric regions is dropped in subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3.
Speciﬁcally, regions are allowed to be asymmetric in two respects. First, regions
diﬀer with respect to their factor endowment in subsection 1.2.2. Additionally, the
impact of preference diﬀerences among regions on capital tax competition is con-
sidered in subsection 1.2.3. Finally, the basic tax competition model is extended
by allowing for household mobility in addition to capital mobility. This analysis is
presented in subsection 1.2.4. Section 1.3 summarizes the main theoretical ﬁndings
of this chapter.
1For an analysis of tax competition models in a two-period framework see, e.g. Gordon (1986),
Razin and Sadka (1991), Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), and Hoyt and Toma (1991). Tax com-
petition models in continuous time are presented, e.g., in Razin and Yuen (1999) and Wildasin
(1999). See also Dixit (1985) for an overview on tax policy in open economies.
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1.1 Basic Model
The basic capital tax competition model, as modeled in Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) and Wilson (1986), consists of n symmetric regions. Due to perfect capital
mobility and the restriction to a source-based capital tax, all regions are engaged in
capital tax competition.2 However, before turning to the implications of capital tax
competition for the eﬃciency of resource allocation, the private and public sector of
the economy have to be modeled ﬁrst.
1.1.1 Private Sector
The private sector of each region is given by a representative household and a rep-
resentative ﬁrm.
Household Households derive utility of the consumption of a private good c and
a public good g. Preferences are given by the concave utility function u = u(c, g),
which exhibits positive and declining marginal utility ∂u/∂c ≡ uc and ∂u/∂g ≡ ug,
respectively.3 Private consumption is equal to the household’s income I, which can
be decomposed into capital and non-capital income. Due to the static character of
the model and, hence, the absence of a savings decision, capital supply is exogenously
determined at the level k˜. The household receives a rate of return on capital given
by r. In addition to capital income the second source of income is due to the supply
of a ﬁxed factor and is denoted by If . The ﬁxed factor may be land or an exogenous
labor supply. Therefore, total income is given by
I = If + rk˜. (1.1)
In this simple framework the household has no decision variable at hand as (i) factor
supply is ﬁxed, (ii) public goods are provided by the local government, and (iii)
total income can only be spent on one private consumption good. For this reason, a
household’s optimization problem does not have to be solved and the direct utility
function coincides with the indirect utility function.
Firm Output x is produced using capital and the ﬁxed factor as inputs. The
production function is given by x = f(k, l) where k denotes capital input and l
2Capital tax competition in the presence of imperfect capital mobility is presented in Lee (1997).
3In all subsequent chapters partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts.
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the ﬁxed factor. The technology exhibits constant returns to scale, is concave, and
possesses the usual properties: ∂f/∂k ≡ fk > 0, ∂f/∂l ≡ fl > 0, ∂2f/∂k2 ≡ fkk < 0,
∂2f/∂l2 ≡ fll < 0, and ∂2f/∂k∂l = ∂2f/∂l∂k ≡ fkl. The regional government
imposes a source-based capital tax at a rate t. Therefore, the producer price of
capital is the sum of the interest rate r and the tax rate t. The price per unit of
the ﬁxed factor employed in production is w. The ﬁrm chooses input levels in order
to maximize proﬁt π. Thus, the proﬁt maximizing input choices can be derived by
solving
max
k,l
π = f(k, l)− (r + t)k − wl, (1.2)
which yields the ﬁrst order conditions
(k) : fk = r + t and (l) : fl = w. (1.3)
Eq. (1.3) implicitly deﬁnes capital demand k and ﬁxed factor demand l as a function
of r + t and w.
Market equilibrium In this simple economy there are n ﬁxed factor markets
and, due to perfect capital mobility, one world capital market. Equilibrium in na-
tional ﬁxed factor markets is determined by the ﬁxed factor demand function and
the ﬁxed factor supply. Therefore, in these markets a change in ﬁxed factor demand
only leads to an adjustment of the price w. By construction, the equilibrium quan-
tity, however, is unaﬀected.
Regions supply their capital stock in the world capital market which is allocated
across regions according to the return on capital. Perfect capital mobility and ar-
bitrage behavior implies that in equilibrium capital earns the same rate of return r
in each country. As countries are endowed with the same amount of capital k˜, total
capital supply is nk˜. Thus, the capital market equilibrium is characterized by the
capital market clearing condition
nk˜ =
n∑
i=1
ki, (1.4)
where national capital demand ki is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition
f ik = r + t
i, i = 1, . . . , n. (1.5)
The characterization of the capital market equilibrium does not require national
ﬁxed factor markets. Thus, the national ﬁxed factor market clearing condition and
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the ﬁrst-order condition fl = w can be neglected. As noted above the equilibrium
amount is exogenous and identical in all countries. Hence, diﬀerences in the marginal
productivity of capital, f ik, can only be attributed to diﬀerent national tax rates, t
i,
and not to the ﬁxed factor.
For the subsequent analysis it is necessary to derive the impact of a single region’s
marginal increase in the capital tax rate on the international allocation of capital
and the world interest rate r. The response of r, ki, and kj due to a marginal
increase in the tax rate ti can be obtained by diﬀerentiating Eqs. (1.4) and (1.5)
with respect to r, ki, kj and ti.
In what follows attention is conﬁned to symmetric equilibria, i.e. ki = kj and
f ikk = f
j
kk. Hence, the responses are given by
∂ki
∂ti
=
n− 1
n
1
fkk
, i = 1, . . . , n (1.6)
∂kj
∂ti
= − 1
n
1
fkk
, i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j (1.7)
∂r
∂ti
= − 1
n
, i = 1, . . . , n (1.8)
(for a derivation see appendix A.1 at the end of this chapter). The equations reveal
that the capital reaction and the interest rate reaction depend on the total number
of regions n. For the subsequent analysis it proves useful to illustrate the inﬂuence
of n on the slope of the reaction functions in more detail. Starting with Eq. (1.8),
n = 1 implies ∂r
∂ti
= −1. In an economy with only one region the source-based capital
tax base is identical to capital endowment k˜. By assumption the regional capital
stock is ﬁxed and, hence, cannot react to capital taxation. Therefore, the ﬁrm is
able to shift the whole tax burden on the household by raising the interest rate pro-
portionally to the rise in the capital tax rate. However, for a ﬁnite n and n ≥ 2, the
source-based capital tax base may diﬀer from the region’s capital endowment. Now,
the capital supplier can react to the region’s capital tax rate by allocating its capital
endowment to foreign regions with a more favorable tax treatment. Put diﬀerently,
a rise in the capital tax rate above the level of other regions causes an outﬂow of
capital. The ﬁrm is no longer able to shift the total tax burden on the household.
Therefore, if n is ﬁnite and n ≥ 2, Eq. (1.8) implies −1 < ∂r
∂ti
< 0. If n → ∞, the
change in the world interest rate approaches zero, i.e. ∂r
∂ti
→ 0. This reﬂects the
fact that regions are small relative to the rest of the world and, consequently, have
no market power. From the perspective of each region the region’s capital supply
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function is inﬁnitely elastic. Hence, the region’s tax policy no longer exerts any
inﬂuence on the world interest rate.
The impact of the number of regions on the response of capital demand to tax
rate changes can analogously be derived. For n = 1 Eq. (1.6) reduces to ∂k
i
∂ti
= 0.
However, for larger values of n, ∂k
i
∂ti
rises in absolute terms. That is, the higher the
number of regions n the more intense capital demand reacts to a marginal increase
in the capital tax rate. The response becomes greatest in absolute terms for n→∞.
In this case ∂k
i
∂ti
approaches 1
fkk
.
The magnitude of ∂k
i
∂ti
is inversely related to the magnitude of ∂r
∂ti
. Recall, if n = 1,
capital employment ki equals capital endowment k˜. Consequently, capital demand
does not react to a change in tax policy. ∂r
∂ti
in turn becomes largest in absolute
terms. With n > 1 the region is no longer a closed economy. Capital employment re-
acts to tax rate changes. With an increasing n the response of ∂k
i
∂ti
increases whereas
the reaction of ∂r
∂ti
becomes smaller reﬂecting reduced market power.
1.1.2 Government
In this subsection it is analyzed how regional governments choose their policy vari-
ables and how the policy outcome can be characterized in terms of eﬃciency. The
ﬁrst part of the subsection is devoted to the derivation of eﬃciency conditions
whereas the second part characterizes the eﬃciency of decentralized government
behavior.
Eﬃciency Due to the ﬁxity of the immobile factor and the absence of a savings
decision the international allocation of capital is the only endogenous factor alloca-
tion which can be evaluated in terms of eﬃciency. An eﬃcient allocation of capital
is achieved if a reallocation of capital cannot increase the sum of national output.
Hence, the eﬃciency condition for the international allocation of capital is given by
f ik = f
j
k , i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j. (1.9)
An illustration of condition (1.9) is provided in ﬁgure 1.1. The ﬁgure shows the
world capital market equilibrium for the case n = 2. The horizontal axis depicts the
amount of capital employed in region 1. The highest value k1 can take is the world
capital supply 2k˜. Graphically, capital input in region 2 is thus given by the dif-
ference between the equilibrium level of k1 (any given point on the horizontal axis)
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and 2k˜. For simplicity, the marginal productivity of capital curves, f ik, are assumed
to be linear. First, an economy without capital taxation is considered. In this case,
the capital market equilibrium, characterized by Eqs. (1.4) and (1.5), is given by
point A, where the marginal productivity of capital curves intersect. The resulting
regional capital choice is k10 and k
2
0, respectively. Moreover, due to the symmetry
assumption capital input in both regions is identical k10 = k
2
0 and the world capital
interest rate is r0. In this equilibrium the eﬃciency condition for the international
allocation of capital is fulﬁlled, i.e. a reallocation of capital between regions cannot
increase the sum of regional output which is given by the area E0k10A+H(2k˜)k
2
0A.
Now, consider a situation in which capital is only taxed in region 1. Equivalently,
one could allow for capital taxation in both regions with t1 > t2. The net-of-tax
marginal capital productivity curve, which is relevant for capital demand in region
1, is given by f 1k − t1. As implied by conditions (1.4) and (1.5) the capital market
equilibrium is at point B. Capital input in region 1 decreases from k10 to k
1
1 and,
correspondingly, k2 increases by the same amount. Due to capital taxation in region
1 the marginal productivity of capital in regions 1 and 2 are not equated in the
equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, f 1k > f
2
k which enables an increase in world output by
reallocating capital from region 2 to region 1 until f 1k = f
2
k . To see this graphically,
note that the change of the interregional capital allocation reduces output in region
1 by the area CAk10k
1
1 and increases output in region 2 by the area BAk
1
0k
1
1. The
resulting loss of world output is illustrated by the triangle ABC.
As a second point of reference, the allocation of national output between private
and public goods is characterized in terms of eﬃciency. The condition for an eﬃ-
cient allocation of private and public goods is given by the well-known Samuelson
rule. In its general form the Samuelson rule states that the sum of the marginal
rates of substitution between private and public goods over all individuals should
be equal to the marginal rate of transformation between private and public goods.
In the basic tax competition model local governments provide a local public good
which is solely consumed by the representative consumer. Additionally, by assump-
tion, the national output can be transformed on a one-to-one basis either in a private
or a public good. Therefore, the Samuelson rule adjusted to the model under con-
sideration is simply
ug
uc
= 1. (1.10)
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Figure 1.1: Interregional capital allocation with symmetric regions.
Decentralized Government Behavior After having characterized the ﬁrst-best
allocation, this paragraph analyzes whether decentralized government behavior fol-
lows the eﬃciency rules presented above. Therefore, ﬁrst the government’s decision
problem is presented and in a second step, it is solved for the optimal decentralized
tax and expenditure policy.
Local governments are assumed to be benevolent. Due to the assumption of a sin-
gle household the government’s objective function reduces to the utility function of
the representative household. The government is restricted to source-based capital
taxation. Local tax revenues tk are recycled by providing a local public good g.4
Thus, the budget constraint is given by5
tk = g. (1.11)
Private consumption c equals household’s income given by Eq. (1.1). To analyze
how private income is determined in general equilibrium the wage rate w is written
as a function of the regional capital choice. Applying the euler theorem and using
4See also Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) for a model with public input provision. Keen and
Marchand (1997) present a model with both public consumption good and public input provision.
Redistribution and capital taxation is considered in Lo´pez, Marchand, and Pestieau (1998).
5As long as no confusion can occur the regional superscipt is omitted.
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Eq. (1.3) the wage rate can be rewritten as w = f(k) − fkk. Therefore, private
consumption is given by
c = f(k)− fkk + rk˜, (1.12)
where the ﬁxed factor supply is normalized to unity and the private good is chosen
as a nume´raire. The local government sets t and, thereby, g by taking the reaction
of regional capital employment and the world interest rate into account. These
reactions are given by Eqs. (1.6) and (1.8). However, it behaves as a Nash competitor
towards other regions, i.e. it takes the policy choices of other regions as given. Using
this information the optimization problem can be stated as follows
max
t
u
(
f(k)− fkk + rk˜, tk
)
subject to Eqs. (1.6) and (1.8). Diﬀerentiating the objective function (1.13) with
respect to t yields6
(t) : uc
(
−fkk ∂k
∂t
k +
∂r
∂t
k˜
)
+ ug
(
k + t
∂k
∂t
)
= 0. (1.13)
The ﬁrst bracketed term reﬂects the change in private consumption due to a marginal
increase in t. In general, the capital tax rate aﬀects private consumption in two ways.
First, a marginal increase in t drives out capital (∂k
∂t
< 0) and, thereby, reduces the
productivity of the ﬁxed factor. Consequently, the ﬁxed factor income is decreased.
Second, if the country is suﬃciently large a higher t lowers the world interest rate
(∂r
∂t
< 0). Hence, in addition to the reduction of the ﬁxed factor income, the second
source of income is reduced as well. The second bracketed term describes how tax
revenues are aﬀected by a marginal tax increase. On the one hand, local tax revenues
increase as t is increased. But on the other hand, the tax base erodes due to an
outﬂow of capital which decreases tax revenues. Note, at an interior optimum the
ﬁrst eﬀects must dominate the latter. Otherwise, an increase in t lowers private
consumption as well as tax revenues. In this case it is optimal to set t = 0.
Since each region behaves in the manner described above all regions choose the same
tax rate and local public spending. In equilibrium the regional capital allocation is
6In the basic capital tax competition model the capital tax rate, t, rather than local public
spending, g, is used as a strategic variable. For an analysis of expenditure competition models
see, e.g., Bayindir Upmann (1998) (public infrastructure as a strategic variable) and Hindriks
(1999) (transfers as strategic variables). An endogenous choice of strategic variables is provided in
Wildasin (1991).
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not changed and regional capital input equals regional capital endowment. Hence,
in a symmetric equilibrium (k = k˜)7 the ﬁrst-order condition (1.13) reduces to
(t) : uc
(
(−fkk ∂k
∂t
+
∂r
∂t
)k
)
+ ug
(
k + t
∂k
∂t
)
= 0, (1.14)
which can be simpliﬁed by using Eqs. (1.6) and (1.8). This yields
uc (−k) + ug
(
k + t
∂k
∂t
)
= 0. (1.15)
Rearranging the terms yields the familiar expression
ug
uc
=
1
1 + k,t
with k,t :=
∂k
∂t
t
k
< 0. (1.16)
Eq. (1.16) reveals that the marginal rate of substitution is equated to the term
1/(1 + k,t). The term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (1.16) reﬂects the marginal costs the
local government faces if it decides to raise an additional unit of tax revenues (to be
more precise a marginal increase in tax revenues). Therefore, this term is referred
to as the marginal costs of public funds (henceforth MCPF). The costs the local
government faces can be decomposed into two parts. The ﬁrst part consists of the
pure resource reallocation cost from the private sector to the public sector which
is given by the marginal rate of transformation. This is reﬂected by the term 1 in
the denominator of the MCPF. The second part refers to the distortionary eﬀect of
source-based capital taxation as perceived by the local government. This is given
by the price elasticity of regional capital demand k,t. More precisely, starting from
an interregional tax diﬀerential of 0 the local government perceives an outﬂow of
capital in response to a marginal increase in the capital tax rate. From the per-
spective of each region the perceived outﬂow of capital is a cost component which
is taken into account when deciding on the optimal level of t. Thus, the MCPF ex-
ceeds unity. The local decision maker increases t and, thereby, g until the marginal
rate of substitution equals the MCPF as perceived by the region. Consequently, the
7In all chapters the existence, uniqueness, and stability of a Nash equilibrium is assumed.
These assumptions are a standard feature in tax competition literature. Without existence of
a Nash equilibrium the analysis of tax competition would be of no use. Furthermore, all three
assumptions are necessary for any meaningful comparative static analysis. Note, in an environment
with symmetric regions, the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium imply a symmetric
equilibrium. A more detailed analysis of Nash equilibria in tax competition models is given in
Wildasin (1988) and Koch and Schulze (1998).
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Figure 1.2: Capital taxation in a small open economy.
marginal rate of substitution exceeds unity. Local public goods are underprovided.8
In contrast, if capital taxation is not distortionary, e.g. capital is immobile or a
residence-based capital tax is available, k,t = 0. In this case, the MCPF coincides
with the marginal rate of transformation and capital taxation is only a resource
reallocation process from the private sector to the public sector. This main result
of the capital tax competition literature is summarized in proposition 1.1.
Proposition 1.1: If the regional government is restricted to use a source-based
capital tax, local public goods are underprovided.
The line of reasoning underlying proposition 1.1 is depicted in ﬁgure 1.2. Con-
sider a small open region (n→∞) which does not initially tax capital. With t = 0
the price of capital equals the interest rate r0. Capital input is thus given by k0.
Fixed factor income amounts to the area CJE and capital income is represented
by the area CEk00. From the perspective of a small open region the introduction
of a capital tax rate t leaves the world interest rate unaﬀected. The price of capi-
tal rises by exactly the capital tax rate. Now, capital input reduces to k1 and the
8The marginal cost of public funds can also fall below unity due to foreign ownership of ﬁrms
[see Huizinga and Nielsen (1997)].
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perceived capital income of the representative household is still given by r0k˜. How-
ever, due to the outﬂow of capital the ﬁxed factor income decreases by the area
ABEC. The area ABDC is turned into capital tax revenues. In contrast, the area
BDE is the perceived excess burden of capital taxation which results in a MCPF
exceeding unity. For this reason the level of local public goods is ineﬃciently low in
equilibrium. As noted above, each region behaves in the same way and regards the
source-based capital tax as distortionary. That is, all regions choose the same tax
rate and, consequently, the world interest rate decreases by t. After the introduction
of the capital tax the interest rate is given by r1 = r0 − t. The equilibrium capital
allocation is unaltered and a loss of ﬁxed factor income does not occur. In contrast,
since r0 − r1 = t, capital tax revenues fall on capital income, i.e. (r0 − r1)k˜ = tk0.
Thus, the excess burden of capital taxation is only perceived by regions and does
not exist in a symmetric equilibrium.
1.2 Model Extensions
In this section, the basic tax competition model is extended in diﬀerent ways. In
subsection 1.2.1 the set of tax instruments is extended whereas in subsections 1.2.2
and 1.2.3 the assumption of asymmetric regions is dropped. Finally, subsection 1.2.4
introduces household mobility.
1.2.1 Multiple Tax Instruments
In the basic capital tax competition model the regional government is restricted
to a source-based capital tax. Other distortionary taxes are not available. This
section extends the basic model with respect to the set of tax instruments available
to the government. First, a wage tax is introduced. Second, the capital tax policy
is brieﬂy analyzed if, besides a source-based capital tax, a residence-based capital
tax is available.
Wage Tax Suppose a wage tax is considered in the basic capital tax competition
model with labor as the ﬁxed factor. Due to exogenous labor supply the wage tax
is a lump-sum tax and it is optimal to collect all tax revenues on the inelastically
supplied labor. In this case local public good provision is eﬃcient. Bucovetsky
and Wilson (1991) extend the analysis by allowing for a wage tax in the presence
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of an endogenous labor supply decision. The introduction of a wage tax modiﬁes
the basic model in the following way. The household preferences are now given
by u = u(c, ) + b(g) with  as the amount of leisure enjoyed by the household.
This variable is endogenous and, hence, is chosen to maximize the utility of the
representative household. The labor supply L is given by L = 1−  where the time
endowment of the household is normalized to unity. Therefore, the optimization
problem is changed to
max
L
u(c, 1− L) + b(g) (1.17)
subject to the budget constraint
L(w − τ) + rk˜ = c. (1.18)
The problem can be stated as follows
max
L
L = u(L(w − τ) + rk˜, 1− L) + b(g). (1.19)
The optimal labor-leisure choice is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
(L) : uc(w − τ)− uL = 0 (1.20)
which implicitly determines the labor supply function L(w − τ, r). Due to the
assumed additive structure of preferences local public good provision g does not
aﬀect the labor-leisure choice. In contrast, a general formulation of preferences,
u = u(c, 1−L, g), would imply a public expenditure eﬀect on labor supply. In most
of the tax competition literature this eﬀect is excluded by appropriate speciﬁcation
of preferences.9
The reaction of labor supply to a change in the net wage can be derived by using
the Slutsky equation. In general, the sign of the reaction can be negative as well as
positive depending on whether or not the income eﬀect (if leisure is normal) domi-
nates the substitution eﬀect. The optimization procedure yields the indirect utility
function v(t, τ) + b(g).
Before the optimal tax system can be derived labor demand and the labor market
have to be introduced. Labor demand l(w, r + t) is given by the proﬁt maximizing
9See, e.g., Fuest and Huber (1999). In contrast, Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) use a more
general formulation of preferences by assuming weak separability between private commodities
and public consumption. However, note the subsequent results are not modiﬁed if weak instead of
additive separability is assumed.
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behavior of the representative ﬁrm. In contrast to the basic tax competition model,
capital demand is given by the ﬁrst-order condition for capital fk = r + t as well
as the ﬁrst-order condition for labor fl = w. In the basic model the ﬁrst-order
condition fk = r + t is only relevant since, with a ﬁxed labor supply, equilibrium
labor employment cannot react to changes in the wage rate and, hence, can be
omitted when deriving the impact of the tax policy on capital demand. However,
with an endogenous labor-leisure choice both ﬁrst-order conditions determine how
factor demand reacts to diﬀerent tax policies. Additionally, the labor market clear-
ing condition l(w, r + t) = L(w − τ, r) and the capital market clearing condition
nk˜ =
∑n
i=1 k
i imply that both the wage rate w and the interest rate r are aﬀected
by t and τ .
The government’s optimization problem is thus given by
max
t,τ
v[w(r + t)− τ, r] + b
{(
t
k
l
(r + t) + τ
)
L[w(r + t)− τ, r]
}
(1.21)
subject to r = r(t, τ). The optimal tax policy is summarized in proposition 1.2.
Proposition 1.2: If the number of countries n is ﬁnite, both labor and capital
tax instruments are used in equilibrium, i.e. t > 0 and τ > 0. However, if n→∞,
τ is strictly positive and t = 0.
Proof: See appendix A.2.
Proposition 1.2 is the static equivalent to proposition 1 in Bucovetsky and Wil-
son (1991) which is derived in a two-period setting. Both assertions in proposition
1.2 have a straightforward explanation. A ﬁnite n corresponds to the case of a large
open economy. For given capital tax rates of other regions a change in the capital
tax rate of one region aﬀects the world interest rate. Therefore, each region faces
a ﬁnitely elastic capital supply. Additionally, labor supply is also ﬁnitely elastic.
Consequently, if n is ﬁnite, it is optimal for the region’s government to equate the
distortions arising from both tax instruments. This behavior results in strictly pos-
itive equilibrium tax rates t and τ .
However, if n is inﬁnite, no region possesses market power in the world capital mar-
ket. Each region faces an inﬁnitely elastic capital supply. In contrast, the elasticity
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of labor supply is still ﬁnite. Hence, for each single region optimality requires to set
the source-based capital tax to 0 and to ﬁnance local public good provision by labor
income taxation.
The above outlined extension introduces a second source of ineﬃciency. In the
basic tax competition model local public goods are ineﬃciently provided. However,
the use of the labor income tax distorts the labor-leisure choice. Hence, in equilib-
rium local public good provision as well as labor supply are distorted. The existence
of the second distortion has striking implications for the eﬃciency of the tax system.
To verify this, recall that eﬃciency requires the collection of all tax revenues on the
inelastically supplied capital and to set τ = 0. In the case of a small open economy
the source-based capital tax is not used at all and all tax revenues are collected on
the elastically supplied labor. Therefore, an inﬁnite n implies an even lower tax rate
t, though starting from the basic tax competition model the capital tax rate should
be increased rather than decreased.
As shown in the previous section capital mobility exerts a downward pressure on the
source-based capital tax. However, the labor tax rate does not remain unaﬀected by
capital mobility. The inﬂuence of capital mobility on the choice of the labor tax rate
can best be illustrated if the government is restricted to use the labor income tax,
i.e. t ≡ 0. With this modiﬁcation the regional government’s optimization problem
becomes
max
τ
v(w(r)− τ, r) + b(τL(w − τ, r)) (1.22)
subject to r = r(τ). Thus, local public good provision can be characterized by
bg
uc
=
1
1 + η − ηs dw
dr
dr
dτ
(1.23)
=
1
1 + η︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:a
−η
s
n
dw
dr
κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:b
(1.24)
with
η := − ∂L
∂(w − τ)
τ
L
, ηs := − ∂L
s
∂(w − τ)
τ
Ls
< 0 and κ < 0. (1.25)
(For a derivation see appendix A.3 at the end of this chapter.) η denotes the elas-
ticity of Marshallian labor supply with respect to τ . ηs refers to the elasticity of
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Hicksian labor supply with respect to τ . The former can be positive as well as
negative whereas the latter is unambiguously negative. To identify the inﬂuence of
capital mobility on the choice of τ , note that the term a in Eq. (1.24) describes the
inﬂuence of labor taxation on labor supply irrespective of the number of regions.
Speciﬁcally, η reﬂects the change in labor supply in response to an increase in τ for
given gross wage w. This term is well known from Atkinson and Stern (1974).10
It represents the marginal cost of public funds for the case of labor income taxa-
tion and ﬁxed factor prices, w and r. The marginal cost of public funds with ﬁxed
factor prices 1
1+η
exceeds unity if Lw−τ > 0. Under this assumption an increase in
τ reduces labor supply and, hence, the tax base. The erosion of the tax base due
to distortionary taxation enters the government’s decision on g. It results in an
ineﬃciently low provision of local public goods according to bg
uc
= 1
1+η
> 1 which is
referred to as the Atkinson-Stern rule.11
This eﬀect is already known from source-based capital taxation. But, the crucial
diﬀerence between source-based capital taxation with symmetric regions and labor
income taxation is that in the former case the reduction in the tax base is only
perceived and does not occur in equilibrium. In the latter case the equilibrium tax
base is reduced.
The impact of a tax induced change in w on labor supply is given by the term
b in Eq. (1.24) which in turn depends on the number of regions n. As κ < 0, dw
dr
< 0
and ηs < 0, the term b is positive. Thus, both terms have an opposite impact on the
marginal cost of public funds. Additionally, observe that the term b is decreasing in
n.
At ﬁrst sight it seems surprising that the number of regions enter the second term.
Labor is immobile and, therefore, the labor income tax is expected to aﬀect the out-
come of the regional labor market irrespective of the number of regions. However,
all labor markets are linked through capital mobility. Labor income taxation in one
region aﬀects the labor market in other regions through interregional reallocation of
10For a textbook treatment of the Atkinson-Stern rule see Myles (1995). Public good provision
with distortionary taxation is also considered in Wildasin (1984), Kaplow (1998), and Browning
and Liu (1998).
11To demonstrate the importance of the assumption Lw−τ > 0 for the result derived above,
consider the case in which leisure is a Giﬀen good, i.e. Lw−τ < 0. Now, an increase in τ has a
positive eﬀect on labor supply. Labor income tax revenues rise as both the tax base and the tax
rate are higher. In this case the marginal cost of public funds is driven below unity and local public
goods are overprovided.
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mobile capital.
A more detailed insight on the role of capital mobility for labor income taxation
can be obtained by considering the case of a closed economy ﬁrst. A closed economy
is given if n = 1. If Lw−τ > 0, an increase in τ reduces labor supply. Consequently,
the marginal productivity of capital is lowered which results in a decrease in the
capital market interest rate r. As shown in appendix A.2, the factor price frontier,
dw
dr
, is negatively sloped. Hence, the equilibrium wage rate increases which counter-
acts the negative inﬂuence of the increased wage tax on labor supply. In sum, the
burden of labor income taxation can partially be shifted on the factor capital.
An open economy corresponds to n > 1. Relative to the case of a closed economy,
the term b decreases and, therefore, the positive eﬀect of labor income taxation on
local public good provision is reduced. This is due to the limiting inﬂuence of capital
mobility on the ability to shift the burden of labor income taxation on capital. More
speciﬁcally, if 1 < n < ∞, i.e. each region is a large open economy, an increase in
τ reduces labor supply. In contrast to a closed economy, the reduced labor supply
not only decreases the interest rate r but also implies higher wages. It also leads
to an outﬂow of capital which, in turn, lowers the marginal productivity of labor
(fkl > 0). This has a negative eﬀect on the wage rate. Hence, the introduction of
capital mobility leads to a decrease in r and to an outﬂow of capital in response to
a higher labor income tax rate. The latter eﬀect is responsible for the diminishing
impact of the term b on local public good provision.
If n→∞, i.e. each region is a small open economy, the region can no longer inﬂu-
ence the interest rate r. A rise in τ still reduces labor supply. However, the reduced
marginal productivity of capital and, hence, lower capital demand, does not result
in a lower r and, consequently, in higher wages. Therefore, the increase in w induced
by a decrease in r, which is present under capital immobility, does not exist from
the perspective of a small open economy. The only capital market response to a
higher τ is an outﬂow of capital. Accordingly, the counteracting eﬀect due to the
endogeneity of the wage rate vanishes in the case of a small open economy. This
is represented by the fact that −ηs
n
dw
dr
κ → 0 if n → ∞. Now, the marginal cost of
public funds coincides with the Atkinson-Stern rule under ﬁxed factor prices.
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However, the ﬁxity of factor prices is only perceived by the government. Recall,
in a symmetric equilibrium capital employment equals capital endowment. The
world interest rate r is lowered and, consequently, the wage rate w is increased.
Thus, the equilibrium marginal cost of public funds is given by the expression for
the marginal cost of public funds which applies in a closed economy, i.e. it is given
by Eq. (1.24) for n = 1.
In sum, the positive eﬀect of labor income taxation on the marginal cost of public
funds, given by the term b in Eq. (1.24), decreases in response to a rise in n. There-
fore, starting from a closed economy the labor income tax rate is negatively related
to the number of regions n. Hence, despite the absence of a source-based capital
tax, the mobility of capital has a negative inﬂuence on the tax rate τ and, thus, on
local public good provision.
Residence-Based Capital Tax Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) also consider the
case of a residence-based capital tax instead of a wage tax. However, the case is not
of interest in this setting for two reasons. First, in the absence of a savings decision
a residence-based capital tax is a lump-sum tax. The solution of the optimal tax
problem is trivial.12 Second, as noted in the introduction, a residence-based capital
tax is excluded from the analysis due to the lack of information of foreign-source
capital income necessary for implementation.
1.2.2 Asymmetric Regions: Factor Endowment Diﬀerences
Up to now, it is assumed that regions are symmetric, i.e. regions are identical in
all respects. With this assumption equilibrium ﬁscal policy is identical across re-
gions. The main analytical results from the basic symmetric tax competition model
is that regions underprovide local public goods when competing for mobile capital.
However, given by the symmetric tax policy, the interregional allocation of capital is
eﬃcient. It is interesting to analyze whether these ﬁndings are robust with respect
to the relaxation of the symmetry assumption. In general, there are multiple pos-
sibilities of dropping the symmetry assumption. One approach would be to model
tax competition across regions with diﬀerent factor endowments. Another approach
12For a general discussion of the eﬃciency properties of the source-based and residence-based
capital tax system see Mintz and Tulkens (1996).
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of introducing asymmetric tax competition would be to allow for interregional taste
diﬀerences for local public goods.
The literature on asymmetric tax competition has largely focused on the former
modeling approach.13 Bucovetsky (1991) considers the case of a tax competition
game played between regions of diﬀerent size whereas size diﬀerences are modeled
by a diﬀerent labor endowment. However, the analysis is restricted to the case of
a quadratic production function. Wilson (1991) extends the analysis to the case of
a neoclassical production function which underlies the symmetric tax competition
literature.14 As the results signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those derived in the symmetric
case the main results and their intuition are presented below.
The Model The analysis is restricted to an economy consisting of two regions.
Each region is endowed with a ﬁxed amount of households Li which supply one
unit of labor. Per capita capital endowment k := k˜
i
Li
is assumed to be identical
across regions. k˜i denotes the region’s capital endowment. The household’s budget
constraint changes to c = w − rk. Firms use labor li and capital ki to produce a
homogeneous good using a constant returns to scale production technology f(ki, li).
Implied by the constant returns to scale property the production technology can
be rewritten in per-capita form F (Ki) where K := k
i
li
. Again, proﬁt maximization
gives F ′(Ki) = r + ti. Therefore, per-capita consumption and local public good
provision are given by
ci = F (Ki)− F ′(Ki)Ki + rk and gi = tiliKi, i = 1, 2. (1.26)
Households derive utility of ci and gi according to the preference function u(ci, gi).
The capital market clearing condition now becomes
l1k + l2k = l1K1 + l2K2, (1.27)
13Only in the commodity tax competition literature are interregional taste diﬀerences considered.
See, e.g., Mintz and Tulkens (1986), De Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990), and Hauﬂer (1996).
14Hwang and Choe (1995) extend the analysis in Wilson (1991) by allowing for interregional
labor and capital endowment diﬀerences. Arnold and Fuest (1999) also analyze asymmetric tax
competition due to factor endowment diﬀerences. However, in their setting the government pro-
vides public inputs rather than public consumption goods.
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where the labor market clearing condition Li = li has already been inserted. Com-
parative static analysis yields
∂Ki
∂ti
=
li
l2F ′′(K1) + l1F ′′(K2)
, i = 1, 2 (1.28)
∂r
∂ti
=
−liF ′′(Kj)
l2F ′′(K1) + l1F ′′(K2)
, i = 1, 2, i = j. (1.29)
Eqs. (1.28) and (1.29) reveal that labor endowment inﬂuences the reaction of capital
demand and the interest rate to a change in the source-based capital tax rate. The
dependence of ∂K
i
∂ti
and ∂r
∂ti
on labor endowment is the driving force for the results
derived below.
Government The government’s optimization problem becomes
max
ti
u
(
F (Ki)− F ′(Ki)Ki + rk, tiliKi
)
i = 1, 2 (1.30)
subject to Ki = Ki(ti) and r = r(ti). Diﬀerentiation with respect to ti gives
(ti) : uc
(
−F ′′(Ki)∂K
i
∂ti
Ki +
∂r
∂ti
k
)
+ ug
(
Ki + ti
∂Ki
∂ti
)
= 0 i = 1, 2. (1.31)
Using Eq. (1.28) and rearranging simpliﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition to
Li
uig
uic
=
1 + (1− k
Ki
) ∂r
∂ti
1 + ε
with ε :=
∂Ki
∂ti
ti
Ki
i = 1, 2. (1.32)
The numerator on the r.h.s. of Eq. (1.32) reﬂects the change in private consumption
ci resulting from a marginal increase in ti whereas the denominator refers to the
change in tax revenues in response to an increase in ti. Hence, the ratio describes
how much consumption a region must sacriﬁce in order to raise one additional unit
of tax revenues. In an optimum, the marginal cost of public funds are equated to
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution, Li
uig
uic
.15
The optimality condition (1.32) provides insight into the main diﬀerence between
symmetric and asymmetric tax competition games. With symmetric tax competi-
tion, i.e. L1 = L2 = L and, hence, Ki = k, the bracketed term in the numerator
15Since the number of households residing in a region is greater unity, the marginal rates of
substitution have to be summed up over all Li households in order to characterize local public
good provision in terms of eﬃciency. Given by the assumption of homogeneous households, the
sum simpliﬁes to Li u
i
g
uic
.
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in Eq. (1.32) becomes 0. Local public good provision can thus be characterized by
Lug
uc
= 1
1+ε
. This condition is identical to the condition derived in the last section,
except for the fact that L is normalized to unity in the basic tax competition model.
However, if regions are asymmetrically endowed with labor, i.e. L1 = L2, the brack-
eted term in the numerator on the r.h.s. of Eq. (1.32) does not vanish. Depending
on whether the bracketed term is positive, negative or 0, the marginal cost of public
funds decreases, increases or is unchanged relative to the symmetric outcome. This,
in turn, depends on the magnitude of the ratio k
Ki
.
The magnitude of the ratio k
Ki
is determined by the size of the region Li as well as
by the tax rates (t1, t2). Throughout the rest of the subsection it is assumed that
L1 > L2. For this reason, region 1 (2) is referred to as the large (small) region.
Intuition for the equilibrium sign of the tax diﬀerential t1 − t2 can be gained by
returning to the slopes of the reaction functions given by Eqs. (1.28) and (1.29).
The denominator of Eq. (1.28) is identical for both regions. However, the larger the
numerator of ∂K
i
∂ti
the larger Li. As L1 > L2, the perceived reaction of capital em-
ployment to a change in the capital tax rate must be larger in absolute value in the
small region. Put diﬀerently, the small region perceives a higher outﬂow of capital
when marginally raising t2 than the large region. This implies a lower increase in
tax revenues and a lower denominator in Eq. (1.32).
As given by Eq. (1.29) the change in the interest rate is also aﬀected by the size
of the region. Starting from the situation k = ki the anticipated reduction in r is
lower in the small region relative to the reaction in the large region. Therefore, the
large region has more market power. It can shift a huger fraction of the capital tax
burden on the other region by being better able to inﬂuence the interest rate. In
sum, the perceived marginal cost of public funds in the larger region is lower than in
the small region. Hence, the large region has more incentives to increase the capital
tax rate. In contrast, the small region perceives a relative high outﬂow of capital
when raising the tax rate. As shown by Wilson (1991), these eﬀects are responsible
for the large region choosing a strictly higher tax rate than the small region, i.e.
t1 > t2.16
The increased market power of the large region seems to be an advantage of the
16A formal proof of this result is given in Wilson (1991), prop. 2, p. 433.
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large region. However, the ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization imply
f ′(k1)− t1 = r = f ′(k2)− t2. (1.33)
As t1 > t2 the marginal productivity of capital in the large region must be higher
than in the small region, i.e. f ′(k1) > f ′(k2). The assumption of a diminishing
marginal productivity of capital gives k1 < k < k2. Hence, in equilibrium, per capita
capital employment in the small region exceeds per capita capital employment in
the large region. The capital import increases private as well as public consumption.
The small region is better oﬀ in equilibrium than the large region though the large
region possesses more market power.17 The result shows that a higher market power
does not imply a more favorable market allocation for the corresponding region. A
diﬀerent result has been derived in the tariﬀ war literature [see e.g. Kennan and
Riezman (1988)]. In the tariﬀ war literature the larger region is better able to ma-
nipulate the terms of trade in its favor and can improve its welfare. However, as
shown above, the beneﬁt of largeness disappears in the tax competition framework.18
DePater and Myers (1994) identify an additional eﬀect which leads to ineﬃciency
once one allows for asymmetric regions. If a region raises its capital tax rate, the
net-of-tax return to capital r decreases. This not only reduces capital income in the
same region but, due to capital mobility, lowers capital income in other regions as
well. However, the latter eﬀect is not accounted for when raising the capital tax rate,
but aﬀects the well-being of residents in other regions.19 If regions are symmetric,
this eﬀect does not play a role in a symmetric equilibrium. More precisely, suppose
a system of n identical regions where n is ﬁnite, i.e. regions are large enough to in-
ﬂuence r. A rise in the capital tax rate in region i implies a reduction in the capital
income in region i by ∂r
∂ti
k˜ and in the other regions by (n− 1) ∂r
∂ti
k˜. Only the former
eﬀect is part of the region i’s optimization problem. As all regions are identical in
all respects, the same is done by all regions. Hence, from the perspective of region
i the eﬀect of its tax rate decision on other regions and the eﬀect of the tax rate
17This conclusion is formally proved in Wilson (1991), prop. 1, p. 430.
18Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999) show that in the case of tax competition for direct investments
larger regions are better oﬀ than smaller regions if transaction costs are zero.
19This eﬀect is mediated via the price system. For this reason the eﬀect is referred to as a
pecuniary externality.
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decision of all other regions on region i is given by
(n− 1) ∂r
∂ti
k˜ =
n∑
j=1
i=j
∂r
∂tj
k˜ (1.34)
= (n− 1) ∂r
∂tj
k˜. (1.35)
Consequently, in a symmetric equilibrium both eﬀects cancel each other. Thus, with
symmetric capital tax competition this eﬀect is of no concern. However, with asym-
metric regions does Eq. (1.34) not hold. For this reason, asymmetric tax competition
produces an additional eﬀect that has to be corrected if an eﬃcient allocation is to
be achieved. In contrast to the aforementioned capital reallocation in response to
a capital tax rate increase, this eﬀect is not only perceived. It is an equilibrium
phenomenon.20
1.2.3 Asymmetric Regions: Taste Diﬀerences
In this subsection, asymmetry across regions is modeled by taste diﬀerences for local
public goods. Hence, in contrast to the existing literature on asymmetric tax compe-
tition, regions do not diﬀer with respect to their factor endowments and, thus, with
respect to their inﬂuence on the world interest rate. Here, the asymmetry is modeled
by a diﬀerent marginal rate of substitution between private and public consump-
tion. The subsequent analysis shows that in a high preference region local public
goods are always underprovided. However, local public good provision in low pref-
erence regions is ambiguous. Speciﬁcally, local public goods can be underprovided,
overprovided and eﬃciently provided.
TheModel The economy consists of two regions which are identical in all respects
except of their preferences for local public goods. The preferences are given by
ui(ci, gi), i = h, l. The asymmetry between both regions is represented by
uhg
uhc
>
ulg
ulc
. (1.36)
Eq 1.36 states that, for a given allocation (c, g), the marginal rate of substitution
between c and g is higher in the h-type region than in the l-type region. This implies
20Note, in the absence of symmetric regions the negative interest rate externality is counteracted
by a wage rate externality since the regional wage rate is increasing in foreign capital tax rates.
Thus, the magnitude of both types of externalities determine the sign of the overall pecuniary
externality.
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a high (low) preference for the local public good in a h(l)-type region. The regions
are endowed with a capital stock k˜ and a ﬁxed factor, e.g. land.
Each region produces a homogeneous good with a constant return to scale technology
f(k) using capital k and the ﬁxed factor as inputs.21 Output can be used on a one-
to-one basis either for private or public consumption. Proﬁt maximization implies
a capital demand characterized by
f ′(ki) = r + ti, i = h, l, (1.37)
where r is the interest rate and ti > 0 the source-based capital tax rate in region i.
Hence, the region’s private consumption is given by
ci = f(ki)− f ′(ki)ki + rk˜, i = h, l. (1.38)
The region’s government recycles the capital tax revenues by providing a local public
good gi = tiki. Other tax instruments are not available to the government.
Capital is mobile between both regions. The capital market equilibrium is charac-
terized by the capital market clearing condition kh + kl = 2k˜ and the ﬁrst-order
condition (1.37). This implies
∂ki
∂ti
=
1
f ′′(kh) + f ′′(kl)
and
∂r
∂ti
=
−f ′′(kj)
f ′′(kh) + f ′′(kl)
, i, j = h, l, i = j. (1.39)
Government In this paragraph the policy outcome of decentralized source-based
capital taxation in the h- and l-type regions is derived.
The regions’ optimization problem is as follows
max
ti
ui(f(ki)− f ′(ki)ki + rk˜, tiki), i = h, l. (1.40)
The ﬁrst-order condition for ti is
(ti) : uic
(
−f ′′(ki)∂k
i
∂ti
ki +
∂r
∂ti
k˜
)
+ uig
(
ti
∂ki
∂ti
+ ki
)
= 0, i = h, l. (1.41)
Inserting Eq. (1.39) in the ﬁrst-order condition yields
uig
uic
=
f ′′(ki)ki + f ′′(kj)k˜
ti + ki(f ′′(kh) + f ′′(kl))
, i, j = h, l, i = j. (1.42)
21For simplicity, the ﬁxed factor is omitted from the notation.
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To be better able to compare the outcome of symmetric tax competition with the
outcome of asymmetric tax competition it is useful to rewrite Eq. (1.42) as follows
uig
uic
=
1
1 + ki,ti
+
f ′′(kj)δi
ti + ki[f ′′(ki) + f ′′(kj)]
, (1.43)
with
ki,ti :=
∂ki
∂ti
ti
ki
and δi := k˜ − ki, j, i = h, l, i = j. (1.44)
The ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (1.43) is already well known from the analy-
sis of symmetric tax competition. It reﬂects the impact of the perceived outﬂow
of capital in response to an increase in the source-based capital tax rate on local
public good provision. Recall, with symmetric tax competition the outﬂow of cap-
ital is only perceived since, in a symmetric equilibrium, capital employment equals
capital endowment. However, with asymmetric tax competition this may no longer
be the case. The inﬂuence of the asymmetry between both regions on local public
good provision is summarized by the second term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (1.43). The
sign of the term is given by the sign of δi.22 δi measures the magnitude of capital
reallocation between regions and is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between capital endow-
ment and capital employment. A positive δi indicates a capital export of region i
whereas a negative δi indicates a capital import. Hence, the impact of asymmetric
tax competition on local public good provision depends on whether the region under
consideration is a capital exporter or capital importer. In capital exporting regions
the marginal cost of public funds increases relative to the outcome of symmetric tax
competition. As already noted, with symmetric tax competition no capital reallo-
cation occurs in equilibrium. Now, with a positive δi, the outﬂow of capital is not
only perceived by the region’s government. It also occurs in equilibrium.
In contrast, in the case of a capital importing region the second term on the r.h.s.
of Eq. (1.43) becomes negative. Consequently, the marginal cost of public funds is
22To see this, multiply the numerator and denominator of the second term by ∂ki/∂ti =
1/[f ′′(ki) + f ′′(kj)]. This yields
f ′′(kj)δi
ti + ki[f ′′(ki) + f ′′(kj)]
=
f ′′(kj)δi
f ′′(ki)+f ′′(kj)
ti ∂k
i
∂ti + k
i
. (1.45)
By the optimizing behavior of governments, i.e. k
i
ti ∂k
i
∂ti
+ki
> 1, the denominator on the r.h.s. of
Eq. (1.45) is positive. Therefore, the sign of the second term of Eq. (1.43) is determined by the
sign of δi.
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lowered due to the asymmetry of regions.
Eq. (1.43) reveals that the eﬃciency of local public good provision depends on the
interregional capital allocation which in turn depends on the tax diﬀerential th− tl.
The following implication for the sign of the tax diﬀerential th − tl can be derived.
Lemma 1.1: In a tax competition equilibrium th is strictly larger than tl, i.e.
th > tl.
Proof: The proof is done by contradiction. Note, both regions play Nash, i.e.
they choose a best-response for given tax rate of the other region. Formally, let
ti∗i∈{h,l} =argmax{ui(ti, tj)}, i = j. Hence,
ui(ti∗, tj∗) ≥ ui(ti, tj∗), i, j = h, l, i = j. (1.46)
Thus, the Nash equilibrium implies
ui(ci, gi) ≥ ui(cj, gj), i, j = h, l, i = j, (1.47)
where ci = ci(ti∗, tj∗) and gi = gi(ti∗, tj∗). The proof proceeds in two steps. First,
tl∗ = th∗ is ruled out as an equilibrium solution. In a second step, tl∗ > th∗ is proved
to be incompatible with a Nash equilibrium.
If tl∗ = th∗, it follows that kh = kl, ch = cl and gh = gl. Consequently, the r.h.s. of
Eq. (1.42) is identical for both regions. However, this contradicts Eq. (1.36). Thus,
tl∗ = th∗.
If th∗ < tl∗, kh > kl and ch > cl. Additionally, Eq. (1.47) requires gh < gl. However,
implied by Eq. (1.36) this allocation violates Eq. (1.47) at least for one type of re-
gion. Hence, th∗ > tl∗. This completes the proof. ✷
The assumption necessary for lemma 1.1 is that a Nash equilibrium exists. In
contrast to Wilson (1991) and Hwang and Choe (1995) lemma 1.1 does not require
the best response functions implicitly deﬁned by Eq. (1.42) to be continuous. Ad-
ditionally, with taste diﬀerences instead of endowment diﬀerences the interregional
tax diﬀerential th− tl can be signed in an easier way as in Wilson (1991) and Hwang
and Choe (1995).
Two clarifying remarks concerning lemma 1.1 are helpful. The ﬁrst remark refers
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Figure 1.3: Asymmetric tax competition: tax rate structure.
to Eq. (1.47) which states that a Nash equilibrium is incentive compatible. To
see that Eq. (1.47) follows from Eq. (1.46) suppose the equilibrium tax rates are
given by th∗ and tl∗. If Eq. (1.47) does not hold for both types of regions, i.e.
uh(ch, gh) < uh(cl, gl) and ul(cl, gl) < ul(ch, gh), both regions have an incentive to
change their tax rate choices. Each region can attain its more preferred allocation
by simply adopting the tax rate of the other type of region. Thus, th∗ and tl∗ do not
constitute a Nash equilibrium which violates the initial assumption.
The second remark refers to the assertion of lemma 1.1 that th < tl is incom-
patible with Eq. (1.47) and Eq. (1.36). This point is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.3 with
private consumption c on the vertical axis and the amount of local public goods on
the horizontal axis. As depicted in ﬁgure 1.3 the indiﬀerence curves of the two types
of regions intersect only once. This property is implied by Eq. (1.36). For this rea-
son Eq. (1.36) is usually referred to as the single-crossing property. The allocations
(ch, gh) and (cl, gl) correspond to th < tl. To see this, note ch > cl follows directly
from the negative tax diﬀerential. In contrast, gh < gl is implied by the negative tax
diﬀerential and Eq. (1.47). The inequality gh ≥ gl would imply ul(cl, gl) < ul(ch, gh).
In this case, th < tl cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium.
By construction, both allocations lie on the same indiﬀerence curve of the h-type re-
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gion. However, as indiﬀerence curves of both regions intersect only once, the l-type
region strictly prefers (ch, gh) to (cl, gl) which violates Eq. (1.47). A similar line of
reasoning can be applied if (cl, gl) lies in area II or III.
After having characterized the sign of the equilibrium tax diﬀerential, the eﬃciency
of the resulting local public good provision is characterized next. First, the analysis
turns to the h-type region.
Proposition 1.3: Local public goods are underprovided in the h-type region, i.e.
uhg
uhc
> 1.
Proof: Use lemma 1.1, Eq. (1.42), and note that an overprovision and eﬃcient
provision of the local public good requires a negative tax rate th which violates the
nonnegativity constraint for th. ✷
The rationale for this result is straightforward. For a given tax rate tl, a marginal
tax increase in a h-type region leads to an outﬂow of capital. The reduction in the
capital tax base implies a marginal cost of public funds greater unity. Hence, the
capital tax rate is set ineﬃciently low. So far, this result is in line with the existing
literature on tax competition. However, in contrast to the literature on symmetric
tax competition the equilibrium capital allocation is not identical across regions.
As th > tl, kh < k˜. In equilibrium, the h-type region exports capital to the l-type
region. With symmetric tax competition the outﬂow of capital is only perceived and
does not occur in equilibrium, i.e. capital employment equals capital endowment.
The optimal policy in both types of regions is not identical. Rewriting Eq. (1.42)
yields proposition 1.4.
Proposition 1.4: Local public good provision in the l-type region is characterized
by
ulg
ulc


>
=
<

 1 if f ′′(kh)k˜


<
=
>

 f ′′(kh)kl + tl. (1.48)
Analogous to the h-type region the government in the l-type region perceives an
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Figure 1.4: Asymmetric tax competition: policy outcome.
outﬂow of capital when increasing tl for a given th. The marginal cost of public
funds as perceived by the l-type region exceeds unity. Hence, the tax rate tl is set
ineﬃciently low. However, the crucial diﬀerence between both types of regions is
that the l-type region imports capital, i.e. k˜ < kl, which increases capital tax rev-
enues tlkl. The inﬂux of capital counteracts the eﬀect of the ineﬃciently low capital
tax rate on local public good provision. Therefore, three cases can be distinguished:
(i) the tax rate eﬀect dominates resulting in an underprovision of gl, (ii) the tax rate
eﬀect and the capital import eﬀect nullify each other; consequently, gl is eﬃciently
provided, and (iii) the capital import eﬀect dominates, i.e. gl is overprovided.
These three cases are reﬂected by condition (1.48) in proposition 1.4. For a given
tax rate tl and starting from the situation described in case (i), a higher capital im-
port implies a decrease of the r.h.s of condition (1.48). Hence, for a certain amount
of capital imports the r.h.s. equals the l.h.s. and the ineﬃcient local public good
provision is turned into an eﬃcient provision of gl. Furthermore, a suﬃciently high
capital import implies an overprovision of the local public good.
The eﬃciency of the interregional capital allocation is depicted in ﬁgure 1.4. In the
34
absence of capital taxation the marginal productivity of capital is equalized across
regions. Thus, the interregional capital allocation is eﬃcient. Regional output in the
h-type region and in the l-type region is given by the area EAkh00 and HAk
h
0 (2k˜),
respectively. With capital taxation in both regions the net-of-tax marginal pro-
ductivity curves shift downward. Due to th > tl > 0 the downward shift of the
fhk − th-curve exceeds the reduction in f lk − tl. In the new equilibrium regional out-
put in the h-type region amounts to ECkh10. Correspondingly, regional output in
the l-type region is indicated by HDkh1 (2k˜). Distinct regional capital tax rates yield
an ineﬃcient interregional capital allocation. The reduction in aggregate output
is given by the area CAD which is borne by the h-type region. Furthermore, the
h-type region also bears the l-type region’s beneﬁt of having low preferences for
public goods. The beneﬁt is due to a higher regional output relative to the initial
situation and is reﬂected by the area ADkh1k
h
0 . For this reason, the h-type region’s
reduction in regional output equals the excess burden of distinct capital taxation
plus the increase in regional output in the l-type region.
1.2.4 Household Mobility
Much of the literature on capital tax competition assumes a perfectly immobile pop-
ulation. One implication of this assumption and the exogenous labor-leisure choice
in the basic tax competition model is that labor taxes are lump-sum taxes. With
a labor tax and a source-based capital tax local public good provision follows the
Samuelson Rule. In this case the source-based capital tax is not part of the optimal
tax system. The same holds if a residence-based tax on capital and a source-based
capital tax is available to the government. In the setting of the basic tax competition
model the former is equivalent to a lump-sum tax. The relaxation of the assumption
of an immobile population has striking implications for the eﬃciency of local public
policy. Hence, some of these implications are summarized in this subsection.
Myers (1990) examines the eﬃciency of local public good provision in the pres-
ence of perfect household mobility. In that model, regions are endowed with a ﬁxed
quantity of land and each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor at the
place of residence. Local governments compete for mobile labor by providing a local
public good which is ﬁnanced by a source-based tax on land and a labor tax. Now,
the labor tax is no longer a lump-sum tax as it enters the endogenous location deci-
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sion. However, the source-based land tax (property tax) is nondistortionary as it is
independent of the place of residence. In addition to the available tax instruments,
the regional government can make transfers to other regions.23 The entire popula-
tion is homogeneous and, resides where utility is highest. Migration implies that
equilibrium utility is equalized across regions. The migration equilibrium condition
has an important impact on the outcome of the regional government’s maximization
problem. Intuition for this result can be gained by the following remark. In addition
to the public budget constraint, the regional government is constrained by migra-
tion. Any change in regional public policy induces a relocation of households until
the migration equilibrium condition holds. Myers (1990) shows that in equilibrium
Samuelson levels of local public goods are provided and the population distribution
is eﬃcient.24 This result seems to be surprising because households may leave the
region in response to an unfavorable public policy. Hence, the marginal cost of pub-
lic funds of labor taxation exceed unity. But perfect household mobility implies that
utility maximization in one region carries over to the maximization of utility in all
regions. Consequently, regional optimization is equivalent to a maximization from
the entire economy’s viewpoint. Myers (1990) refers to this eﬀect as “strong incen-
tive equivalence”. The availability of transfers is crucial for this result as voluntary
transfers are made to induce an eﬃcient allocation of households. For this reason,
perfect household mobility is not a source of ineﬃciency for decentralized decision
making as long as transfers are available at the regional level.
Myers’ analysis concentrates on the role of perfect household mobility for the ef-
ﬁciency of local public policy. The analysis does not consider the impact of capital
mobility on local public ﬁnance which is of primary interest in this analysis. Both
capital mobility and household mobility are considered by Wilson (1995), Burbidge
and Myers (1994), and Wellisch (1995).
23The issue of household mobility is also considered by Flatters, Henderson, and Mieszkowski
(1974) and Boadway and Flatters (1982). In contrast to Myers (1990) the local government has no
access to a transfer instrument in both papers. They show that an eﬃcient allocation of households
and an eﬃcient provision of local public goods are incompatible. Thus, they conclude that there
is a need for a federally-mandated transfer system to achieve eﬃciency.
24An eﬃcient distribution of the population requires an equalization of the marginal net beneﬁt of
the population across regions. The condition for an eﬃcient interregional allocation of population
can be rationalized as follows. Since each household supplies one unit of labor l an inﬂow of one
household raises regional output by fl . The additional household not only increases output by fl,
but also consumes a fraction of the additional output denoted by c. Thus, the marginal net beneﬁt
of the population is given by the diﬀerence fl − c.
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The implication of a source-based capital tax in the presence of both household mo-
bility and capital mobility is considered by Burbidge and Myers (1994) and Wellisch
(1995). Burbidge and Myers (1994) adopt the “attachment-to-home-approach” of
Mansoorian and Myers (1993). According to this approach, households have a pref-
erence for a particular region for cultural reasons. Hence, the analysis allows for
diﬀerent degrees of household mobility. Households are endowed with land and
capital, and inelastically supply one unit of labor at the place of residence. They
consider three tax regimes: (i) a source-based tax on land and a residence-based
tax on households (head tax), (ii) the aforementioned two tax instruments plus a
source-based capital tax, and (iii) a source-based capital tax and a head tax. Under
tax regime (i) the Nash equilibrium is eﬃcient. This is not surprising as local public
good provision is ﬁnanced by the nondistortionary land tax. The more interesting
tax regimes are regimes (ii) and (iii) as both include a source-based capital tax.
Burbidge and Myers (1994) show that under tax regime (ii) the Nash equilibrium
is eﬃcient. In contrast, tax regime (iii) results in ineﬃciencies in general.
The model in Wellisch (1995) is very close to the basic tax competition model.
The only diﬀerence between the latter and Wellisch’s analysis is the introduction
of perfect household mobility. In particular, the set of ﬁscal policy instruments
does not include a transfer instrument as in Myers (1990) and public expenditures
have to be ﬁnanced by a source-based capital tax. In this setting Wellisch (1995)
shows that the local public goods are eﬃciently provided. Moreover, the eﬃcient
distribution of the population is realized. In sum, with perfect household mobility
and homogenous population the restriction to a source-based capital tax does not
limit local governments in their attempt to pursue eﬃciency. The reason for this
result is similar to the one in Myers (1990). The migration equilibrium condition
ensures that all eﬀects of decentralized decision making are taken into account when
deciding on the source-based capital tax. Thus, the local government perceives a
migration response in addition to the perceived outﬂow of capital. Both perceived
reactions in response to an increase in the tax rate imply an eﬃcient outcome. The
implication is that there is no ineﬃciency in local public ﬁnance which has to be
corrected, e.g., by a central government.25
25The impact of household mobility on the eﬃciency of decentralized public ﬁnance is addressed
in a variety of other papers as well. See, e.g., Krelove (1993) for an analysis of tax export and
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1.3 Summary
In this chapter, the inﬂuence of capital mobility on local public ﬁnance has been
analyzed. This has been done in the framework of a system of regions which com-
pete for scarce capital. Regions do not just compete for scarce capital to increase
regional production and, therefore, to increase income generated in regional produc-
tion. Since ﬁscal authorities are restricted to source-based capital taxes, a higher
capital employment also results in higher local public good provision and, hence,
regional welfare. A residence-based capital tax is not available to governments.
In the basic tax competition model presented in section 1.1 the analysis has been
restricted to the case of symmetric regions and to source-based capital taxes as the
only tax instrument. Governments choose the capital tax rate for given tax rates of
the other governments. By increasing the capital tax rate, capital leaves the region
and relocates in regions with a higher net return on capital. Governments account
for this eﬀect in their decision-making. The perceived reduction in the tax base
raises the marginal cost of public funds above unity. Optimality in decentralized
decision-making requires to equate the marginal cost of public funds to the marginal
rate of substitution between private and public consumption. Hence, local public
goods are underprovided in equilibrium.
However, the outﬂow of capital is only perceived. Due to the symmetry assumption
all regions choose the same capital tax rate. Thus, the equilibrium is characterized
by a regional capital employment which equals regional capital endowment. No
capital outﬂow occurs in equilibrium.
The basic tax competition model has been extended in several ways. The extensions
can be categorized with respect to the assumption (symmetry assumption, source-
based capital tax as the only tax instrument, and household immobility) which has
been dropped.
The assumption of the limited availability of tax instruments is dropped ﬁrst. The
introduction of a labor income tax requires endogeneizing the labor-leisure choice.
Otherwise, the labor income tax is a lump-sum tax. In this case local public goods
are provided eﬃciently by collecting all tax revenues on the inelastically supplied
factor. In the presence of an endogenous labor-leisure choice the analysis is more
Wrede (1998) for a model with Leviathan governments.
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complex. Both the source-based capital tax and the labor income tax are distor-
tionary from the perspective of a single region. The basic diﬀerence between both
tax instruments is that the former results in no equilibrium factor distortions. The
latter implies a change in the supply of labor and in an equilibrium distortion.
Therefore, from a social point of view the labor tax should not be used. Instead
the source-based capital tax ought to be increased. However, optimal taxation from
the regions’ point of view results in the opposite outcome. With a ﬁnite number of
regions both tax instruments are used. Since regions possess market power they face
a ﬁnite elasticity of capital supply. The optimal tax policy is to equate the perceived
distortions arising from capital taxation to those arising from labor income taxation.
The marginal cost of public funds is still greater unity. Consequently, local public
goods are underprovided. If the number of regions converges to inﬁnity, the capital
tax is not used in equilibrium. Now, regions are small relative to the rest of the
world. They face an inﬁnite elasticity of capital supply. Hence, tax revenues are
only collected on the ﬁnitely elastically supplied labor. However, the tax policy is
the opposite to what social optimality requires. The capital tax rate should be set
to zero instead of setting the labor income tax rate to zero.
The symmetry assumption is dropped in two ways. First, asymmetry is introduced
by allowing for factor endowment diﬀerences. The second approach models asym-
metric regions by introducing taste diﬀerences for local public goods. The analysis
reveals that in both cases the equilibrium interregional capital allocation is ineﬃ-
cient. In general, local public good provision is ineﬃcient as well. Furthermore,
the analysis shows that regions with a lower factor endowment or lower preferences
for local public goods are better oﬀ in equilibrium than regions with higher factor
endowments or preferences for local public goods.
The last section has reviewed the literature on tax competition and household
mobility. With perfect household mobility and capital mobility the restriction to
source-based capital taxation is no barrier for the regional government to achieve
an eﬃcient local public good provision and an eﬃcient interregional population dis-
tribution. The rationale for this result is that the perceived outﬂow of capital in
response to source-based capital taxation is oﬀset by the residence choice of the
population.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Comparative Static Analysis
In this appendix, the comparative static analysis of regional capital employment
ki, i = 1, . . . , n and the world interest rate r with respect to regional tax rates ti,
i = 1, . . . , n is presented. In a ﬁrst step the capital market clearing condition
nk˜ =
n∑
i=1
ki (A.1)
and the ﬁrst-order condition for regional capital demand
f ik = r + t
i i = 1, . . . , n. (A.2)
are diﬀerentiated with respect to ki, r and ti. In matrix form this yields

1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0
f 1kk 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 −1
0 f 2kk 0 . . . . . . . 0 −1
0 0 f 3kk 0 . . 0 −1
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . fnkk −1




dk1
·
·
·
·
dkn
dr


=


0
dt1
·
·
·
·
dtn


Solving for dki and dr by applying Cramer’s Rule gives
∂ki
∂ti
=
∑n
m=1,m=iΠ
n
h=1,h =i,mf
h
kk
Λ
, (A.3)
∂kj
∂ti
= −Π
n
h=1,h =i,jf
h
kk
Λ
, i = j, (A.4)
∂r
∂ti
= −Π
n
h=1,h =if
h
kk
Λ
, (A.5)
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with
Λ :=
n∑
m=1
Πnh=1
fhkk
fmkk
. (A.6)
In the analysis attention is conﬁned to symmetric equilibria, i.e. ki = kj and
f ikk = fkk. Hence, the expressions simplify to
∂ki
∂ti
=
n− 1
n
1
fkk
, i = 1, ..., n, (A.7)
∂kj
∂ti
= − 1
n
1
fkk
, i = 1, ..., n, i = j, (A.8)
∂r
∂ti
= − 1
n
, i = 1, ..., n. (A.9)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
In this part of the appendix the optimal tax policy in a static model is derived if the
government has access to a source-based capital tax and a labor income tax. Before
turning to the government’s optimization problem some results are derived which
are needed to solve the government’s optimal taxation problem.
The ﬁrm’s factor demand is given by the ﬁrst-order conditions
fl = w and fk = r + t. (A.10)
Eq. (A.10) implicitly deﬁnes the factor price frontier w = w(r + t). The constant
returns to scale property of the production technology f(l, k) implies a negatively-
sloped factor price frontier, i.e.
dw
d(r + t)
= −k
l
< 0. (A.11)
By rewriting the production function to f˜(k
l
) and noting, that fk = f˜
′ = r + t, the
change in capital intensity due to a change in r + t can be stated as follows
dk
l
d(r + t)
=
1
f˜ ′′
< 0. (A.12)
Using the Slutsky equation Lr and Lw−τ can be decomposed into the substitution
and income eﬀect
Lsw−τ = Lw−τ + Lc
∂e
∂(w − τ) and L
s
r = Lr + Lc
∂e
∂r
= 0 (A.13)
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with e(w − τ, r, u) as the expenditure function and Ls as the Hicksian labor supply
function. Note, a change in r has an income eﬀect on labor supply. However, a
substitution eﬀect is not present, i.e. Lsr = 0. By the envelope theorem one obtains
∂e
∂r
= −k˜ and ∂e
∂w−τ = −L. Inserting these results in Eq. (A.13), using the fact that
k = k˜ in a symmetric equilibrium, and subtracting both Slutsky equations from
each other one arrives at the expression
kLw−τ − LLr = kLsw−τ . (A.14)
The terms representing the income eﬀects are eliminated and only the terms rep-
resenting the total and the substitution eﬀects enter the expression. Additionally,
observe that the envelope theorem also implies
vw−τ = ucL and vr = uck˜. (A.15)
The capital market clearing condition can be rewritten to
nk˜ =
n∑
i=1
ki
li
(r + t)Li(w(r + t)− τ, r). (A.16)
Diﬀerentiating Eq. (A.16) with respect to r, t, and τ and using Eq. (A.11) gives
dr
dt
= −
d(k/l)
dt
L− (k
l
)2Lw−τ
γ
and
dr
dτ
=
k
l
Lw−τ
γ
(A.17)
with
γ := n
[
d(k/l)
dr
L− k
l
(
Lw−τ
k
l
− Lr
)]
. (A.18)
Now, one can obtain the optimal tax policy. The government’s optimization problem
can be stated as follows
max
t,τ
v[w(r + t)− τ, r] + b
{(
t
k
l
(r + t) + τ
)
L[w(r + t)− τ, r]
}
(A.19)
subject to r = r(t, τ). The ﬁrst-order conditions are
(t) : vw−τ
[
dw
d(r + t)
(
dr
dt
+ 1
)]
+ vr
dr
dt
+ bg
{
L
[
k
l
+ t
dk
l
d(r + t)
(
dr
dt
+ 1
)]
+
(
t
k
l
+ τ
)[
Lw−τ
dw
d(r + t)
(
dr
dt
+ 1
)
+ Lr
dr
dt
]}
= 0 (A.20)
(τ) : vw−τ
[
dw
d(r + t)
dr
dτ
− 1
]
+ vr
dr
dτ
+ bg
{
L
(
t
dk
l
d(r + t)
dr
dτ
+ 1
)
+
(
t
k
l
+ τ
)[
Lw−τ
(
dw
d(r + t)
dr
dτ
− 1
)
+ Lr
dr
dτ
]}
= 0. (A.21)
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Using Eqs. (A.11), (A.15), and (A.17) and subtracting both ﬁrst-order conditions
yields (
t
k
l
+ τ
)(
k
l
Lw−τ − Lr
)
= t
(
−γ + d
k
l
d(r + t)
L
)
. (A.22)
Inserting Eqs. (A.18) and (A.14) gives
τ
k
l
Lsw−τ = t(n− 1)
[
− d
k
l
d(r + t)
L+
k
l
Lsw−τ
]
. (A.23)
Rearranging yields
t
τ
=
k
l
Lsw−τ
(n− 1)
[
− d kl
d(r+t)
L+ k
l
Lsw−τ
] . (A.24)
As Lsw−τ is positive and d
k
l
/d(r + t) is negative the numerator as well as the de-
nominator of the r.h.s. of Eq. (A.24) are positive. Hence, if n is ﬁnite, both tax
instruments are used in equilibrium. However, if n → ∞, the source-based capital
tax is set to 0 and the budget is solely ﬁnanced by the labor income tax.
A.3 Labor Income Taxation
In this part of the appendix the optimal tax policy is derived if the government
only has access to a labor income tax. With the labor income tax τ as the only tax
instrument the optimization problem changes to
max
τ
v (w(r)− τ, r) + b (τL(w − τ, r)) (A.25)
subject to r = r(τ). The ﬁrst-order condition is
(τ) : vw−τ
[
dw
dr
dr
dτ
− 1
]
+ vr
dr
dτ
+ bg
{
L+ τ
[
Lw−τ
(
dw
dr
dr
dτ
− 1
)
+ Lr
dr
dτ
]}
= 0.
(A.26)
Using Eqs. (A.11), (A.14), (A.15) and rearranging yields
bg
uc
=
1
1 + η − ηs dw
dr
dr
dτ
(A.27)
where
η := − ∂L
∂(w − τ)
τ
L
and ηs := − ∂L
s
∂(w − τ)
τ
Ls
< 0. (A.28)
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To identify the inﬂuence of the number of regions n on the level of local public goods
it is useful to rewrite the condition as follows
bg
uc
=
1
1 + η − ηs
n
dw
dr
κ
. (A.29)
Note, by Eqs. (A.14) and (A.17)
dr
dτ
=
1
n
κ (A.30)
with
κ :=
k
l
Lw−τ
d(k/l)
dr
L− k
l
(Lsw−τ
k
l
)
. (A.31)
If Lw−τ > 0, κ is unambiguously negative.
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Chapter 2
Capital Taxation in a Federal
System
In the last chapter, the analysis is restricted to a system of independent regions.
Each unit of government decides independently how much local public goods to
provide and, if multiple taxes are available, which taxes are used in funding public
expenditures. The resulting ineﬃciency in local public good provision is due to the
mobility of the tax base. One objective of this chapter is to provide a systematic
description of the ineﬃciency result. A further objective is to extend the setting
of the previous chapter by allowing for a multi-tier federal state. Speciﬁcally, the
impact of capital mobility on public ﬁnance within a two-tier federal system is ana-
lyzed. Thus, the chapter is organized as follows: after an introduction in section 2.1
the concept of ﬁscal externalities is presented in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Section 2.4
introduces a model of public ﬁnance in a two-tier federal system - a central govern-
ment and two regional governments. In this model capital taxation occurs at the
lower level whereas a labor income tax is assigned to the central level. Section 2.5
summarizes and concludes the chapter.
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the last chapter, capital mobility gives rise to an ineﬃcient decen-
tralized decision making if tax revenues have to be raised by a source-based capital
tax. The obvious intuition for this result is that each regional government acts in-
dependently. It selects a public policy to maximize the utility of its residents and,
thus, acts in the best interest of its residents. However, in choosing the optimal
policy it neglects the impact of its decision on nonresidents. This eﬀect is ignored
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by the regional government resulting in an ineﬃcient capital tax rate.
Gordon (1983) and Wilson (1989) identify the source of this failure as a ﬁscal exter-
nality. To see how the ineﬃciency result relates to externalities, recall that in the
basic tax competition model a rise in the capital tax rate implies a reduction of the
tax base. But the outﬂow of capital is equivalent to an inﬂow of capital and, thus,
a higher tax base in other regions. The capital tax raising region does not account
for this beneﬁcial externality. Consequently, the capital tax rate is ineﬃciently low.
This explanation for the ineﬃciency result in local public ﬁnance is a familiar concept
in economics. In contrast to the “usual” externalities (e.g. environmental external-
ities) ﬁscal externalities only operate among ﬁscal decision units. More precisely,
ﬁscal externalities are due to the behavior of a decision unit not anticipating the
reaction of other ﬁscal decision units when making its decision. To provide a better
understanding of this issue suppose there is a system of two independent regions.
Everything else is assumed to be identical to the structure of the basic tax competi-
tion model. If one region anticipates the reaction of the other region, due to its tax
rate decision, ﬁscal externalities would not arise. It would take into account that a
capital outﬂow corresponds to an inﬂow of capital in the other region which in turn
aﬀects the decision of the other regional government. The illustration reveals that
the existence of ﬁscal externalities crucially depends on the behavioral assumption
underlying public decision making.
As motivated above, optimal taxation within a federal system is closely connected
to the strategic interaction between decision units. A more detailed analysis of
this issue is given in the rest of this section. However, before turning to the issue
of optimal taxation in a federal system the traditional optimal taxation approach
is brieﬂy reviewed with respect to the behavioral assumption of the policy maker.
This is done in the next paragraph. In the second paragraph the optimal taxation
approach is applied to a federal system.
Optimal Taxation The traditional optimal taxation approach seeks to minimize
the overall distortions caused by a tax system.1 The classical problem in the theory
of optimal taxation is to analyze the optimal commodity tax structure if a lump-
sum tax is not available and one good (e.g. leisure) is not taxable.2 In general, the
1See, e.g., Mirrlees (1986) for a survey on the theory of optimal taxation.
2The most known optimality conditions are the Ramsey rule, the Corlett-Hague rule, and the
Inverse-Elasticity rule where the Corlett-Hague rule and the Inverse-Elasticity rule are only special
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distortions in the private agents’ decisions can take diﬀerent forms, e.g. substitution
eﬀects in the labor-leisure choice, substitution eﬀects in the intertemporal consump-
tion choice, or a reduction in the ﬁrms’ investments. The tax planner takes the
eﬀects of the tax system on the private agents’ decisions into account and chooses
the tax rates so as to spread the distortions evenly over all decisions. The optimal
tax system is thus characterized by an equalization of the welfare loss resulting from
the diﬀerent forms of distortions. More precisely, private agents decide for a given
tax system. The tax planner (i.e. the government) knows the reaction functions of
private agents and uses this information when deciding on the tax system. That is,
the government acts as a Stackelberg leader whereas the private agents behave in a
Nash manner. Therefore, these behavioral assumptions ensure that all eﬀects of the
tax system are internalized by the government. Externalities do not arise from the
tax system.
The traditional optimal tax problem either assumes the existence of only one gov-
ernment for all private agents or that the tax decision of one government has no
eﬀect on other governments. Hence, the traditional approach abstracts from any
intergovernmental relations. However, this assumption is not appropriate as nei-
ther only one government exists for all private agents nor, in a world with multiple
governments, intergovernmental eﬀects of national tax systems are negligible.
Optimal Taxation in a Federal System The relaxation of this assumption
leads to the application of the optimal-taxation methodology to ﬁscal federalism
which dates back to Gordon (1983). In general, the optimal taxation approach to
ﬁscal federalism analyzes how a tax system should be designed if, in addition to
private agents within the state, other states and the private agents therein are af-
fected by the tax policy. Consequently, this approach encompasses the traditional
approach to optimal taxation as both the intra- and interregional eﬀects of the
tax policy are subject to optimization. The optimization procedure results in an
optimal federal tax system which serves as a reference for intergovernmental tax
system design. In addition to characterizing the optimal federal tax system, the
optimal taxation approach to ﬁscal federalism aims at identifying ﬁscal external-
ities responsible for a deviation of the implemented tax system from the optimal
tax system. Since Gordon’s contribution, a large amount of literature has evolved
cases of the Ramsey rule; see Mirrlees (1986).
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which deals with the issue of identifying ineﬃciencies in federal policy making. As
mentioned above, the sources of ineﬃciency can be summarized by the concept of
ﬁscal externalities which simply states that not all eﬀects of the region’s tax policy
are internalized. The occurrence of ﬁscal externalities in turn can be traced back
to the behavioral assumption underlying public decision making. More precisely,
ﬁscal externalities result from a dichotomy of behavior. The regional government
anticipates the change in the supply and demand behavior of its residence which is
consistent with the traditional optimal taxation approach. However, the reaction
of other states to a change in tax policy is not anticipated. That is, the region’s
government behaves as a Stackelberg leader towards its residents, but behaves in a
Nash manner towards other regions and their residents.3
In sum, the behavioral assumption of ﬁscal decision units is an important element
in the optimal taxation approach to ﬁscal federalism. In particular, the question
whether the eﬃciency of decentralized source-based capital taxation can be im-
proved in a federal system crucially depends on the behavior of governments at each
level of the federation. For this reason the interaction between ﬁscal externalities
and the above mentioned behavioral assumptions is highlighted in the rest of this
chapter. First, a survey on diﬀerent forms of ﬁscal externalities is presented in the
next subsection, which goes beyond the types of externalities detected in Gordon
(1983).
2.2 Fiscal Externalities: An Overview
In general ﬁscal externalities can take two forms. They can be direct or indirect.
Both forms of ﬁscal externalities are illustrated in ﬁgure 2.1 for the case of a two-tier
federal state with two regions at the lower level. A direct ﬁscal externality occurs
when a change in the government’s ﬁscal policy has an eﬀect on private agents (e.g.
households) of other regions. Policy changes also aﬀect the residents of the same
region. However, this eﬀect is internalized by the regional government. The direct
horizontal ﬁscal eﬀect can be due to a change in the expenditure policy or tax pol-
icy. One example of a direct horizontal ﬁscal externality caused by tax policy is
tax exporting. Tax exporting refers to a situation where a part of a region’s tax
revenue is borne by non-residents. This kind of negative direct ﬁscal externality oc-
3For a general discussion of game-theoretic concepts in the theory of ﬁscal federalism see Pﬁn-
gsten and Wagner (1995).
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Figure 2.1: Fiscal externalities.
curs when taxes are imposed on goods which are exported and tax revenues accrue
to the country of origin. The benevolent government sets the tax rate to maximize
the utility of the residents. Hence, the government has an incentive to impose too
high tax rates as not all negative eﬀects of the tax policy enter the optimization
problem. Put diﬀerently, the private marginal cost of public funds is lower than
the social marginal cost of public funds.4 A detailed analysis of this issue is given,
e.g., in Arnott and Grieson (1981) and Wildasin (1987). In contrast, indirect ﬁscal
externalities occur when the ﬁscal policy of a government aﬀects the ﬁscal policy of
other governments. In general, indirect ﬁscal externalities can be categorized in hor-
izontal ﬁscal externalities and vertical ﬁscal externalities. The distinguishing feature
between both kinds of ﬁscal externalities is that the latter can only occur in federal
states while the existence of the former is not restricted to federal states. Horizon-
tal ﬁscal externalities can even occur between independent states. The nature and
implications of both forms of ﬁscal externalities are presented in the following two
subsections.
4The social marginal cost of public funds encompasses all eﬀects of a marginal increase in the
tax rate. If the government accounts for all eﬀects of its tax rate decision, the private marginal
cost of public funds coincide with the social marginal cost of public funds.
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2.2.1 Horizontal Fiscal Externalities
As mentioned above, horizontal ﬁscal externalities arise on the same level of gov-
ernments. The implications for the government’s decision making are comparable
to those when a direct ﬁscal externality occurs. A benevolent government does not
take all consequences of its decision into account and, therefore, chooses an ineﬃcient
public policy. However, the direction of the distortion depends on the nature of the
horizontal ﬁscal externality. A positive ﬁscal externality implies a higher marginal
cost of public funds as perceived by the government relative to the social marginal
cost of public funds. In this case, the distortion would result in an ineﬃciently low
value of the public policy instrument. A negative ﬁscal externality has the opposite
eﬀect. The perceived marginal cost of public funds is too low compared to the social
marginal cost of public funds. Consequently, the policy instruments are set at an
ineﬃciently high level. The existence of horizontal ﬁscal externalities requires some
form of factor or commodity mobility. Factor or commodity mobility is the mean by
which negative or positive eﬀects of regional ﬁscal policy are transmitted to other
regions. Without any form of mobility regions act in isolation and, consequently,
horizontal ﬁscal externalities cannot arise. Most of the literature dealing with hori-
zontal ﬁscal externalities assumes the tax base itself is mobile and that regions are
engaged in tax competition.5 In these models the precise nature of the horizontal
ﬁscal externality depends on the tax instrument used to compete for a mobile tax
base. Three strands of literature on tax competition have been developed: capi-
tal tax competition with immobile households, labor tax competition with mobile
households, and commodity tax competition.
Capital Mobility As mentioned in the previous section, if a government is re-
stricted to a source-based capital tax it perceives an outﬂow of capital when in-
creasing the tax rate. In addition to the social marginal rate of transformation,
the decline in the capital tax base is seen as a cost component for providing a lo-
cal public good. As a result, local public goods are underprovided. The ineﬃcient
low level of the local public good can be explained by a positive horizontal ﬁscal
5However, the existence of horizontal ﬁscal externalities does not require a mobile tax base.
As shown in the last chapter an immobile, but endogenously determined tax base is suﬃcient for
ﬁscal spillovers to arise. Recall, labor income taxation in the presence of capital mobility implies
a positive horizontal ﬁscal externality. As a consequence, the labor income tax rate is ineﬃciently
low though labor itself is immobile.
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externality. Speciﬁcally, when deciding on the level of the tax rate the government
perceives an outﬂow of capital. However, this leads to an inﬂow of capital in other
regions. Consequently, capital tax revenues rise in regions which enjoy a capital
inﬂow. Therefore, the source of ineﬃciency are externalities which are a familiar ex-
planation concept for ineﬃciencies in the economic literature. Here the externality
takes the form of a positive horizontal ﬁscal externality.
Household Mobility Households are immobile in the basic capital tax compe-
tition model. The introduction of household mobility has striking implications for
the eﬃciency of decentralized public policy. If one allows for perfect household mo-
bility in the basic tax competition model, local public good provision is eﬃcient [see
Wellisch (1995)]. In this setting regions still perceive an outﬂow of capital in response
to a rise in the capital tax rate. However, this does not imply a positive horizontal
ﬁscal externality as in the basic tax competition model. The reason is that migra-
tion takes place until utility is equated across regions. The utility-equalizing eﬀect
of perfect household mobility ensures that a region maximizes utility in all rather
than only in its own region. To put it diﬀerently, the migration equilibrium condi-
tion acts as an internalization scheme. All eﬀects of an increase in the source-based
capital tax are internalized via the migration equilibrium condition. As a conse-
quence, perfect household mobility induces “strong incentive equivalence” among
regions and, thus, with symmetric regions no externalities are associated with the
use of a source-based capital tax.
Commodity Exchange In addition to the tax competition literature on mobile
capital and mobile labor, a third strand of literature on commodity tax competition
has been developed. Mintz and Tulkens (1986) consider a model with two regions
in which each region consists of a representative consumer who consumes a private
good, a public good, and leisure. The private consumption good can be domes-
tically produced or imported from the other region. Households import goods by
cross-border shopping. They incur transportation costs by traveling to the foreign
region. The local government ﬁnances public good provision by a commodity tax.
Interregional commodity exchange is taxed on an origin basis, i.e. a commodity is
taxed where it is produced irrespective of where it is consumed. A labor income
tax is not available to the government. The commodity tax rates are chosen non-
cooperatively as to maximize the utility of representative household.
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In general, two kinds of ﬁscal externalities can occur in this setting. First, an
increase in a region’s tax rate increases the consumer price for the consumption of
the imported commodity. This in turn aﬀects utility of the representative house-
hold in the foreign region in a negative way. The negative direct ﬁscal externalitiy
is referred to as the private consumption eﬀect. Second, a rise in a region’s tax rate
also implies higher tax revenues in the other region and thereby, increases public
good provision.6 This positive indirect horizontal ﬁscal externality is referred to as
the public consumption eﬀect. Both eﬀects work in opposite directions.
Mintz and Tulkens (1986) show that, if cross-border shopping occurs at least in one
region and production occurs in both regions, tax rates are ineﬃciently chosen due
to the existence of ﬁscal externalities.7 As both ﬁscal externalities have an oppo-
site sign it is possible that the tax rates are ineﬃciently low as well as ineﬃciently
high in each of the two regions. The authors show that the case of an ineﬃciently
high tax rate in both regions can be excluded. That is, under the conditions stated
above, it is not possible that the negative ﬁscal externality outweighs the positive
ﬁscal externality in both regions.
Hauﬂer (1998) concludes that in the Mintz-Tulkens setting the case of ineﬃciently
low tax rates in both regions can also be excluded in general. Consequently, in one
region the tax rate is too low whereas the tax rate in the other region is chosen too
high relative to the eﬃcient level. Hence, in the low tax region the positive external-
ity dominates and in the high tax region the negative externality is the dominating
eﬀect.
The diﬀerence between capital tax competition and commodity tax competition as
modeled by Mintz and Tulkens (1986) is that the former allows for the mobility of
the tax base whereas the latter does not allow for an interregional reallocation of
the tax base in response to tax rate changes. With commodity tax competition the
household’s consumption choice react to changes in both states’ tax policy. How-
ever, a reduction of the tax base does not occur. Consequently, both regions do
6More speciﬁcally, an increase in the tax rate may have two eﬀects on production and, therefore,
on the tax base in the foreign region. First, the tax rise implies higher consumption of the imported
commodity. Second, as the consumer in the foreign region faces a higher price for the imported
good consumption of the domestically produced good increases. The total eﬀect of a tax increase
on the consumption of domestically produced commodities in the other region is positive. Hence,
the tax base increases which reﬂects the positive indirect ﬁscal externality [see prop. 2 and 4 in
Mintz and Tulkens (1986)].
7These two restrictions correspond to regime 2 and 3 in Mintz and Tulkens (1986).
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not really compete for a tax base.8 A second diﬀerence between the basic capital
tax competition model and the model considered here is that in the commodity tax
competition approach the indirect horizontal ﬁscal externality occurs in equilibrium
and is not only perceived. 9
Empirical Results While most of the literature on horizontal ﬁscal externalities is
of theoretical nature there are also some empirical studies. Stephenson and Hewett
(1985) analyze the interdependence between motor fuel tax revenues in the U.S.
states of Iowa and Missouri. They ﬁnd that a 1% increase in Missouri’s motor fuel
tax rate causes a 10.8% rise in Iowa’s motor fuel tax revenues. Conversely, the
elasticity of Missouri’s motor fuel tax revenues with respect to Iowa’s motor fuel
tax rate is 14.85%. Both results conﬁrm the theoretical ﬁnding that the tax rate
decision in one region has an impact on other regions due to the mobility of the
tax base (here the mobility of consumers, i.e. cross-border shopping). The positive
eﬀect of a tax rate increase in one region on tax revenues in other regions imply an
overestimation of the marginal cost of public funds if it ignores the ﬁscal interregional
eﬀects. Hence, the empirical result suggests too low motor fuel tax rates in both
states.
Bu¨ttner (1999) deals with the question whether tax competition can be identiﬁed
in local public ﬁnance in Germany. In contrast to the United States and Canada,
there is almost no source for horizontal ﬁscal externalities due to tax rate decisions in
Germany since tax rates are determined at the upper level of government (Bund).
However, one exception is the business tax (Gewerbesteuer) which is assigned to
the lowest level of government (Kommunen). The empirical analysis reveals that
business tax rates are positively related to those of neighboring regions. This result
is in line with the theoretical literature. Moreover, Bu¨ttner (1999) shows that tax
rates are positively related to the population size. Hence, larger regions set higher
tax rates. Again, this result is consistent with the literature on asymmetric tax
competition as well. Recall, as shown by see Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991),
8For this reason, Wilson (1999) ﬁnds it diﬃcult to classify Mintz and Tulkens (1986) as a tax
competition model.
9DeCrombrugghe and Tulkens (1990) and Lockwood (1993) also address commodity tax com-
petition. In particular, see Lockwood (1993) for an analysis of commodity tax competition under
both the origin-based and the destination-based principle.
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asymmetric tax competition implies distinct equilibrium tax rates. Larger regions
possess more market power and, thus, perceive a smaller outﬂow of capital when
raising the tax rate. The marginal cost of public funds are lower and, consequently,
the resulting tax rate is higher.
Accordingly, the empirical literature on interregional tax interdepence conﬁrms the
results derived in the theoretical tax competition literature.10
2.2.2 Vertical Fiscal Externalities
The literature in public ﬁnance has devoted much interest to the analysis of hor-
izontal ﬁscal externalities. However, that is not the only kind of ﬁscal externality
which can arise from expenditure and tax policy. A second type of ﬁscal externali-
ties are vertical ﬁscal externalties. It is only recently that these ﬁscal externalities
have received attention in the public ﬁnance literature. Though the ﬁrst papers
dealing with vertical ﬁscal externalities are Flowers (1988) and Johnson (1988) it is
the paper by Boadway and Keen (1996) and a survey by Dahlby (1996) which have
directed more attention to this type of ﬁscal externality.
Vertical ﬁscal externalities can only occur in a federal system, i.e. in a state with
at least two levels of government. In general, vertical ﬁscal externalities arise if
one level of government neglects the impact its ﬁscal decisions have on ﬁscal policy
of the other levels of government. The ﬁscal decision variables can include public
expenditures as well as tax rates. Most of the following analysis concentrates on tax
rates rather than public expenditures as the policy variable which creates vertical
spillovers. Vertical ﬁscal externalities arising from tax rate decisions can be catego-
rized with respect to its direction and source. An illustration of this categorization
is given in the next two paragraphs.
Direction of Vertical Fiscal Externalities In the case of vertical ﬁscal ex-
ternalities multiple levels of government are simultaneously engaged in tax setting.
Thus, a vertical spillover can go from a lower level to an upper level of government
and vice versa. The former is referred to as bottom-up vertical ﬁscal externality.
Conversely, the latter is called top-down vertical ﬁscal externality. For the eﬃciency
of public decision making the direction of the vertical spillover is irrelevant. Only
10See also Case (1993) for an empirical analysis of tax competition and Fujii, Kahled, and Mak
(1985) for an empirical study on tax export.
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the sign and magnitude of it matter.
Sources of Vertical Fiscal Externalities Vertical spillovers are due to the fact
that both levels of government use the same tax base. The resulting concurrent
taxation can have diﬀerent sources. The most obvious source of vertical ﬁscal ex-
ternalities is a perfect tax base overlap. A perfect tax base overlap is given if more
than one level of government is assigned a tax which is applied to the same tax base.
One prerequisite for perfect tax base overlap to arise is that each layer must have
tax-setting powers. Tax sharing agreements among diﬀerent layers do not cause ver-
tical spillovers. Under this institutional arrangement tax revenues are shared, but
only one layer has tax setting power. For instance, in Germany major tax revenues
such as the income tax, value-added tax, and the corporate tax are shared at least
among the Bund and the La¨nder. However, tax-setting powers are assigned to the
Bund.
This source of vertical ﬁscal externalities has been analyzed by Wrede (1996), Boad-
way and Keen (1996), and Boadway, Marchand, and Vigneault (1996). Wrede (1996)
uses a model where diﬀerent layers of government have access to the same tax base
which in turn is mobile among the member states of the federation. Regions play
Nash. That is, the regional government selects the tax rate for given tax rates of
other regions. If the mobile tax base could not leave the federation, i.e. the tax
base would only be mobile within the federation, vertical ﬁscal externalities would
not occur. From the perspective of the federal layer, the tax base is immobile and,
hence, a federal tax rate change would not change the tax base of the lower layer.
In this case, the federal tax is a lump-sum tax. To introduce vertical ﬁscal external-
ities Wrede (1996) has allowed for the possibility that capital can also be allocated
outside the federation. A natural application of this model is capital tax compe-
tition. With a tax base overlap, decentralized capital taxation leads to a positive
horizontal ﬁscal externality and a negative bottom-up vertical ﬁscal externality as
some capital leaves the federation and, thus, can no longer be taxed by the central
government. Additionally, centralized capital taxation causes a negative top-down
vertical ﬁscal externality. In response to central tax decisions the tax base of the
lower level of governments shrinks which is not taken into account as the upper level
of government plays Nash.
By contrast, Boadway and Keen (1996) and Boadway, Marchand, and Vigneault
(1998) develop a model where both levels of government tax labor income. The
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distinctive feature between these two models and that of Wrede (1996) is that in
the latter the tax base can only react due to the mobility assumption whereas in the
former the tax base reacts due to the mobility as well as an endogenous labor-leisure
choice. The two papers also diﬀer from Wrede (1996) with respect to the behavioral
assumption of the central government. In both papers the central government acts
as a Stackelberg leader. As motivated at the beginning of this chapter this diﬀer-
ence has important implications for the occurrence of ﬁscal externalities. A detailed
description of Boadway and Keen (1996) and Boadway, Marchand, and Vigneault
(1998) is given in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
A diﬀerent source of concurrent taxation is given if two levels of government use
diﬀerent tax bases but taxes paid at one level of government reduce the tax liability
towards the other level of government. In general, this kind of concurrent taxation
can take two forms. First, the tax liability towards one layer can be deducted from
the tax base of the other layer. This is referred to as tax deductibility.11 In the sec-
ond form, the tax liability towards one layer can be subtracted from the tax liability
towards the other level of government. This form of tax treatment is called tax
credit. For instance, the U.S. personal income tax system exhibits this institutional
feature. The personal income tax paid at the state level can be deducted from the
tax base of the federal income tax. Moreover, in some states the federal income tax
can even be deducted from the state income tax (reciprocal tax deductibility).
The deductibility of taxes among diﬀerent layers of government has important im-
plications for the eﬃciency of public decision making in a federal state. Consider
the case of a regional government which chooses its tax policy based on given federal
tax rates. If regional taxes can be deducted from the federal tax the lower level of
government does not account for the impact of its decision on the federal budget.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in regional tax revenues lowers federal tax revenues.
This bottom-up vertical ﬁscal externality is negative in sign. Hence, tax deductibil-
ity lowers the perceived marginal cost of public funds at the regional level.
As vertical tax spillovers are implied by tax law, Keen (1998) refers to both perfect
tax base overlap and tax deductibility as formal concurrency. Additionally, Keen
(1998) distinguishes between formal concurrency and eﬀective concurrency. The
latter is not rooted in tax law. In the case of eﬀective concurrency the source of
11It should be stressed that tax deductibility is not only restricted to a federal system. It can
also occur in a unitary nation.
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the vertical ﬁscal externalities are relative price changes due to a tax decision of one
layer. To state it more precisely, suppose two levels of governments have access to
diﬀerent tax bases. If the lower level of government changes its tax rate, e.g. a labor
tax in the presence of an endogenous labor-leisure choice, equilibrium employment
is changed. In general, this does not leave the upper level budget unaltered. For
instance, if the upper layer taxes proﬁts the tax induced reaction of equilibrium
employment also aﬀects proﬁts. Hence, the tax base of the upper level of govern-
ment reacts to a tax rate change of the lower level of government through general
equilibrium eﬀects (relative price changes). Note, in contrast to tax deductibility
this form of vertical ﬁscal externalities can be negative as well as positive in sign.
Dahlby, Mintz, and Wilson (1999) analyze the interaction between tax deductibility
and vertical ﬁscal externalities through general equilibrium eﬀects.12 They derive
the optimal deductibility rate, i.e. the deductibility rate that neutralizes the ver-
tical spillover. In their setting the federal government anticipates the reaction an
increase in the federal tax rate exerts on the regional budget. The vertical spillover
can be decomposed into a direct eﬀect due to tax deductibility and an indirect eﬀect
arising from general equilibrium eﬀects. The optimal deductibility rate depends on
the sign and magnitude of the change in the federal budget due to a rise in the re-
gional tax rate. Since the direct eﬀect is unambiguously negative, the optimal rate
is determined by the sign and magnitude of the indirect eﬀect. Dahlby, Mintz, and
Wilson (1999) show that if the indirect eﬀect is zero, i.e. besides tax deductibility
the federal budget is unaﬀected by regional tax policy, the optimal deductibility
rate is 0. By setting the rate at 0 no vertical ﬁscal externalities occur. However,
if the indirect eﬀect is negative the federal budget is negatively aﬀected by both
eﬀects. For a given tax assignment the direct eﬀect cannot be altered. However,
because of the endogeneity of the deductibility rate the negative indirect eﬀect can
be counteracted by choosing a negative deductibility rate. Now, the direct eﬀect
becomes positive. The optimal negative rate neutralizes the negative indirect eﬀect.
On the other hand, a positive indirect eﬀect requires a positive deductibility rate.
Speciﬁcally, if the federal tax base increases by less than 1 Euro (due to the indirect
12See also Dahlby and Wilson (1999) for an analysis of this issue. They examine the provision
of productivity enhancing activities in a federal state. In contrast to Dahlby, Mintz, and Wilson
(1999) they conﬁne attention to vertical ﬁscal externalities due to general equilibrium eﬀects and
expenditure externalities.
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eﬀect) in response to a 1 Euro rise in state tax revenues the optimal deductibility
rate is lower than one. A one-to-one relation between a rise in state tax revenues
and the federal tax base calls for a full deductibility of state taxes from the federal
tax base, i.e. the optimal deductibility rate is 1. The positive indirect vertical ﬁscal
externality is neutralized by allowing for a negative direct vertical ﬁscal externality
where the magnitude of the latter is adjusted to that of the former.
Empirical Results Most papers dealing with vertical ﬁscal externalities are the-
oretical in nature. However, there are a few papers which analyze vertical spillovers
empirically.13 Besley and Rosen (1998) analyze consumption tax interdependence
in the U.S. federal system. In the U.S. both the federal and state layers tax gaso-
line and cigarettes. The empirical analysis aims at estimating the magnitude of
the responses of the state gasoline and cigarette tax to federal tax rate increases.
Besley and Rosen (1998) ﬁnd that a 10-cent per gallon increase in the federal tax
rate on gasoline is followed by a 3.2-cent increase in the state tax rate. Additionally,
a 10-cent per pack increase in the federal tax rate on cigarettes implies a 2.7-cent
increase in the state cigarette tax. The responses are found to be statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Both results suggest that there is a strong tax interdependence in the U.S.
consumption tax system.
Esteller-More´ and Sole´-Olle´ (1999) quantify the magnitude of the personal income
tax independence in the U.S. federal system. As outlined before in the U.S. personal
income tax system the state income tax can be deducted from the federal income
tax base. Esteller-More´ and Sole´-Olle´ (1999) also perform an empirical test for the
existence of vertical ﬁscal externalities by estimating the response of the state tax
rate to a rise in the federal income tax rate. They ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant
positive reaction of the state personal income tax rate when the federal government
increases its own income tax rate. More precisely, a 1 point increase in the federal
tax rate leads to an increase of approximately 0.25 points in the state tax rate.
Unfortunately, a decomposition of the total state response into a reaction resulting
from tax deductibility and a reaction arising from general equilibrium eﬀects cannot
be derived in the analysis. This would require a benchmark with either only tax
13Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba (1997), Fullerton and Rogers (1993) provide an empirical
analysis of the impact changes in U.S. federal tax rates have on the economy. However, they
assume constant state tax rates. Hence, these papers are not directed at testing for vertical ﬁscal
externalities.
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deductibility eﬀects or general equilibrium eﬀects. In sum, both Besley and Rosen
(1998) and Esteller-More´ and Sole´-Olle´ (1999) conﬁrm that vertical ﬁscal external-
ities are not only of theoretical interest but also of empirical relevance.
2.3 Boadway and Keen (1996) - ANeutrality Re-
sult
Boadway and Keen (1996) (BK henceforth) provide a systematic analysis of vertical
ﬁscal externalities. The main ﬁnding in BK is that ﬁscal externalities arising from
concurrent labor taxation and household mobility are of no concern if the federal
government acts as a Stackelberg leader. To get a better understanding of the neu-
trality result the model is presented in the remainder of this section. This enables
to draw parallels between the model in BK and a federal setting with source-based
capital taxation at the lower level analyzed in the next section.
In BK the federal government taxes labor income at the rate t and the local govern-
ment at the rate τ . Hence, the total labor income tax amounts to T = t + τ . The
federal government’s budget constraint is nS +G = ntl. G is the level of a national
public good provided by the central government, n is the number of regions within
the federation, l is the employment level, and S denotes an unconditional transfer
which can either go from the federal government to the regions or vice versa. The
local government’s budget constraint is g = τ l + S where g is a local public good
provided by the regional government.
First, attention is restricted to the case of household immobility. With this re-
striction the only household’s endogenous decision is the labor-leisure choice. The
regional government sets τ to maximize the indirect utility function of the represen-
tative household. The upper level’s tax rate decision is taken as given and, thereby,
the impact of its tax decision on federal tax revenues is neglected. The marginal cost
of public funds at the regional level is equated to the marginal rate of substitution
between private income and local public goods. As labor supply is decreased in
response to an increase in τ , a negative bottom-up vertical ﬁscal externality results
from decentralized ﬁscal policy. Hence, the tax rate τ is set too high.
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The federal government chooses t to maximize the indirect utility function of the
representative household.14 In contrast to local governments the federal government
acts as a Stackelberg leader. It takes all eﬀects of its decision into account when
deciding on t. Speciﬁcally, it anticipates the impact of its decisions on regional tax
revenues and the induced change in τ . If labor tax revenues are the only source of
tax revenues for the upper and lower level of government a solution to the federal
optimization problem is to set the tax rate t to 0. With t = 0 federal labor tax
revenues are 0 and the regional ﬁscal decision would not exert a negative eﬀect on
labor tax revenues at the upper level. That is a negative bottom-up vertical ﬁscal
externality does not arise. Federal expenditures are ﬁnanced by a transfer from the
lower to the upper levels of government.
However, this is not a general solution of the model considered in BK since, in
addition to labor, a second input factor is used in production. The second input
factor, e.g. land, is exogenous and immobile. This gives rise to rents which can be
taxed away without causing distortions. In BK these rents are taxed at 100% and
shared among both levels of government. A fraction of θ accrues to the federal level
and the corresponding fraction 1− θ accrues to the regional level. With this modi-
ﬁcation a tax rate t of 0 cannot eliminate vertical ﬁscal externalities. Federal labor
tax revenues are still zero. But the regional choice of τ aﬀects rents and, therefore,
the second source of federal tax revenues. This negative bottom-up vertical ﬁscal
externality is not eliminated by setting t = 0. Now, it is optimal to choose t = 0
and to allow for vertical spillovers on both sources of federal tax revenues. However,
the federal government can still choose t to induce a total labor income tax T which
would be chosen in a unitary nation, i.e. in the absence of vertical ﬁscal externalities.
To see this, consider T ∗ as the total income tax rate chosen in a unitary nation. In
the federal setting of BK the regional government selects an ineﬃciently high τ due
to the existence of negative vertical spillovers. As the total tax rate is the sum of t
and τ , the federal government can mitigate the ineﬃciency in decentralized decision
making by setting t appropriately, i.e. t = T ∗ − τ . Thus, the central government
acting as a Stackelberg leader can implement the same tax policy as in a unitary
14Though the federal labor tax rate t is applied to all n regions the federal government’s objective
function can be restricted to the indirect utility function of the representative household. A welfare
functional with the indirect utility of all regions as arguments is not necessary as regions are not
linked through household mobility or international capital markets.
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nation. To put it diﬀerently, the central government can mitigate the ineﬃciency
caused by the Nash behavior of the regional government.
If labor tax revenues are the only source of tax revenues and t is optimally set
to 0 transfers ﬂow from the regional to the federal budget. However, with two
sources of tax revenues the direction of transfers is ambiguous. As one usually ex-
pects transfers go from the center to the regions. But transfers from the regions to
the center cannot be excluded. The direction of transfers depends on which level of
government has the less distortionary tax instrument at hand. That is, transfers go
from whichever layer has the less distortionary tax instrument to whichever layer
has the more distortionary tax instrument.
So far, only vertical ﬁscal externalities are present in this model. To introduce hori-
zontal ﬁscal externalities the tax base must become mobile. BK allows for horizontal
ﬁscal externalities by introducing perfect household mobility. Now, households can
choose the region where they reside and supply labor and, thus, move to the region
where utility is highest. In a migration equilibrium households’ utility is equalized
across regions. This equilibrium condition is a crucial factor for the eﬃciency of
decentralized decision making. As shown in chapter 1 the utility-equalizing eﬀect
of perfect household mobility ensures that all eﬀects of local decision making are
internalized (“strong incentive equivalence”). Hence, as shown by BK, horizontal
ﬁscal externalities do not arise. The regional optimal policy under household im-
mobility and perfect household mobility coincide and the neutrality result derived
under household immobility applies here as well.
BK modify the model by restricting attention to the case of labor mobility. House-
holds are free to work in any region while remaining residents of the initial region.
The regional labor tax now becomes a source-based labor tax. With this modiﬁ-
cation the interregional net wage diﬀerential rather than the interregional utility
is equalized. Under labor mobility the local governments optimization problem is
similar to that in the basic tax competition model. In addition to the eﬀects under
labor immobility, a rise in the labor tax rate reduces the net wage which leads to
an outﬂow of labor. As a result a positive horizontal ﬁscal externality arises. At
the same time, the ﬁxed factor income decreases. Due to rent sharing this in turn
reduces regional tax revenues (with fraction 1 − θ) and federal tax revenues (with
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fraction θ). The latter eﬀect is not accounted for by the regional government. For
this reason, it constitutes a negative bottom-up vertical ﬁscal externality. Since
both eﬀects are diﬀerent in sign the impact of labor mobility on the regional gov-
ernment’s policy choice depends on which externality dominates. BK show that the
federal government has enough policy instruments to replicate the unitary nation
outcome. The optimal federal policy requires a higher federal labor tax rate t and
a rise in transfers to the regions relative to the optimal federal policy under labor
immobility. This indicates a lower regional labor tax rate τ as T ∗ = τ + t. The
result conﬁrms the ﬁnding in the basic tax competition model that factor mobility
increases the marginal cost of public funds at the regional level which translates
into a lower tax rate relative to factor immobility. Summing up, in the setting of
BK ﬁscal externalities arising from concurrent taxation and from the mobility of the
tax base can be internalized. Crucial for this result is that the federal government
moves ﬁrst.
2.4 Fiscal Externalities: A Model
In this section, a model of federal taxation is presented. The section is structured
as follows. After a literature review in section 2.4.1 the model set-up is introduced
in section 2.4.2. In section 2.4.3 the outcome in a unitary nation is analyzed, which
serves as a benchmark in this section. A two-tier federal system and the policy
outcome under both-sided Nash behavior is presented in section 2.4.4. Section 2.4.5
examines the interaction between the federal and state levels if the federal gov-
ernment can commit to its policy. In section 2.4.6 the direction of commitment is
reversed and the implications for the choice of policy variables are discussed. Finally,
section 2.4.7 includes a summary and conclusion.
2.4.1 Introduction
Following the seminal papers by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986),
a stream of literature has explored the implications of tax competition for public
good provision. In the simplest model with perfectly mobile capital, an immobile
ﬁxed factor, and a restriction on source-based capital taxes, local public goods are
underprovided due to horizontal ﬁscal externalities. In a variety of contributions the
role of the federal government in internalizing ﬁscal externalities has received much
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attention. The idea that a central institution is established to internalize external-
ities is not new in economics (see, e.g., the evolution of international institutions
that deal with environmental problems). Applied to the European Union (EU) this
would imply a potential role for the central level in the EU to internalize ﬁscal ex-
ternalities created by capital tax competition among member states.
In the following paragraphs diﬀerent approaches to capture this idea are presented.
One of the early papers is Gordon (1983). Gordon’s primary objective is to detect
ineﬃciencies that may occur in the decentralized form of public decision-making. In
addition to horizontal ﬁscal externalities other sources of ineﬃciencies are explored
in Gordon (1983) as well. Examples include congestion cost which may change in
one region due to the ﬁscal policy in a neighboring region or public good spillovers.
Although Gordon (1983) introduces a central level when characterizing the fully co-
ordinated policy outcome, the paper does not introduce a federal and regional level
simultaneously. Hence, the interaction between diﬀerent levels of government is not
captured by that analysis.
A diﬀerent paper is Johnson (1988). The paper addresses the question of the ap-
propriate federal level to redistribute income. Common to Gordon (1983), Johnson
(1988) compares the centralized with the decentralized outcome to explore ineﬃ-
ciencies in decentralized redistribution. The paper identiﬁes horizontal and vertical
ﬁscal externalities associated with decentralized redistribution. They are due to
migration responses as well as beneﬁt spillovers. However, also common to Gordon
(1983), the federal level is not explicitly modeled in the analysis. Thus, strategic
interaction in a federal state is not captured in this paper, either.
Smart (1998) examines the inﬂuence of an intergovernmental transfer system on
the eﬃciency of local public ﬁnance. In that paper the federal level is represented
by a transfer formula and, thus, an explicit representation of the federal government
is not part of the model. The paper shows that equalization grants may increase the
tax rate chosen by the regional government. Applied to capital tax competition, the
equalization grant may internalize horizontal ﬁscal externalities and, hence, reduces
the marginal cost of public funds as perceived by regions. Speciﬁcally, in the case
of an unconditional grant, i.e. a grant independent of the level of local public good
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provision, the local policy choice is not aﬀected by the grant. Only with condi-
tional grants, the regional government takes into account how the grant changes in
response to a change in local public policy. As a consequence, the regional tax rate
decision is altered according to the speciﬁcation of the intergovernmental transfer
system.15
Sobel (1997) analyzes the optimal structure of taxation in a federal system. The pa-
per compares the eﬃciency properties of two institutional settings. Under the ﬁrst
institutional setting, tax revenues are collected at the lower level of government.
The second institutional setting is characterized by centralized tax collection. The
characterization of the federal level is restricted to the inability to diﬀerentiate tax
rates across regions. That is, the federal government is assumed to levy uniform
tax rates. While abstracting from horizontal ﬁscal externalities, optimal taxation
calls for decentralized tax collection. It enables governments to set non-uniform tax
rates. Additionally, as pointed out by Sobel (1997), a federal system with multiple
levels of tax setting authorities is non-optimal due to the existence of vertical ﬁscal
externalities. However, Sobel (1997) provides no further formal analysis of this issue.
So far, the cited literature has the common characteristic of a missing federal level.
As shown in section 2.3, Boadway and Keen (1996) explicitly consider a federal
government. The paper demonstrates that the federal government, acting as a ﬁrst
mover, can internalize horizontal and vertical ﬁscal spillovers. Thus, the widely-
accepted argument that a central government is needed to achieve eﬃciency holds
in this setting.
Boadway, Marchand, and Vigneault (1998) extend the analysis of Boadway and Keen
(1996) to the case where redistribution and public good provision is undertaken by
both levels of governments. Decentralized redistribution is subject to ineﬃciencies
due to migration responses of taxpayers and aid recipients. Besides this horizontal
ﬁscal externality, a vertical ﬁscal externality arises as both levels of government use
the same tax base. With this model speciﬁcation the federal level is able to oﬀset
15A further analysis of intergovernmental grant design is given in Wildasin (1989), De Pater and
Myers (1990), and Dahlby (1996). In particular, Wildasin (1989) presents the design of conditional
grants to internalize horizontal ﬁscal externalities arising from capital tax competition. De Pater
and Myers (1990) analyze the grant structure aimed at internalizing pecuniary externalities.
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all ﬁscal externalities. Thus, the result of Boadway and Keen (1996) carries over to
the case of redistribution. Therefore, the analysis shows that redistribution can be
decentralized.16
Sato (2000) extends Boadway and Keen (1996) by allowing for diﬀerent degrees
of household mobility and heterogenous regions. In this extended framework, Sato
(2000) arrives at the same result as Boadway and Keen (1996). Fiscal externalities
can be internalized by a federal government that commits to its policy. That is, a
federally mandated interregional transfer system is suﬃcient to replicate the fully
centralized outcome where, of course, ﬁscal externalities cannot arise. As a result,
full centralization and decentralization in the form of a federal system are equivalent
in the setting considered by Sato (2000). Recall, a special feature of this setting is
that both levels of government use the same tax base.
Common to all papers that explicitly model a federal government is the assumption
of a Stackelberg leadership by the federal government. The state acts as a follower
and chooses its policy for given federal policy. Whether this assumption is appro-
priate is not obvious. There are good reasons to assume that the state is better able
to commit to its own policy. As noted by Keen (1998), states within the Russian
federation are in a better position to commit to their own policy than the federal
government. Additionally, Dahlby (1996) reports that Ontario, as a member of the
Canadian federation, is more likely to be a Stackelberg leader since 40% of fed-
eral tax revenues stem from Ontario. Similarly, in the EU it is highly questionable
whether the central level has the ability to commit to its policy and the member
states take Brussels’ policy choice as given.
The objective of this section is to contrast both assumptions concerning federal-state
interaction.17 The primary intention is to analyze two questions. First, to what ex-
tent does the allocation of public goods depend on the speciﬁcation of federal-state
interaction and second, in what way is the federal ﬁnancial structure determined
16There is one additional paper that considers the interaction between the federal and state level
in a federal system. Dixit and Londregan (1998) examine the choice of redistributive politics in a
federation by modeling the political process leading to diﬀerent politics. The subsequent analysis
abstracts from redistributive and political considerations.
17Persson and Tabellini (1990, 1994a) show that the assumption on commitment is critical to
the welfare eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. However, they analyze the interaction between private agents
and governments.
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by the behavioral assumption? In contrast to the existing literature the analysis
shows that a federal state is not always able to replicate the outcome of a unitary
nation. In particular, the deviation from the unitary nation optimum depends on
the speciﬁcation of federal-state interaction.
The model in this section also diﬀers from the above mentioned literature with
respect to the federal tax assignment. Boadway and Keen (1996), Sato (2000), and
Boadway, Marchand, and Vigneault (1998) consider a model of tax base overlap.
Both levels tax labor income, which creates a vertical and horizontal ﬁscal exter-
nality. In the subsequent analysis, only the upper level of government imposes a
labor income tax. States levy a source-based capital tax and, hence, are engaged in
capital tax competition. The modiﬁcation allows to analyze whether the equivalence
between a fully centralized and a decentralized tax system still holds if both levels of
the federation are assigned diﬀerent rather than the same tax bases. Thereby, this
section addresses the issue whether the result derived in Boadway and Keen (1996),
Sato (2000), and Boadway, Marchand, and Vigneault (1998) is robust to changes in
the tax assignment.18
There is one paper that explicitly models federal-state interaction as a game with
states as Stackelberg leaders. Silva and Caplan (1997) analyze the design of federal
environmental policy to control transboundary pollution. Within their framework
they show that a Stackelberg leadership by states enables an eﬃcient environmental
policy whereas the traditional assumption of Stackelberg leadership by the federal
level results in an ineﬃcient outcome.19
2.4.2 The Model Set-Up
Consider an economy with 2 identical regions. Each state consists of a representative
household and a representative ﬁrm. The representative household derives utility
18Hoyt and Jensen (1996) also consider a model in which states have access to a source-based
capital tax and the federal level taxes labor income. They examine the welfare eﬀects of a com-
mitment by the federal level. However, they do not analyze the speciﬁc nature of the ﬁnancial
structure within the federation and the implications for local public good provision.
19Other papers using a common agency approach are Bernheim and Whinston (1986, 1987),
Dixit (1996), Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997), Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Rama
and Tabellini (1998). However, they concentrate on the interaction between private agents and
the government rather than between diﬀerent levels of government.
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from a private good c, leisure , and a local public good g provided by the state
government. For simplicity we restrict attention to additive-separable preferences
u = c+ h() + b(g), (2.1)
where h(·) and b(·) are strictly increasing and strictly concave. Time endowment is
normalized to unity which implies a labor supply of L = 1−. Some further remarks
concerning the preference structure will be made below. Utility is maximized subject
to the budget constraint
c = If + (w − τ)L+ rk˜, (2.2)
where If is income generated from a ﬁxed and immobile factor (say land), τ is the
labor income tax rate, r is the interest rate, and k˜ the capital endowment of each
state. The labor supply decision is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
(w − τ)− h′ = 0. (2.3)
The additive-separable structure of preferences ensures that no income eﬀect aﬀects
the labor supply decision. Only substitution eﬀects inﬂuence the choice of L. There-
fore, an increase in the net wage rate w− τ leads to an increase in labor supply, i.e.
L′ > 0.
The preference structure is quite restrictive. However, it has been assumed for
two reasons. First, the additive separability of preferences in public consumption
is a necessary condition to exclude vertical ﬁscal externalities. To see this, assume
that preferences are given by u = c+ b(, g). In this case, labor supply depends on
τ and g which in turn depends on τ and t. Hence, L = L(τ, t). In a federal state
with centralized labor taxation and decentralized capital taxation the lower level
choice of t aﬀects the tax base of the upper level. The speciﬁcation of preferences
results in an expenditure externality. Speciﬁcally, there is a bottom-up vertical ﬁscal
externality from which the subsequent analysis abstracts. The second remark refers
to the assumption that preferences are additively separable in private consumption
and leisure. To demonstrate the appropriateness of this assumption consider the
preference structure u = h(c, ) + b(g). For instance, the preference structure is
assumed by Boadway and Keen (1996).20 In this case, labor supply is inﬂuenced
20In Boadway and Keen (1996) the upper level provides a national public good G and the lower
level a local public good g. In their analysis, preferences are given by u = h(c, #) + b(g) + B(G).
Here, the upper level does not provide a national public good. Hence, the corresponding preference
structure for the institutional framework in this analysis is u = h(c, #) + b(g).
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by τ and the level of private consumption which in turn is determined by τ and t.
Therefore, the more general speciﬁcation of preferences imply a bottom-up vertical
ﬁscal externality. However, this type of ﬁscal externality is assumed to be absent
here.
Each state produces a single good with a constant returns to scale technology
f(l, k).21 The representative ﬁrm in each state maximizes proﬁts π = f(l, k) −
wl − (r + t)k with t as the source-based capital tax rate. The proﬁt maximizing
input choices are given by the familiar ﬁrst-order conditions
fl = w, (2.4)
fk = r + t. (2.5)
As mentioned in subsection 2.2.2, besides perfect tax base overlap and tax deductibil-
ity, general equilibrium eﬀects are a source of vertical ﬁscal externalities. Though no
formal concurrency exists, the tax rate choice of one level of government inﬂuences
tax revenues of other levels of government by a change in relative prices. Note, with
flk = 0 factor demand is given by k = k(r + t, w) and l = l(r + t, w), respectively.
Thus, the capital (labor) tax rate inﬂuences labor (capital) demand. As in equilib-
rium labor demand is identical to the labor tax base, tax revenues of other levels
of government are aﬀected by an increase in the capital tax rate t. Hence, flk = 0
causes eﬀective concurrency.
For this reason, flk ≡ 0 in the following analysis. The corresponding factor demand
functions are thus given by l = l(w) and k = k(r + t). The assumption flk ≡ 0
implies a separation of labor and capital demand.
To complete the description of the model the conditions for a factor market equilib-
rium have to be introduced. The capital market equilibrium is given by Eq. (2.5) for
each region and the capital market clearing condition k1 + k2 = 2k˜. The response
of ki to a capital tax increase is given by
∂ki
∂ti
=
1
∆
i = 1, 2, (2.6)
∂ki
∂tj
=
−1
∆
i, j = 1, 2 i = j, (2.7)
21To be precise, the technology exhibits constant returns to scale in all three production factors.
For simplicity, the ﬁxed and immobile factor is omitted from notation.
70
∂r
∂tj
=
−f ikk
∆
i, j = 1, 2 i = j, (2.8)
with ∆ := f 1kk + f
2
kk < 0. (2.9)
Due to the separation of labor and capital demand and the ﬁxity of total capital
supply the equilibrium level of capital employment in region i only reacts to changes
in the capital tax rate ti as well as to changes in the capital tax rate of region j.
The labor income tax τ does not aﬀect capital employment. Top-down vertical ﬁscal
externalities induced by general equilibrium eﬀects are not present in this model.
The labor market equilibrium is characterized by Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4), and the labor
market clearing condition li = Li. Comparative static analysis yields
∂li
∂τ
=
−1
σ
and
∂w
∂τ
=
fll
σ
(2.10)
with σ := −h′′ − fll > 0. (2.11)
The equilibrium level of li is only inﬂuenced by τ . The capital tax rate t does
not aﬀect the labor market. This result is due to the assumption flk ≡ 0, which
separates factor demands, and the additive-separable preferences, which imply L =
L(w − τ). Both sides of the labor market are not aﬀected by t.
In this model a source-based capital tax and a labor income tax is available to the
governments. Both are distortionary. The former is distortionary if capital is taxed
at the lower level of the federal state. The latter distorts the resource allocation due
to the endogeneity of the labor-leisure choice. However, rents are not taxed though
a rent tax is nondistortionary since the ﬁxed factor does not react to a rent tax.22
However, if one allows for rent taxation by the lower level of government the tax
base would be aﬀected by the labor tax decision of the upper level of government.
Hence, vertical ﬁscal externalities would arise. By contrast, rent taxation by the
upper level of government yields an eﬃcient allocation of resources if tax revenues
are suﬃcient to ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best level of g. In this case the optimal taxation
problem becomes trivial.
2.4.3 The Unitary Nation
As a point of reference the optimal policy in a unitary nation is derived ﬁrst. In this
setting the central government has access to a source-based capital tax and a labor
22Boadway and Keen (1996) assume a 100% tax on rents. Recall, besides concurrent labor
taxation, rent taxation and sharing of tax receipts is the reason for the occurrence of vertical ﬁscal
externalities.
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✲✉ ✉
τ, t k1, k2, l1, l2
Figure 2.2: Sequence of decisions: unitary nation.
income tax. The decision sequence is depicted in ﬁgure 2.2. At the ﬁrst stage of
the game the government selects the policy variables anticipating the private agents’
reactions. Private agents make their choices at the second stage of the game. Public
revenues are recycled by providing a local public good g. Hence, the budget con-
straint takes the form g1 + g2 = τ(l1 + l2) + t1k1 + t2k2. The government selects
ti, τ , and gi by maximizing the Benthamite welfare functional u1(·) + u2(·) subject
to the budget constraint.
The optimal policy can be characterized without having to set up the decision prob-
lem and to solve for the optimal policy formally.
Proposition 2.1: In a unitary nation the government provides local public goods
eﬃciently. In equilibrium, the source-based capital tax is levied at a uniform rate
and the labor income tax is set to 0.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The government can induce an
eﬃcient interregional allocation of capital by setting t1 = t2. With uniform capital
taxation the source-based capital tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax which yields
an eﬃcient provision of local public goods, i.e. big = 1. Therefore, it is optimal
to have all tax revenues collected on the inelastic supply of capital and to set the
distortionary labor income tax, τ , to 0.
2.4.4 The Federal State: Nash Behavior
In subsection 2.4.3 the optimal tax policy in a unitary nation has been analyzed. In
this section a second level of government is introduced. From now on it is assumed
that the federal system consists of two layers: the federal level and the state level.
State governments are in a position to impose a source-based capital tax ti. The tax
revenues are recycled by providing a local public good gi. The federal government
provides transfers si which are ﬁnanced by a uniform labor income tax τ . The
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✲✉ ✉
center: τ, s1, s2
regions: t1, t2 k1, k2, l1, l2
Figure 2.3: Sequence of decisions: federal state with both-sided Nash behavior.
decision sequence is depicted in ﬁgure 2.3. At stage 1 of the game both levels
of government choose their policy instruments simultaneously, i.e. they behave as
Nash competitors. Each level of government chooses its policy instruments without
anticipating how the tax and expenditure policy of other public decision units reacts
to its decision. However, they account for the eﬀect of their decisions on the behavior
of private agents. At the second stage of the game private agents decide on k and l
for given policy instruments.
State Government First, the optimization problem at the state level is solved.
The state government sets its policy variables ti, for given si, τ as well as tj, j = i,
to maximize the utility of the representative household. Therefore, the optimization
problem for state 1 is as follows
max
t1
f(k1, l1)− fkk1 − τ l1 + rk˜ + h(1− l1) + b1(t1k1 + s1). (2.12)
The ﬁrst-order condition for t1 is
(t1) : −f 1kkk1t1k1 + rt1 k˜ + b1g(t1k1t1 + k1) = 0. (2.13)
The state government equates the marginal change in private consumption due to
a higher tax rate t1 to the marginal beneﬁt given by an increase in local public
spending. Inserting Eqs. (2.6) and (2.8) yields
b1g =
k1
t1k1t1 + k
1
> 1 (2.14)
=
1
1 + k1t1
with k1,t1 :=
∂k1
∂t1
t1
k1
(2.15)
Due to the distortionary character of source-based capital taxation local public goods
are underprovided. The state’s marginal cost of public funds (r.h.s. of Eq. (2.14);
henceforth SMCPF) is greater than unity as states perceive an outﬂow of capital
if they increase their capital tax rate for a given tax rate of the other state. At
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an optimum the beneﬁts of taxation given by the marginal utility of local public
goods are equated to the costs of taxation represented by the term k1/(k1 + t1k1t1).
The optimization problem of state 2 is identical to that of state 1 and, therefore,
it is not repeated here. The ﬁrst-order condition (2.13) together with the state’s
budget constraint determine the reaction functions t1 = t1(s1, τ) and t2 = t2(s2, τ),
respectively.23
Federal Government Under the assumption of Nash behavior, the federal gov-
ernment’s optimization problem is as follows. For given states’ policy choices (t1, t2)
it solves
max
s1,s2,τ
L = f(k1, l1)− fkk1 − τ l1 + rk˜ + h(1− l1) + b1(t1k1 + s1) (2.16)
+ f(k2, l2)− fkk2 − τ l2 + rk˜ + h(1− l2) + b2(t2k2 + s2) (2.17)
+ µ[s1 + s2 − τ(l1 + l2)]. (2.18)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
(s1) : b1g + µ = 0 (2.19)
(s2) : b2g + µ = 0 (2.20)
(τ) : −l1 − l2 + µ(−l1 − l2 − τ l1τ − τ l2τ ) = 0 (2.21)
which yields
big =
li
li + τ liτ
> 1 i = 1, 2 (2.22)
=
1
1 + ηli,τ
with ηli,τ :=
∂li
∂τ
τ
li
i = 1, 2. (2.23)
The federal government sets transfers and the tax rate as to equate the marginal
rate of substitution to the marginal cost of public funds at the federal level (r.h.s. of
Eq. (2.22); henceforth FMCPF). Labor income taxation induces households to re-
duce their labor supply. Therefore, with an increase in τ the federal tax base shrinks
which is taken into account by the federal policy maker when deciding on its policy
variables.24 The ﬁrst-order conditions give the reaction functions s1 = s1(t1, t2),
23The existence of an interior solution is assumed in all games analyzed in this chapter.
24In the literature, diﬀerent representations of the marginal cost of public funds in the presence
of labor income taxation are discussed. For example, some authors use the compensated labor
supply function or the uncompensated labor supply function for analyzing the marginal cost of
public funds (see e.g. H˚akonsen (1998)). For the preference function used in this section both
measures are identical as the compensated and uncompensated labor supply function coincide.
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s2 = s2(t1, t2), and τ = τ(t1, t2). Let (tN , τN , sN) denote the solution to the system
of reaction functions s1 = s1(t1, t2), s2 = s2(t1, t2), τ = τ(t1, t2), t1 = t1(s1, τ) and
t2 = t2(s2, τ).25
The optimal policy under both-sided Nash behavior has an interesting feature. By
inspection of Eqs. (2.14) and (2.22) one can infer that in equilibrium the SMCPF
is equated to the FMCPF, i.e. the marginal cost of public funds at both levels of
government coincide. This result seems to be in line with optimal taxation the-
ory which implies that distortions have to be equated in a second-best equilibrium.
However, in contrast to the distortion at the federal level the distortion at the state
level is only perceived and does not occur in a symmetric equilibrium. Therefore,
as shown in section 2.4.3, optimal taxation requires setting the labor income tax to
zero and to ﬁnance the budget solely by the capital tax. The result is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2: If governments at the state level and the federal government
decide simultaneously (Nash behavior), both tax instruments are used in a symmet-
ric equilibrium. The marginal cost of public funds at both levels of government are
equated which implies an ineﬃcient provision of local public goods.
As shown in chapter 1 the magnitude of labor taxation is inﬂuenced by capital
mobility. Recall, with interdependent factor markets a rise in τ does not only af-
fect labor supply. The reduction in labor supply reduces the marginal productivity
of capital and, hence, the tax-setting government perceives an outﬂow of capital.
This additional eﬀect causes an undertaxation of labor relative to the optimal pol-
icy under capital immobility. However, in this setting the undertaxation result is
not replicated as from the perspective of the labor tax-setting government capital is
immobile. For this reason, an outﬂow of capital is not perceived in response to an
increase in the labor tax rate. Even if one extends the analysis by allowing capital
to leave the federation, the labor tax rate is not negatively aﬀected by capital mo-
bility. This is implied by the separation of factor markets. Recall, factor markets
are separated since fkl ≡ 0. Thus, the marginal productivity of labor does not react
to changes in labor supply. The marginal cost of public funds due to labor taxation
25The superscript N stands for Nash behavior.
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under capital mobility and capital immobility are identical.26
Two further remarks are in place here.
Remark 1: Up to now it is assumed that transfers ﬂow from the federal govern-
ment to states as one would expect in a federal system. Boadway and Keen (1996)
showed that this may not be optimal from a welfare-theoretic point of view. If the
states have a less distortionary tax instrument in hand than the federal government,
a transfer from the states to the federal level is welfare enhancing. However, in
this setting a negative transfer s1 would not yield the same result as in Boadway
and Keen (1996) since it would only imply a subsidization of labor. However, a
reversal of the direction of transfers could be obtained by introducing a national
public good G which is provided by the federal government. With this extension
and non-cooperative behavior of states, a ﬂow of transfers from the federal level to
the state level or vice versa cannot be excluded.
Remark 2: Fiscal cartelization as considered by Flowers (1988) would yield a dif-
ferent result. In case of ﬁscal cartelization states collude and, hence, choose t by
coordinating their tax decisions. Consequently, horizontal ﬁscal externalities are
internalized and states realize that the source-based capital tax is equivalent to a
non-distortionary residence-based capital tax (recall, k˜ is exogenous). In this modi-
ﬁed setting the optimal tax and transfer policy is to set τ and si to zero and ﬁnance
local public good provision solely by capital tax revenues. The rationale behind
this result is that the labor income tax is distortionary (l′ > 0) whereas the capital
tax is a lump-sum tax. Hence, the cooperative behavior at the state level leads to
Pareto-eﬃcient provision of g.
26Note, with capital mobility, interdependent factor markets, and t ≡ 0 the marginal cost of
public funds due to labor taxation is given by
SMCPF =
1
1 + η − ηs ∂w∂r ∂r∂τ
. (2.24)
The term ηs ∂w∂r
∂r
∂τ in the denominator represents the inﬂuence of capital mobility on the marginal
cost of public funds. With fkl ≡ 0 this term vanishes and the expression for the marginal cost of
public funds reduces to Eq. (2.23).
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Welfare Implications As shown above, both-sided Nash behavior implies posi-
tive tax rates t and τ . To represent the welfare implications of this ﬁnding a tax
reform is conducted in all regions. The tax reform is modeled as a marginal increase
in the capital tax rate and a marginal decrease in the labor tax rate, i.e. dt > 0 and
dτ < 0, where the starting point is the Nash equilibrium. Diﬀerentiating u = u(t, τ)
with respect to both tax rates yields27
du = [uc(−k) + ug(k + tkt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dt+ [uc(−l) + ug(l + τ lτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dτ (2.25)
From the perspective of the regional government the tax reform leaves utility of
the representative household unaltered. The tax rate change, dt, aﬀects utility by
uc(−k) + ug(k + tkt) and the marginal decrease in τ aﬀects utility by uc(−l) +
ug(l + τ lτ ). Starting from the Nash equilibrium (t
N , τN) both ﬁrst-order utility
eﬀects are zero. Recall, the ﬁrst-order conditions for t and τ coincide with both
terms in Eq. (2.25). However, as this tax reform is conducted in all regions, dk =
0 in a symmetric equilibrium. Consequently, from the perspective of the federal
government the change in utility due to the tax reform reduces to
du = [uc(−k) + ug(k)] dt+ [uc(−l) + ug(l + τ lτ )] dτ. (2.26)
By the ﬁrst-order condition of the federal government’s optimization problem the
second term in Eq. (2.26) is still zero. The ﬁrst term in Eq. (2.26), however, is
positive. To see this, recall that by the optimizing behavior of the state government
uc(−k) + ug(k + tkt) = 0. Since tkt < 0, the term uc(−k) + ug(k) > 0. Therefore,
for dt > 0 and dτ < 0, du is unambiguously positive. This result is not surprising.
The ﬁrst-best policy requires to set τ = 0 and to collect all tax revenues by a uni-
form capital tax on the inelastically supplied capital. Therefore, a tax system which
makes more use of the capital tax dt > 0 and less use of the labor tax dτ < 0 is
Pareto improving.
Though the change in utility is positive, the underlying change in private consump-
tion c and in public consumption g is not unambiguously determined. Rearranging
Eq. (2.26) yields
du = uc [(−k)dt+ (−l)dτ ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=dc
+ug [(k)dt+ (l + τ lτ )dτ ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=dg
. (2.27)
27For the preference function used in this section uc = 1 and ug = bg.
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The change in utility can be decomposed into a private and a public consumption
eﬀect. The former refers to the change in private consumption due to the tax reform.
The latter describes how public consumption is aﬀected by the change in the tax
structure. For dt = −dτ > 0 the change in c and g can be rewritten to
dc = (−k + l)dt and dg = (k − l − τ lτ )dt (2.28)
Eq. (2.28) reveals that dc and dg can be positive as well as negative. A higher capital
tax rate lowers c by k. As dt = −dτ > 0, private consumption also increases by l.
In general, one cannot determine which of the two counteracting eﬀects dominates.
Additionally, for dt > 0 public consumption increases by k. The corresponding
reduction in τ causes labor tax revenues to fall by l. But labor tax revenues also
rise by −τ lτ as labor supply and, hence, the labor tax base responds positively to a
lower labor tax rate.
Depending on the sign of the expression k − l two cases can be distinguished. If
k− l > 0 at the initial equilibrium, dc
dt
is negative. Furthermore, since τ lτ < 0 public
consumption increases, i.e. dg
dt
> 0. In contrast, a negative sign of k − l implies a
higher private consumption level, i.e. dc
dt
> 0. Now, the change in public consump-
tion is ambiguous. Speciﬁcally, it is positive (negative) if k − l < (>)τ lτ . Hence,
a Pareto-improving tax reform can go along with a reduction or a rise in public
consumption. This observation plays a crucial role in the subsequent subsection.
The second-best outcome crucially depends on the Nash-behavior assumption and
the resulting horizontal ﬁscal externality at the state level. Therefore, in the next
two sections the assumption is partially lifted. In section 2.4.5 the federal govern-
ment is assumed to act as a Stackelberg leader and state governments still play
Nash. In section 2.4.6 the behavioral assumption is reversed. State governments
move ﬁrst and the federal government plays Nash.
2.4.5 The Federal State: Federal Government as Stackel-
berg Leader
In this section, it is analyzed whether the ineﬃciency resulting from the separation
of decision powers between the two layers of the federal system can be mitigated by
allowing the federal government to move ﬁrst. Except of the change in the behav-
ioral assumption the model remains unaltered. The sequence of decisions is depicted
78
✲✉ ✉ ✉
center: τ, s1, s2 regions: t1, t2 k1, k2, l1, l2
Figure 2.4: Sequence of decisions: federal state and Stackelberg leadership by a
federal government.
in ﬁgure 2.4. By moving ﬁrst the federal government chooses si and τ at the ﬁrst
stage of the game. It anticipates the reaction of the state governments as well as
the reaction of private agents. The state government acts as a follower. At the
second stage of the game states decide on their policy variables taking the policy
variables of the federal government as given. However, as in the previous section
they anticipate the reaction of private agents. For given policy variables, private
agents move at the third stage of the game.
The interdependence of the endogenous variables is shown in ﬁgure 2.5. The federal
governments’s policy variables si and τ determine the choice of the states’ capital
tax rate ti. However, they also inﬂuence the choice of private agents ki and li. The
latter impact can be decomposed in a direct and an indirect eﬀect. The choice of τ
exerts a direct inﬂuence on li. Additionally, the outcome of the third stage of the
game is aﬀected by the inﬂuence of si and τ on ti which in turn enters the private
agents’ optimization problem. This constitutes the indirect eﬀect. The game is
solved by backward induction in order to identify a subgame-perfect equilibrium in
pure strategies.
State Government The state government sets its policy variable ti for given si
and τ to maximize the utility of the representative household. The optimal policy
of state i is characterized by the reaction function ti = ti(si, τ) implicitly deﬁned by
Eq. (2.14). The slope of the reaction function plays a crucial role in answering the
question whether the federal government’s ability to commit to its policy can achieve
a better result than under both-sided Nash behavior. Diﬀerentiating Eq. (2.14) with
respect to ti and the federal policy instruments si and τ yields
dti
dτ
= 0 and
dti
dsi
=
bigg
∂ k
1
t1k1
t1
+k1
/∂ti − bigggiti
i = 1, 2. (2.29)
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Figure 2.5: Stackelberg leadership by the federal government: policy variables.
A change in the federal tax rate does not aﬀect the choice of ti. This result is due
to the separability assumption between ﬁrms’ capital demand and labor demand.
However, the transfer inﬂuences the optimal tax policy at the state level. To sign
the states’ reaction to a marginal increase note that giti is positive by the optimizing
behavior of the states. Additionally, observe that the SMCPF is increasing in ti.28
This together with the assumption bigg < 0 implies that the capital tax rate of state
i is decreasing in si.
Federal Government The federal government chooses the transfer policy and tax
policy to maximize the Benthamite welfare functional subject to the states’ reaction
functions t1 = t1(s1) and t2 = t2(s2) and the budget constraint s1 + s2 = τ(l1 + l2).
max
s1,s2,τ
L = f(k1, l1)− fkk1 − τ l1 + rk˜ + h(1− l1) + b1(t1k1 + s1) (2.30)
+ f(k2, l2)− fkk2 − τ l2 + rk˜ + h(1− l2) + b2(t2k2 + s2) (2.31)
+ µ[s1 + s2 − τ(l1 + l2)]. (2.32)
The optimal policy is given by the ﬁrst-order conditions
(s1) : b1g + µ+ b
2
gg
2
t1t
1
s1 = 0 (2.33)
28To see this, note that ∂ k
i
tiki
ti
+ki
/∂ti is unambiguously positive if ∂2ki/∂(ti)2 ≤ 0. Using
Eq. (2.6) the second derivative of ki becomes − 1∆2 ∂∆∂ti which is zero if ∂∆∂ti = 0. Diﬀerentiating ∆
with respect to ti gives f ikkkk
i
ti + f
j
kkkk
j
ti , i = j. As kiti = −kjti , i = j, ∂∆∂ti = 0 in a symmetric
equilibrium. Hence, ∂2ki/∂(ti)2 = 0 and ∂ k
i
tiki
ti
+ki
/∂ti is unambiguously positive.
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(s2) : b2g + µ+ b
1
gg
1
t2t
2
s2 = 0 (2.34)
(τ) : −l1 − l2 + µ(−l1 − l2 − τ l1τ − τ l2τ ) = 0 (2.35)
where the ﬁrst-order conditions have already been simpliﬁed by using conditions (2.3),
(2.7), and (2.14). The assumption of identical states implies that the federal gov-
ernment does not need to diﬀerentiate its policy across states and, in a symmetric
equilibrium of the federation, the ﬁrst-order conditions reduce to
big(1 + g
j
tit
i
si) =
li
li + τ liτ
i, j = 1, 2 i = j. (2.36)
Let (tSf , τSf , sSf ) denote the optimal policy under this regime.29 The optimality
condition under Stackelberg-leadership by the federal government diﬀers from the
outcome under both-sided Nash behavior by the term gjtit
i
si . g
j
ti reﬂects the impact of
a marginal tax increase in state i on tax revenues in state j. The positive horizontal
ﬁscal externality which is responsible for the ineﬃciently low taxation of capital is
now part of the optimization problem of the federal government. To characterize
the optimal policy recall that the optimal solution under both-sided Nash behavior
(tN , τN , sN) satisﬁes Eq. (2.22). Inserting this policy vector in Eq. (2.36) yields the
inequality
big(1 + g
j
tit
i
si) <
li
li + τ liτ
i, j = 1, 2 i = j. (2.37)
By Eq. (2.29) the bracketed term (1 + gjtit
i
si) is lower than unity. Hence, evaluated
at (tN , τN , sN) the equality in Eq. (2.36) is turned into an inequality as given by
Eq. (2.37). Given the mild assumption ∂
∂τ
( l
i
li+τliτ
) > 0 an optimal response is to
lower τ and, consequently, the r.h.s. of the inequality.30 Note, the federal budget
constraint implies a reduction in si which in turn induces the state government to
choose a higher capital tax rate. The latter response is implied by the negatively-
sloped reaction function ti = ti(si). Therefore, one gets the following result.
Proposition 2.3: If the federal government moves ﬁrst (Stackelberg leadership),
the source-based capital tax increases relative to the Nash outcome, i.e. tSf > tN .
The labor income tax decreases, i.e. τSf < τN .
29The superscript Sf stands for Stackelberg leadership by the federal government.
30The assumption ∂∂τ (
li
li+τliτ
) > 0 is not very restrictive. Note, that a suﬃcient condition for this
term to become positive is ∂2li/∂τ2 < 0. By Eq. (2.10) a suﬃcient condition for this requirement
to be satisﬁed is that h′ is strictly convex in # and fl is strictly concave in l, i.e. h′′′ > 0 and
flll < 0.
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Figure 2.6: Stackelberg leadership by the federal level: choice of tax rate.
An illustration of this proposition is given in ﬁgure 2.6. The upward-sloping curve
represents the marginal cost of public funds due to source-based capital taxation
1
1+
. The downward-sloping curves represent the marginal utility of local public
goods for diﬀerent values of τ . Note, the bg-curves are depicted from the perspective
of the regional government. The Nash behavior by the regional government implies
a shift of the bg-curve if federal policy changes. To put it diﬀerently, the transfer
volume s acts as a shift parameter of bg(tk + s).
At the equilibrium under both-sided Nash behavior τ = τN which enters bg through
the magnitude of the transfer sN . Thus, for given federal policy variables the
marginal utility curve relevant for regional optimization is given by bg|τ=τN . The
regional government equates the marginal utility of local public goods with the
marginal cost of public funds. Hence, the optimal tax rate is tN . Given by the
Stackelberg leadership by the federal government τN > τSf and, thus, sN > sSf . A
lower transfer volume shifts the bg-curve upwards. Now, the relevant bg-curve be-
comes bg|τ<τN . The marginal cost of public funds 11+ , however, remains unchanged.
From the perspective of the regional government each level of t is associated with
a higher marginal utility of local public goods. Consequently, the optimal tax rate
tSf exceeds tN .
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This result is in sharp contrast to Boadway and Keen (1996) and Boadway, Marc-
hand, and Vigneault (1998) where the federal government can replicate the unitary
nation optimum by committing to its policy. As shown in the previous subsection,
the unitary nation optimum is the Pareto-eﬃcient allocation for gi. However, the
federal state as a Stackelberg leader cannot achieve this outcome. The rationale
behind this result is straightforward. A federal tax rate of 0 would have no eﬀect
on the states’ decision and the level of local public good provision is simply the
uncoordinated tax competition equilibrium given by Eq. (2.14). However, a positive
labor income tax rate allows the federal government to inﬂuence the states’ tax rate
t by making transfers to the states. Starting at τ = 0, a marginal increase in τ leads
to FMCPF greater unity. Hence, it is optimal for the federal government to increase
τ and, thereby, to reduce t up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt of an increase
in τ , given by the reduction in SMCPF adjusted for the negative impact on t, is
equated to the marginal cost of taxation at the state level given by the FMCPF.
Therefore, in equilibrium the states’ perceived marginal cost of an increase in t is
not unity and horizontal ﬁscal externalities are not fully internalized.
This does not leave local public good provision unaﬀected. The sign of the dif-
ference g(tSf , τSf )− g(tN , τN) cannot be derived from the change in tax rates. This
is due to the fact that t increases and τ decreases. Accordingly, capital tax rev-
enues increases while labor tax revenues decrease. Having only this information one
cannot conclude which eﬀect dominates. However, the induced change of gi can be
inferred from Eq. (2.14) which is shown in proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.4: Under Stackelberg leadership by the federal level local public goods
are underprovided. Speciﬁcally, local public good provision decreases relative to the
Nash level of g.
Proof: Given by ∂ k
i
ki+tiki
ti
/∂ti > 0, ∂ k
i
ki+tiki
ti
/∂τ = 0, and the optimality condition
big =
ki
ki+tiki
ti
[Eq. 2.14], the reversal of the tax structure implied by proposition 2.3,
translates into a higher SMCPF and, thus, big. Hence, given by the strict concavity
of b(·), gi is unambiguously lowered. ✷
83
At ﬁrst sight this result seems to be contradictory to proposition 2.3 stating that
the state government makes more use of the source-based capital tax. Recall, under
the assumption of both-sided Nash behavior local public goods are underprovided.
This result is due to the ineﬃciently low capital tax rate and the use of the dis-
tortionary labor tax. Relative to the ﬁrst-best policy, gi and ti are too low and τ
is too high. The Stackelberg leadership by the federal government reduces τ and,
thereby, increases ti. For this reason the tax structure moves towards the ﬁrst-best
structure. One may expect a corresponding increase of g towards the ﬁrst-best level.
However, given by the Nash behavior by states any increase in t translates into a
higher marginal utility of public goods. For this reason local public good provision
becomes more ineﬃcient relative to gN (see also ﬁgure 2.6 for an illustration). This
result is also consistent with the ﬁnding in the last subsection. The welfare analysis
of public policy under both-sided Nash behavior has revealed that a rise in t and a
lower τ is Pareto-improving. Moreover, the welfare-enhancing policy can go along
with a reduction in g. Exactly this happens under Stackelberg leadership by the
federal government.
Modiﬁcation In the ﬁrst part of this subsection it has been assumed that the
federal government sets si separately and, thereby, perceives a capital reallocation.
As given by the slope of the reaction function in Eq. (2.29) an increase in si induces
a lower capital tax rate ti. Consequently, capital is attracted to region i in response
to a rise in si, i.e. ∂k
i
∂si
= kitit
i
si > 0. However, implied by symmetry both regions
receive identical transfers. Hence, in equilibrium capital reallocation does not take
place. Therefore, it is questionable why the federal government does not anticipate
this eﬀect and, thus, why the transfer volume is not chosen simultaneously. An
alternative formulation of the optimization problem is to set si = s. Note, the
modiﬁcation does not aﬀect the state’s optimization problem. The reaction of the
state government to federal policy is still given by Eq. (2.29). Before turning the
federal government’s optimization problem it is useful to derive the response of the
interest rate r to a higher capital tax rate in both states. Setting dt1 = dt2 = dt
and diﬀerentiating Eq. (2.5) and the capital market clearing condition k1+ k2 = 2k˜
with respect to t gives dr
dt
= −1.
The federal government’s objective function remains unchanged. The ﬁrst-order
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conditions for s and τ are
(s) :
(
dr
dt
k˜ + b1gk
1
)
ts + b
1
g +
(
dr
dt
k˜ + b2gk
2
)
ts + b
2
g + 2µ = 0 (2.38)
(τ) : −l1 − l2 + µ
(
−l1 − l2 − τ l1τ − τ l2τ
)
= 0. (2.39)
Rewriting both ﬁrst-order conditions yield
big(1 + k
its)− kits = l
i
li + τ liτ
i = 1, 2. (2.40)
In addition to the direct eﬀect on local public good provision, an increase in s has
two counteracting eﬀects on utility. First, a higher transfer volume corresponds to
a decrease in t and thus, to lower capital tax revenues. This impact is represented
by the term kts in the bracketed term. Additionally, the induced reduction in t
increases the interest rate on a one-to-one basis. For this reason interest income
rises which is indicated by the term −kits. Hence, a positive and a negative eﬀect
are present and at ﬁrst sight it is not obvious which eﬀect dominates. However,
inserting the Eq. (2.14) into Eq. (2.40) gives
big(1− tkitts) =
li
li + τ liτ
. (2.41)
Since the r.h.s. of Eq. (2.41) is greater than unity and the bracketed term on the
l.h.s. lies in the interval (0,1), local public goods are underprovided, i.e. big > 1.
Following the same line of reasoning as applied above one arrives at τSf < τN
and, consequently, at tSf > tN . Local public good provision under this modiﬁed
assumption is still characterized by gSf < gN . Therefore, the modiﬁcation of the
assumption used in the former paragraph does not qualitatively change the result.
2.4.6 The Federal State: States as Stackelberg Leaders
In this section, states are assumed to act as Stackelberg leaders. The sequence of
decisions is depicted in ﬁgure 2.7. At the ﬁrst stage of the game states simultaneously
select the capital tax rate ti. A state government plays Nash towards the other
state government. However, they choose the policy instrument taking the reaction
of the federal government and private agents into account. At the second stage
of the game the federal level determines its policy variables si, τ for given states’
policy variables. By contrast, it anticipates the reaction of private agents to its
choice. Private agents move at the third stage of the game. Their choice variables
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Figure 2.7: Sequence of decisions: federal state with Stackelberg leadership by states.
are chosen for given policy of the federal level and state level. The corresponding
interdependence of decision variables is shown in ﬁgure 2.8. The state government’s
policy choice ti aﬀects the federal transfer policy si and tax policy τ . Moreover, it
enters the decision problem of private agents. Therefore, ti has a direct impact on
ki and an indirect eﬀect through the impact of ti on si and τ , which in turn aﬀects
the household’s optimization problem. Thus, the federal policy variables and the
private agents’ decision variables are determined by ti. Again, the game is solved
by backward induction to identify a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
t1 t2
s1, s2, τ
l1, k1 l2, k2
❅
❅❘

✠

✠
❅
❅❘
1st stage
2nd stage
3rd stage
Figure 2.8: Stackelberg leadership by states: policy variables.
Federal Government The federal government’s optimization problem is solved
ﬁrst. For given states’ policy choices (t1, t2), the optimal federal policy is character-
ized by Eq. (2.22). The federal government equates the marginal rate of substitution
to the FMCPF. The optimality condition implicitly deﬁnes the federal government’s
reaction functions s1 = s1(t1, t2), s2 = s2(t1, t2) and τ = τ(t1, t2). The slopes of the
reaction functions are crucial for analyzing whether the perceived marginal cost of
public funds at the state level decreases and, hence, whether the capital tax rate
increases relative to the Nash outcome. Total diﬀerentiation of Eq. (2.22) (for both
86
regions) and the federal budget constraint s1 + s2 = τ(l1 + l2) and solving for ds1,
ds2 and dτ yields (dt2 = 0)31
ds1
dt1
=
β(t1k1t1 + k
1) + α
|A| (2.42)
ds2
dt1
=
β(t2k2t1)− α
|A| (2.43)
dτ
dt1
=
b1ggb
2
gg(t
2k2t1) + b
1
ggb
2
gg(t
1k1t1 + k
1)
|A| (2.44)
with
α := −b1gg (t1k1t1 + k1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=g1
t1
∂ l
2
l2+τl2τ
∂τ
+ b2gg t
2k2t1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=g2
t1
∂ l
1
l1+τl1τ
∂τ
and (2.45)
β := b1ggb
2
gg
2∑
i=1
(li + τ liτ ) > 0. (2.46)
(See Appendix A1 for a derivation.) Provided ∂
∂τ
( l
i
li+τliτ
) > 0, τt1 is negative (see
Appendix A1). Hence, the optimal response of the federal government to a marginal
increase in t1 is to reduce the income tax rate τ . This implies that the state gov-
ernment anticipates a reduction in the labor income tax when increasing t1 which
in turn reduces the perceived cost of capital taxation.
The derivation of sign[s1t1 ] is slightly more complicated. The term α plays a crucial
role in signing the slope. α can be interpreted as a measure for the impact of a
change in t1 on tax revenues in both states. To see this, note that an increase in t1
implies a rise in tax revenues in state 1 by g1t1 = t
1k1t1 + k
1. However, due to the
mobility of capital some capital leaves state 1 leading to a decrease in tax revenues
by an amount of t1k1t1 . Although the reduction in tax revenues due to the respon-
siveness of the tax base in region 1 corresponds to the rise in tax revenues in state 2,
i.e. −t1k1t1 = t2k2t1 , it is still ambiguous whether g1t1 exceeds g2t1 or not. If the rise in
tax revenues of state 1 induced by an increase in t1 exceeds the loss of tax revenues
due to capital mobility, i.e. g1t1 > g
2
t1 , α becomes positive and vice versa. For this
reason, α can be interpreted as a measure for the intensiveness of the horizontal
ﬁscal externality. A positive α indicates a low horizontal ﬁscal externality. In con-
trast, a negative α reveals a large horizontal ﬁscal externality. This interpretation
is useful in understanding the results derived below.
31The slope of the reaction functions is only derived with respect to a marginal change in t1. By
symmetry, the slope of the reaction functions, with respect to t2, is analogous.
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characterization ds
1
dt1
ds2
dt1
dτ
dt1
Case (i): α > 0 − +− −
Case (ii): α < 0 and β(t1 ∂k
1
∂t1
+ k1) > |α| − − −
Case (iii): α < 0 and β(t1 ∂k
1
∂t1
+ k1) < |α| + − −
Case (iv): α < 0 and β(t1 ∂k
1
∂t1
+ k1) = |α| 0 − −
Case (v): α = 0 − − −
Table 2.1: Stackelberg leadership by states: comparative static analysis.
By inspection of Eqs. (2.42) and (2.43) one can infer that the equilibrium trans-
fers s1 and s2 depend on the sign and magnitude of α as well as on the magnitude
of β. Therefore, in order to give a complete characterization of sign[s1t1 ] ﬁve cases
have to be considered:
Case (i): If α > 0, s1t1 < 0. As outlined above, a positive α indicates a low capital
reallocation due to capital taxation. The increase in tax revenues in state 2 result-
ing from an inﬂow of capital is lower than in state 1. This implies the inequality
b2g > b
1
g. Recall, in a symmetric equilibrium b
2
g = b
1
g. According to Eq. (2.42), the
federal government decreases s1 to equate b1g to b
2
g. The federal policy instrument
τ exerts the same inﬂuence on the FMCPF of both states and is lowered to restore
Eq. (2.22).32
Case (ii): If α < 0 and β(t1k1t1 + k
1) > |α|, s1t1 < 0. A negative α indicates a high
capital reallocation due to capital taxation. The increase in tax revenues in state 2,
resulting from an inﬂow of capital, exceeds that in state 1 as given by Eq. (2.45).
This implies the inequality b2g < b
1
g. The federal government decreases s
1. However,
this response does not eliminate the aforementioned inequality. By inspection of
Eq. (2.43), s2 is also decreased. This is done until the inequality is turned into
an equality, i.e. b1g = b
2
g. The federal policy instrument τ is lowered to restore
32Note, that the FMCPF only depends on τ and, consequently, is not aﬀected by a change in t1.
As τ is the same for both states, the labor income tax rate can solely be used for a simultaneous
and identical reaction of the FMCPF in state 1 and 2. It is left to changes in s1 and s2 to eliminate
interstate diﬀerences.
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Eq. (2.22).
Case (iii): If α < 0 and β(t1k1t1 + k
1) < |α|, s1t1 > 0. In equilibrium a marginal
increase in t1 increases the transfer s1 to state 1 and lowers the labor income tax
rate τ . This is ﬁnanced by a marginal decrease in the transfer to state 2 since, for
a negative α, s2t1 is negative [see Eq. (2.43)].
Case (iv): If α < 0 and β(t1k1t1 + k
1) = |α|, s1t1 = 0. The transfer s1 is unaﬀected
by a change in t1. However, both τ and s2 are negatively aﬀected by a marginal
increase in t1.
Case (v): If α = 0, the responses of s1, s2, and τ are identical to those in case (ii).
That is, the transfer s1 and the labor income tax rate τ are lowered in response to
an increase in t1. Furthermore, a change in t1 reduces s2.
The results of the comparative static analysis are summarized in table 2.1.
State Government The state maximizes the utility of the representative house-
hold anticipating the reaction of the federal government given by s1 = s1(t1, t2),
s2 = s2(t1, t2), and τ = τ(t1, t2). The optimization problem
max
t1
f(k1, l1)− fkk1 − τ l1 + rk˜ + h(1− l1) + b1(t1k1 + s1) (2.47)
gives the ﬁrst-order condition
−f 1kkk1t1k1 + rt1 k˜ − l1τt1 + b1g(t1k1t1 + k1 + s1t1) = 0. (2.48)
The state does not only equate the direct marginal cost, −f 1kkk1t1k1 + rt1 k˜, and
beneﬁt, b1g(t
1k1t1 + k
1), of capital taxation, which occurs if states cannot commit to
its policy. It also takes into account how the induced change in the federal policy
variables aﬀects private consumption, −l1τt1 , and utility derived from local public
good provision, b1gs
1
t1 . However, the eﬀect of the change in τ , due to a higher t
1, on
region 2 is neglected. In a symmetric equilibrium Eqs. (2.22) and (2.48) yield
l1
l1 + τ l1τ
=
l1τt1 + k
1
t1k1t1 + k
1 + s1t1
. (2.49)
Let (tSs, τSs, sSs) denote the solution to Eqs. (2.22) and (2.49).33 In general, the
SMCPF is not equated to the FMCPF, if the additional eﬀects due the Stackelberg
leadership by states are not vanishing, i.e. b1gs
1
t1− l1τt1 = 0. In this case the marginal
33The superscript Ss stands for Stackelberg leadership by states.
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cost of public funds as perceived by the state acting as a Stackelberg leader diﬀers
from the SMCPF. This ﬁrst result is summarized in proposition 2.5
Proposition 2.5: Provided bigs
i
ti − liτti = 0, the SMCPF is not equated to the
FMCPF. Thus, if states move ﬁrst (Stackelberg behavior) local public good provision
diﬀers from the outcome under both-sided Nash behavior.
The anticipated reduction of the labor income tax, in response to an increase in
t1, leads to a lower marginal cost of public funds at the state level relative to the
SMCPF. The reduction in the perceived marginal cost of public funds implies a
higher capital tax rate. To put it diﬀerently, the reduction in τ partly internalizes
the positive horizontal ﬁscal externality which is the source of ineﬃciently low cap-
ital taxes. However, the total change in the perceived marginal cost of public funds
also depends on the reaction of s1. Unfortunately, sign[s1t1 ] can be positive as well as
negative. A positive sign would imply a further reduction of the r.h.s. of Eq. (2.49).
A negative sign would have the opposite eﬀect.
To give a characterization of the equilibrium allocation a more detailed descrip-
tion of the equilibrium tax rates is necessary. Therefore, the analysis proceeds in
two steps. First, general conditions are derived under which the policy outcome
under the Stackelberg leadership of the states diﬀers from that under both-sided
Nash behavior presented in section 2.4.4. In a second step, the implications for local
public good provision are analyzed. Following both steps one is able to answer the
question whether or not the institutional setting under consideration allows for a
Pareto improvement.
To determine the change in the capital tax rate t1 for all ﬁve cases, lemma 2.1
states conditions for tSs to be lower, equal, or greater than tN .
Lemma 2.1: If s1t1 ≥ 0, the capital tax rate under Stackelberg leadership by states
exceeds the capital tax rate under both-sided Nash behavior, i.e. tSs > tN . If s1t1 < 0
the eﬀect on the tax rate t1 is given by
−l1τt1


<
=
>


∣∣∣b1gs1t1∣∣∣⇒


tSs < tN
tSs = tN
tSs > tN

 . (2.50)
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Proof: From Eq. (2.48) the optimal state behavior is characterized by b1g(k
1+t1k1t1)+
b1gs
1
t1 = k
1 + l1τt1 . Starting from the Nash outcome t
N as given by Eq. (2.14), the
state’s incentive to deviate from tN depends on the terms b1gs
1
t1 and l
1τt1 . By Eq.
(2.44), l1τt1 is negative. If b
1
gs
1
t1 is nonnegative [cases (iii) and (iv)] the state can
increase after-tax labor income as well as local public good provision by setting
tSs > tN .
To prove the second assertion, consider the opposite case. If s1t1 < 0 and −l1τt1
exceeds |b1gs1t1|, the state can improve utility of the representative household by
choosing a tax rate tSs > tN . The marginal increase in utility due to the decrease
in the labor income tax outweighs the marginal decrease in utility resulting from a
marginal reduction in transfer s1. The reverse holds for s1t1 < 0 and −l1τt1 < |b1gs1t1|.
For the special case s1t1 < 0 and −l1τt1 = |b1gs1t1| the opposite eﬀects nullify each
other. The state has no incentive to deviate from the tax rate tN . ✷
The impact of the slope of the response functions on the tax rate can be inferred
from Eq. (2.50) only for cases (iii) and (iv). In case (iii), τt1 < 0 and s
1
t1 > 0.
Lemma 2.1 predicts that state 1 chooses a higher capital tax rate than under the
Nash-policy regime presented in section 2.4.4, i.e. tSs > tN . The reason for this
result is that the state government anticipates two eﬀects when increasing t. First,
the labor income tax is lowered leading to higher private consumption. Second, the
transfer from the federal government to the state is increased. Both positive eﬀects
counteract the perceived outﬂow of capital and, thereby, imply a partial internal-
ization of the positive horizontal ﬁscal externality. Hence, they provide incentives
to the state to set tSs above the ineﬃciently low level tN . In case (iv), τt1 < 0 and
s1t1 = 0. Following an analogous line of reasoning yields t
Ss > tN .
In cases (i), (ii), and (v), transfer s1 reacts in the opposite direction as in case
(iii), while the labor income tax rate is still decreased with an increase in t. The
implication for tSs, relative to tN , cannot be derived without having a more precise
condition than Eq. (2.50), which is given in lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2: In cases (i), (ii), and (v) condition (2.50) is equivalent to the
following condition
0
<
>
1
2
β
[
(t1k1t1 + k
1)− t2k2t1
]
+ α⇒


tSs < tN
tSs = tN
tSs > tN

 . (2.51)
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Proof: See Appendix A.2.
In case (i), t1k1t1 + k
1 > t2k2t1 , which implies α > 0. Consequently, state 1 chooses
a tax rate tSs < tN . The decrease of s1, in response to a marginal increase in t1,
dominates the positive eﬀect of a lower labor income tax rate. Therefore, starting
from tN state 1 can increase utility of the representative household by a further
reduction in t1. In case (ii), t1k1t1 + k
1 < t2k2t1 and, thus, α becomes negative. This
implies a negative term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (2.51). The positive eﬀect of a lower
labor income tax rate in response to a marginal increase in t1 dominates the decrease
in s1. Hence, the optimal policy of the state government is to set tSs > tN . In case
(v), t1k1t1 + k
1 = t2k2t1 and, therefore, α = 0. Consequently, t
Ss = tN .
The inﬂuence of the institutional setting analyzed in this section on the capital tax
rate relative to the Nash outcome is summarized in proposition 2.6.
Proposition 2.6: If α > 0 [case (i)], the capital tax rate under Stackelberg lead-
ership by states is strictly lower than the optimal capital tax rate under both-sided
Nash behavior, i.e. tSs < tN . Conversely, if α < 0 [cases (ii) and (iv)], the capital
tax rate under Stackelberg leadership by states is strictly higher than the optimal
capital tax rate under both-sided Nash behavior, i.e. tSs > tN . If α = 0 [case (v)],
the capital tax rate under Stackelberg leadership by states is identical as that under
both-sided Nash behavior,i.e. tSs = tN .
Implied by proposition 2.6, α plays a crucial role in answering the question whether
the Stackelberg leadership by states allows for a Pareto improvement relative to
the both-sided Nash policy. Recall, α can be given an economic interpretation. As
noted earlier, a positive α indicates low equilibrium horizontal ﬁscal externalities,
i.e. giti − gjti > 0. By contrast, a negative sign gives rise to large equilibrium hori-
zontal ﬁscal externalities. Thus, if equilibrium horizontal ﬁscal externalities are low
[case (i)], the source-based capital tax tSs is even lower relative to tN . However,
high equilibrium horizontal ﬁscal externalities (deﬁned by α < 0) call for a rise in
the source-based capital tax rate. If α vanishes, the source-based capital tax rate
coincides with tN . In this case, the Stackelberg leadership by states and the insti-
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tutional setting of both-sided Nash behavior are equivalent.
A better understanding for this result can be gained by analyzing the role of Eqs. (2.42)
and (2.44) in signing α. A positive α [case (i)] implies a rise in the marginal cost of
public funds of states as given by the r.h.s. of Eq. (2.49) relative to the SMCPF. To
see this, note that in all ﬁve cases τt1 < 0 which lowers the marginal cost of public
funds. The impact of τt1 < 0 is counteracted by s
1
t1 < 0 which, by itself, raises
the marginal cost of public funds. Since the latter eﬀect dominates, the marginal
cost of public funds is increased implying a lower capital tax rate tSs.34 In contrast,
the marginal cost of public funds is lowered in cases (ii), (iii), and (iv) underlying
α < 0. More speciﬁcally, in case (ii) τt1 < 0 dominates s
1
t1 < 0.
35 Additionally, in
case (iv) the counteracting eﬀect vanishes, i.e. τt1 < 0 and s
1
t1 = 0, whereas in case
(iii) both eﬀects reduce the marginal cost of public funds. For this reason, tSs > tN
if α < 0. Summing up, if horizontal ﬁscal externalities are high, the Stackelberg
leadership by states implies a reduction in the marginal cost of decentralized capital
taxation and vice versa. Only for α = 0 the policy outcome does not change. 36
As given by Eq. (2.44), τ moves in the opposite direction as t. Therefore, if α > 0
the equilibrium labor tax rate is higher than τN . Thus, from an eﬃciency point
of view the overtaxation of labor is even increased. Recall, in the Nash outcome
labor income has already been overtaxed since in the benchmark of a unitary nation
optimality requires τ to be set equal to 0. Therefore, low horizontal ﬁscal external-
ities increase the incentive to tax labor income if states move ﬁrst. In contrast, if
α < 0, the incentive to use labor tax revenues is reduced. However, it is not fully
eliminated.
Figure 2.9 depicts the decision problem of the federal government. The upward-
sloping curve is the marginal cost of public funds due to labor taxation 1
1+η
. Diﬀer-
ent values of the source-based capital tax t correspond to diﬀerent bg-curves. This
is due to the assumption that the federal government plays Nash. Thus, capital
tax revenues are given for the federal government and determine the locus of the
34For a formal proof of this result see Lemma 2.2.
35Again, a formal proof of this result is presented in Lemma 2.2.
36The result, that the internalization of externalities depends on its magnitude, can already be
found in the literature. See Klibanoﬀ and Morduch (1995) for a model where agents bargain to
internalize externalities. Common to the result in this analysis, Klibanoﬀ and Morduch (1995)
demonstrate that only for suﬃciently high externalities a Pareto improvement is achieved.
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ττSs τN τSs
bg|tSs>tN
bg|tSs=tN
bg|tSs<tN
1
1+η
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1
1+η
Figure 2.9: Stackelberg leadership by states: choice of tax rate.
bg-curve. Under both-sided Nash behavior the capital tax rate is given by t = t
N .
The corresponding bg-curve is bg|tSs=tN . The optimizing behavior of the upper level
implies a labor tax rate choice of τN .
A negative α induces the state government to set tSs > tN . Capital tax revenues
rise. Since they act as a shift parameter, the bg-curve shifts downwards. The rele-
vant bg-curve becomes bg|tSs>tN . In this case, the labor tax is less beneﬁcial for the
federal government as the marginal utility of local public goods is lower for all τ .
However, the marginal cost of public funds is not altered. Therefore, the federal
government chooses a lower labor tax rate τSs < τN .
Conversely, α > 0 implies tSs < tN . Capital tax revenues are lower and, hence,
the bg-curve shifts upwards. Now, the federal level optimizes for the given bg|tSs<tN .
From the perspective of the federal government, each level of τ is associated with a
higher level of bg. For this reason, the optimal choice of τ increases.
The implications for local public good provision are presented in proposition 2.7.
Proposition 2.7: Suppose ∂ l
i
li+τliτ
/∂τ > 0. If α > (<) 0, local public good pro-
vision decreases (increases) relative to the Nash level of g. The underprovision of
local public goods is increased (lowered). If α = 0, local public good provision is
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unaltered relative to the Nash level of g.
Proof: Note that the FMCPF is unaﬀected by a change in t, i.e. ∂ l
i
li+τliτ
/∂t = 0 and
by assumption is increasing in τ , i.e. ∂ l
i
li+τliτ
/∂τ > 0. Furthermore, given by the
optimality condition of the federal government, bg =
1
1+η
[Eq. (2.22)], any change
in the FMCPF implies a corresponding change in bg. Combining these eﬀects and
using proposition 2.6 implies that, if α > 0 (tSs < tN and, as given by Eq. (2.44),
τSs > τN), both the FMCPF and bg increase. Hence, g
Ss < gN where the last step
follows from the strict concavity of b(·). An analogous argument can be applied if
α ≤ 0. ✷
Given by proposition 2.7 local public good provision moves in the same direction
as the source-based capital tax. Thus, any improvement in the eﬃciency in the tax
structure translates into an enhanced eﬃciency in local public good provision and
vice versa. This result is in contrast to the ﬁndings in the last subsection. Un-
der Stackelberg leadership by the federal government a more eﬃcient tax structure
results in a lower level of local public goods.
2.4.7 Conclusion
In this section, the federal-state interaction in a federation is of interest. Traditional
contributions rest on the assumption that the federal level can commit to its policy.
Within this framework it is shown that the federal government replicates the unitary
nation optimum. In the existing literature the structure of the ﬁnancial relation
between the federal and state level is not discussed. The idea of this model is to
reverse the direction of commitment and to analyze the implications of the direction
of commitment for the allocation of local public goods and the ﬁnancial structure
between both levels of the federation. The problem is analyzed within a model
of a two layer federal system with labor income taxation at the upper level and
source-based capital taxation at the lower level.
Financial Structure The ﬁnancial structure, i.e. the choice of tax rates, is sum-
marized in table 2.2. In a unitary state all revenues are collected on the inelastically
supplied capital. Under this regime the source-based capital tax is a lump-sum tax
as total capital supply is exogenous. The distortionary labor tax is set to 0. In-
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t τ s
Unitary Nation > 0 = 0 = 0
Federal State
Nash tN > 0 τN > 0 sN > 0
Stackelberg: Sf tSf > tN 0 < τSf < τN 0 < sSf < sN
Stackelberg: Ss α < 0 tSs > tN 0 < τSs < τN 0 < sSs < sN
α = 0 tSs = tN τSs = τN sSs = sN
α > 0 0 < tSs < tN τSs > τN sSs > sN
Table 2.2: Tax structure in a federal state under diﬀerent behavioral assumptions.
tergovernmental transfers are of no use in a one-layer state. Hence, s = 0. The
introduction of a two-layer federal economy with capital taxation at the lower level
and labor taxation at the upper level changes the ﬁnancial structure. With both
levels of government playing Nash the capital tax rate as well as the labor tax rate
are levied at positive rates. The reason for this result is that decentralized capital
taxation causes horizontal ﬁscal externalities. Therefore, from the perspective of
the regional government the use of the source-based tax implies a marginal cost
of public funds above unity. Thus, the capital tax rate is set at an ineﬃciently
low level. The federal level can improve the allocation by choosing a positive labor
tax rate. The resulting labor tax revenues ﬂow into the regional budgets, i.e. sN > 0.
The Stackelberg-leadership by the federal government causes regions to set the cap-
ital tax at a higher level relative to the outcome under both-sided Nash-behavior.
The underlying intuition is as follows. The upper level anticipates the reaction of
the lower level to its policy choice. Speciﬁcally, the federal government anticipates
a reduction in tSf if τSf increases. Additionally, the federal level takes into account
that a change in t only causes a reallocation of the capital tax base. The behavioral
assumption implies a lower level of the labor tax rate, i.e. τSf < τN and, thus, a
higher capital tax rate. The transfer volume decreases.
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The optimal policy under Stackelberg leadership by states is not as clear cut as
under Stackelberg-leadership by the federal government. The crucial factor for the
result is the term α. α can be interpreted as a measure for the intensiveness of the
horizontal ﬁscal externality. Depending on the sign of α three cases can be distin-
guished. A negative sign indicates a high horizontal ﬁscal externality. In this case,
the capital tax rate is set at a higher level because the regional level anticipates a
positive response of the federal government’s policy variables to an increase in tSs.
Though the labor tax rate always decreases, the transfer can be negatively as well
as positively aﬀected with α < 0. If s is negatively aﬀected by a rise in t, the impact
of a decreasing labor tax rate dominates. For this reason, a high horizontal ﬁscal
externality causes regions to chooses a higher capital tax rate and, accordingly, hor-
izontal ﬁscal externalities are partially internalized.
In contrast, a positive sign of α indicates a low horizontal ﬁscal externality. In
this case the regional government anticipates a negative response by the federal
government to a higher capital tax rate. More speciﬁcally, the reaction of the labor
tax rate is still negative. However, with α > 0 the transfer volume is negatively
aﬀected by a rise in t. The driving force for the result is that the latter eﬀect
dominates. Thus, the perceived marginal cost of public funds by capital taxation
increases rather than decreases. Consequently, capital employment is taxed at a
lower rate and the deviation from the outcome in a unitary nation increases. With
α = 0 the positive eﬀect of a lower labor tax rate in response to a higher capital tax
rate is oﬀset by lower transfers. For this reason, the tax policy under Stackelberg
leadership by states and both-sided Nash behavior coincide.
The labor tax rate moves in the opposite direction as t. Accordingly, a positive, neg-
ative or vanishing α causes the labor tax rate to rise, fall or stay constant relative
to the labor tax rate chosen under both-sided Nash behavior.
Local Public Good Provision The consequences for local public good provi-
sion are presented in table 2.3. In a unitary nation, local public good provision is
eﬃcient, i.e. bg = 1. In contrast, the level of local public goods is ineﬃcient in a
federal state, i.e. bg > 1. More precisely, if only the lower level of government plays
Nash and the upper level acts as a ﬁrst mover, local public good provision decreases
relative to gN . This result is somewhat surprising as horizontal ﬁscal externalities
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are partially internalized under Stackelberg leadership by the federal government.
However, a rise in t corresponds to a decline in τ and the latter eﬀect dominates.
Thus, total tax revenues and local public good provision are lowered relative to gN .
Again, under Stackelberg leadership by states, the result depends on the sign of
α. Given α < 0, local public good provision increases. Though the labor tax rate
decreases the capital tax rate rises. The latter eﬀect outweighs the former, which
translates into a higher level of g, i.e. gSs > gN . Thus, a high horizontal ﬁscal
externality in combination with states acting as ﬁrst movers results in the most
preferable policy outcome in a federal state. The capital tax rate and local public
good provision move towards the ﬁrst-best levels. The distortionary labor tax is
reduced.
Conversely, a positive α lowers g. The declining capital tax rate has a dominant ef-
fect on total tax revenues. For this reason a low horizontal ﬁscal externality worsens
the outcome relative to the outcome under both-sided Nash-behavior, i.e. gSs < gN ,
tSs < tN , and τSs > τN . Put diﬀerently, the federal state as a whole makes more
use of the distortionary tax instrument, lowers the capital tax rate, which is nondis-
tortionary from the entire economy’s perspective, and reduces local public good
provision.
With α = 0 the outcome under Stackelberg leadership by states does not deviate
from that under both-sided Nash behavior. Accordingly, local public spending gSs
equals gN .
The aim of this section is not to evaluate which assumption concerning the federal-
state interaction is more appropriate. This deﬁnitely depends on the speciﬁc country
under consideration. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that none of the Stackelberg
leadership assumptions is appropriate. If both levels of government do not have the
ability to commit to their actions, then the assumption of Nash behavior for both
levels will ﬁt better.
In this section, one abstracts from political considerations. But the constitution,
the voting systems, and the power of selﬁsh politicians will have an inﬂuence on the
commitment ability in a federation. Therefore, a positive analysis is useful to ap-
proach the question, which level of a federation is more likely to act as a Stackelberg
98
bg g
Uniform Nation = 1 > 0
Federal State
Nash > 1 gN > 0
Stackelberg: Sf > 1 gSf < gN
Stackelberg: Ss α < 0 > 1 gSs > gN
α = 0 > 1 gSs = gN
α > 0 > 1 gSs < gN
Table 2.3: Local public good provision under diﬀerent behavioral assumptions.
leader. This is of particular importance to evaluate the potential role of the central
level of the European Union to internalize ﬁscal externalities. Here, attention is
restricted to examining the consequences of diﬀerent behavioral assumptions.
2.5 Summary
In the last chapter, capital tax competition is analyzed within a system of indepen-
dent governments. A source-based capital tax has adverse implications for decen-
tralized local public good provision. Though the capital tax is non-distortionary
from the entire economy’s perspective, regions perceive an outﬂow when raising the
capital tax rate. This provides incentives for regions to make less use of the capital
tax rate leading to ineﬃciently low capital tax rates. Regions neglect that an out-
ﬂow of capital corresponds to an inﬂow of capital and, hence, a higher tax base in
other regions.
In the ﬁrst part of this chapter, the basic reason for the ineﬃciency result is iden-
tiﬁed. The underlying mechanism for the ineﬃciency result can be summarized by
the concept of ﬁscal externalities. This categorization is consistent with the exist-
ing literature in economics which traces ineﬃciencies back to externalities. Fiscal
externalities are eﬀects from one ﬁscal decision unit on another, which are ignored
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by the former. In general, ﬁscal externalities can take two forms. Horizontal ﬁscal
externalities operate at the same level of government. Applied to the basic tax com-
petition model the perceived outﬂow of capital followed by a rise in the capital tax
rate is a positive horizontal ﬁscal externality. The outﬂow of capital aﬀects ﬁscal
decision units in other regions as it increases their capital tax base. For this reason,
the capital tax rate is set at an ineﬃciently low level.
The second form of ﬁscal externalities are vertical ﬁscal externalities. By deﬁnition,
they can only operate in multi-layer states. A vertical ﬁscal externality arises if a
government’s ﬁscal decision inﬂuences policy variables of governments at diﬀerent
layers. Vertical ﬁscal externalities can be due to tax base overlap, tax deductibility,
and general equilibrium eﬀects. Tax base overlap and tax deductibility are referred
to as formal concurrency, since the source of the externality is rooted in institutional
(formal) arrangements. However, what matters is eﬀective concurrency, i.e. an ul-
timate eﬀect on a government’s budget in response to a policy of a government at a
diﬀerent layer. The latter can also occur due to general equilibrium eﬀects.
It is only recently that vertical ﬁscal externalities have received attention in the lit-
erature. Boadway and Keen (1996) consider a two-layer state with tax base overlap
and labor mobility (only in the extension). This gives rise to vertical and horizontal
ﬁscal externalities. Before Boadway and Keen (1996), there were already multiple
approaches to address vertical ﬁscal externalities. However, these approaches ab-
stract from an explicit modeling of the federal government. Boadway and Keen
(1996) show that ﬁscal externalities are of no concern in their setting. They assume
a Stackelberg leadership of the federal government. By committing to its policy, the
federal government is able to nullify all ﬁscal externalities. Thus, the federal govern-
ment can replicate the policy outcome of a unitary nation where ﬁscal externalities
are absent. This result is conﬁrmed in a broader setting by Boadway, Marchand,
and Vigneault (1998).
These two approaches assume a tax-base overlap, i.e. both levels of government
tax the same base, and a Stackelberg leadership by the federal government. Hence,
it is interesting to alter the assumptions and to analyze whether the ﬁndings are
robust to these changes. In the second part of this chapter a model is presented
where tax base overlap does not occur. The upper level of government taxes labor
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income while the lower level has access to a source-based capital tax. Additionally,
both the federal and the regional level rather than only the upper level, are assumed
to act as a Stackelberg leader. The following questions are examined.
• First, to what extent does the behavioral assumption determine the ability of
a federal system to internalize ﬁscal externalities?
• Second, in the absence of perfect tax-base overlap does the Stackelberg lead-
ership by the federal government guarantee a replication of the unitary nation
outcome?
Within this framework, it is shown that the Stackelberg leadership by the federal
government does not guarantee an internalization of ﬁscal externalities. The com-
mitment ability by the federal government brings about a Pareto-improvement rel-
ative to the Nash outcome. But the unitary nation’s policy is not replicated. Thus,
the second question can be answered with “No”.
The answer to the ﬁrst question is more complex. In general, the reversal of the
usually assumed behavioral assumption yields diﬀerent outcomes. Under Stackel-
berg leadership by the federal level, the outcome is unambiguous. The capital tax
rate rises, the labor tax rate decreases, and local public good provision is reduced
relative to the Nash outcome. In contrast, the policy outcome under Stackelberg
leadership by states is ambiguous. Depending on the magnitude of the horizontal
ﬁscal externality (represented by α) two cases can be distinguished. A low horizon-
tal ﬁscal externality implies a lower capital tax rate, a higher labor tax rate, and a
reduction in local public good provision. Therefore, the allocation is inferior to the
Nash outcome. The bias in the regional marginal cost of public funds is increased
rather than decreased.
A high horizontal ﬁscal externalitiy has the opposite eﬀect. The capital tax rate
rises, the labor tax rate decreases and local public good provision is higher. Thus,
a Stackelberg leadership by states in combination with a high horizontal ﬁscal ex-
ternality implements the allocation which is closest to the benchmark allocation of
a unitary nation. In this case, the commitment ability by states yields a superior
result as a commitment ability by the federal government. This result is in sharp
contrast to the ﬁndings in the literature on taxation in federal systems.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Slope of the Reaction Functions
In this part of the appendix the slopes of the reaction functions s1 = s1(t1, t2),
s2 = s2(t1, t2), and τ = τ(t1, t2) are derived. Therefore, Eq. (2.22) (for both regions)
and the federal budget constraint s1 + s2 = τ(l1 + l2) are totally diﬀerentiated and
written in matrix form (dt2 = 0)

b1gg 0 −
∂ l
1
l1+τl1τ
∂τ
0 b2gg −
∂ l
2
l2+τl2τ
∂τ
1 1 −∑2i=1(li + τ liτ )


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A

 ds
1
ds2
dτ

 =

 −b
1
gg(t
1k1t1 + k
1)dt1
−b2ggt2k2t1dt1
0


The determinants of the coeﬃcient matrix A and the matrices Ai, i = 1, 2, 3 are
as follows:
|A| = b1gg

−b2gg 2∑
i=1
(li + τ liτ ) +
∂ l
2
l2+τl2τ
∂τ

+ b2gg ∂
l1
l1+τl1τ
∂τ
< 0 (A.1)
|A1| = −b1gg
(
t1k1t1 + k
1
)
dt1

−b2gg 2∑
i=1
(li + τ liτ ) +
∂ l
2
l2+τl2τ
∂τ

 (A.2)
+
∂ l
1
l1+τl1τ
∂τ
b2ggt
2k2t1dt
1
|A2| = b1ggb2ggt2k2t1
2∑
i=1
(
li + τ liτ
)
dt1 + b1gg
(
t1k1t1 + k
1
) ∂ l2
l2+τl2τ
∂τ
dt1 (A.3)
−
∂ l
1
l1+τl1τ
∂τ
b2ggt
2k2t1dt
1
|A3| = b1ggb2gg(t2k2t1)dt1 + b1ggb2gg(t1k1t1 + k1)dt1 > 0. (A.4)
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In order to sign |A| the sign of li+τ liτ and
∂ l
i
li+τliτ
∂τ
have to be determined ﬁrst. li+τ liτ is
positive. Otherwise, the federal government would end up on the downward-sloping
side of the Laﬀer curve. However, as implied by the federal maximization problem
this is not the case. In contrast, the sign of the expression
∂ l
i
li+τliτ
∂τ
cannot be speciﬁed
without making further assumptions. Note, the second-order condition of the federal
government’s optimization problem only implies the inequality bigg <
∂ l
i
li+τliτ
∂τ
. In
general, the sign can be positive as well as negative. To simplify the analysis
∂ l
i
li+τliτ
∂τ
is assumed to be positive in the subsequent analysis . As shown in footnote 30 a
suﬃcient condition for this assumption to hold is h′′′ > 0 and flll < 0. Therefore,
sign[ |A| ] is negative.
To specify the sign of |A1| and |A2| it will prove useful to rewrite them as follows
|A1| =
[
β(t1k1t1 + k
1) + α
]
dt1 and |A2| =
[
β(t2k2t1)− α
]
dt1. (A.5)
with
α := −b1gg
(
t1k1t1 + k
1
) ∂ l2
l2+τl2τ
∂τ
+ b2ggt
2k2t1
∂ l
1
l1+τl1τ
∂τ
and (A.6)
β := b1ggb
2
gg
2∑
i=1
(
li + τ liτ
)
. (A.7)
The sign of the determinants |A1| and |A2| depends on the sign and magnitude of
α and β. Since α cannot unambiguously be signed, the sign of |A1| and |A2| is
ambiguous as well. In contrast, the sign of |A3| is strictly positive since t2k2t1 and
t1k1t1 + k
1 are both strictly positive.
Applying Cramer’s rule, the slope of the response functions is given by
ds1
dt1
=
β(t1k1t1 + k
1) + α
|A| (A.8)
ds2
dt1
=
β(t2k2t1)− α
|A| (A.9)
dτ
dt1
=
b1ggb
2
gg(t
2k2t1) + b
1
ggb
2
gg(t
1k1t1 + k
1)
|A| . (A.10)
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
In this part of the appendix Lemma 2.2 is proved, i.e. the impact of the optimal
response functions on the magnitude of the tax rate t1 is derived for cases (i),(ii),
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and (v) in section (2.4.6). Substituting Eqs. (2.42) and (2.44) into Eq. (2.50) yields
−l1 b
1
ggb
2
gg (t
2k2t1) + b
1
ggb
2
gg (t
1k1t1 + k
1)
|A|
<
>
b1g
∣∣∣∣∣β (t
1k1t1 + k
1) + α
|A|
∣∣∣∣∣ . (A.11)
Multiplying by −|A| > 0 gives
l1
[
b1ggb
2
gg
(
t2k2t1
)
+ b1ggb
2
gg
(
t1k1t1 + k
1
)] <
>
b1g
∣∣∣β (t1k1t1 + k1)+ α∣∣∣ (A.12)
Using the fact that in equilibrium b1g =
l1
l1+τl1τ
[see Eq. (2.22)] and rearranging con-
dition A.12 lead to
1
2
β
(
t1k1t1 + k
1 + t2k2t1
) <
>
∣∣∣β (t1k1t1 + k1)+ α∣∣∣ (A.13)
with β > 0 as given by Eq. (2.46). As in cases (i), (ii), and (v), β(t1k1t1+k
1)+α > 0,
the inequality can be rewritten to
0
<
>
1
2
β
[(
t1k1t1 + k
1
)
− t2k2t1
]
+ α. (A.14)
Note, this inequality corresponds to the initial situation
−l1τt1 <
>
∣∣∣b1gs1t1∣∣∣ (A.15)
and to the tax rate as given by Eq. (2.50) in Lemma 2.1.
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Chapter 3
Capital Tax Coordination
The following chapter addresses the issue of tax coordination which is an additional
way of mitigating ineﬃciencies in local public spending. The analysis focuses on dif-
ferent tax coordination measures and characterizes its allocative and distributional
implications. The latter are now taken into account as they are crucial for the re-
gions’ incentives to participate in tax coordination. Speciﬁcally, the allocative and
redistributive implications of capital tax coordination in the presence of symmetric
and asymmetric information are analyzed.
The chapter is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section gives an introduction to the
issue of tax coordination. In section 3.2, diﬀerent approaches to tax coordination
are presented and their welfare implications are derived. Tax coordination under
asymmetric information is analyzed in section 3.3 and a formal model of tax coor-
dination under asymmetric information is presented in section 3.4. The model is
extended in various ways. Section 3.5 focuses on the role of commitment for tax
coordination. The constraints for tax coordination imposed by voluntary partici-
pation are explicitly modeled in section 3.6. Section 3.7 completes the analysis by
summarizing the basic results and drawing conclusions.
3.1 Introduction
In the last chapter a central government was introduced to the basic tax compe-
tition model. Within this extended framework, capital taxation still occurs at the
regional level. The central government taxes labor income at a uniform rate. The
aim of the analysis is to answer the question whether a central government us-
ing unconditional grants is able to internalize horizontal ﬁscal externalities arising
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from capital tax competition. Until now regions have behaved non-cooperatively,
either as Nash competitors or Stackelberg leaders. In this chapter the assumption
of non-cooperative behavior is dropped. This is done in order to analyze the welfare
implications of tax coordination. More speciﬁcally, tax coordination is analyzed
with respect to its ability to increase eﬃciency of local public good provision and of
the capital allocation. Recall, the ineﬃciency of decentralized capital taxation rests
on horizontal ﬁscal externalities, which only occur due to non-cooperative behavior
among regions. Therefore, it is interesting to contrast the eﬀects of tax coordination
and tax competition.
In general, tax coordination can take diﬀerent forms. The crucial diﬀerence be-
tween them is whether the tax authority remains at the regional level or whether
it is allocated to a central level. With the former deﬁnition of tax coordination
taxation is still decentralized. In this case tax coordination is modeled as a simul-
taneous increase in tax rates where the initial allocation is the uncoordinated Nash
equilibrium. Even if one restricts attention to this form of tax coordination there
are still diﬀerent ways of modeling the coordinated tax increase. Tax coordination
could imply that all regions increase the tax rate by the same amount. This is a
very common way of modeling tax coordination with decentralized taxation in the
literature.1 However, tax coordination could also imply that a region unilaterally
agrees to change the tax rate. For instance, with interregional tax rate diﬀerential
the low tax country could agree to increase its tax rate and, thereby, move towards
the tax rate level in the high tax country. This is exactly the approach of commodity
tax coordination adopted in the European Union. A third form of tax coordination
is that all regions adjust their tax rates towards an average level of taxation, i.e.
high tax regions lower their tax rates whereas low tax regions increase their tax
rates. This form of tax coordination has been suggested for coordinating corporate
taxation within the European Union.
Most of the literature on tax coordination chooses this decentralized approach to
identify welfare improving tax reforms. The next section provides a brief summary
of the literature and derives the welfare properties of tax coordination with decen-
tralized capital taxation.
1See, e.g., Keen (1989), Wrede (1996), and Fuest and Huber (1999).
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A second deﬁnition of tax coordination requires a reassignment of taxes within
a federal state. The ineﬃciency of local public ﬁnance stems from the fact that
regions ignore positive eﬀects of their policy on neighboring regions. Hence, it is
intuitive to suggest a reassignment of the authority to tax to a level of government
that internalizes all eﬀects of taxation. Thus, horizontal ﬁscal externalities do not
arise. With centralized taxation the central government selects the tax rates by
maximizing some welfare functional. This requires that the central government has
all information relevant for eﬃcient decision making. However, in many models with
centralized policy coordination the assumption of perfect information at the central
level is abandoned in favor of the assumption of asymmetric information. That is, it
is assumed that private information is held by regions, e.g. concerning regional pro-
duction possibilities or preferences. The central government designs a self-selection
mechanism under which each region has an incentive to reveal its private informa-
tion. These mechanisms of tax coordination are analyzed with respect to its welfare
properties.
Most of the literature restricts attention to a welfare comparison of policy coordi-
nation under symmetric and asymmetric information. A comparison of the welfare
performance of centralized and decentralized policy making is often neglected. The
rationale for this is that even with asymmetric information the central government
can implement the same allocation as under tax competition. Thus, under central-
ized taxation welfare is either just as high or even higher as under uncoordinated
decentralized taxation. The information asymmetry restricts the central government
in its policy design. However, it cannot restrict the ability of centralized policy co-
ordination to outperform decentralized capital taxation. This may only occur if,
besides the assumption of perfect information, additional assumptions are dropped.
In that sense, asymmetric information is only a necessary but not a suﬃcient con-
dition for decentralization to yield higher welfare than centralization. Most of the
chapter deals with this centralized form of policy coordination. In section 3.3 the
literature on centralized policy coordination is surveyed. A formal analysis of cen-
tralized capital taxation is presented in sections 3.4 to 3.6.
In order for tax coordination to work regions must either be willing to change their
tax rates from the Nash equilibrium level or to reallocate the tax authority to a
central government. Thus, both forms of tax coordination will be more likey if
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all regions beneﬁt from the policy measure. Applied to tax policy reforms within
the European Union this requirement becomes very restrictive as tax coordination
policy is unanimously decided upon. Therefore, all regions must beneﬁt from tax
coordination. Otherwise, the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium tax rates are applied.
For this reason the change in regions’ utility due to tax coordination and, thus, the
incentive to participate in any form of tax coordination receives special attention
under both forms of tax coordination.
3.2 Tax Coordination
Edwards and Keen (1996) analyze the eﬀects of capital tax coordination in the pres-
ence of a private agenda of the government. In their setting the government cares
about utility of the representative citizen. The policy maker also derives utility
from wasteful expenditures, i.e. from the fraction of capital tax revenues that is not
spent on public goods. Therefore, Edwards and Keen (1996) relax the assumption
of benevolent governments and allow for capital tax competition with governments
which are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self-serving. Tax coordination
yields the following results. A simultaneous rise in all regions’ tax rates unambigu-
ously increases the well-being of the policy maker. In that sense, tax coordination
is beneﬁcial as capital tax competition restrict governments to a lower level of wel-
fare. However, as the interest of the government is not perfectly alligned to the
interest of the representative citizen this result does not have to carry over to the
citizen’s utility change. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀect of tax coordination on utility of the
representative citizen is ambiguous. The intuition for this result is straightforward.
A coordinated increase in the capital tax rate is equivalent to a lump-sum tax on
capital. Thus, tax coordination constitutes a lump-sum transfer from the citizen to
the government in order to ﬁnance public as well as wasteful expenditures. The citi-
zen’s utility is only aﬀected by private consumption and public consumption and not
by wasteful expenditures. Thus, in Edwards and Keen (1996) public consumption
and wasteful expenditures increase while private consumption decreases due to tax
coordination. If the private consumption eﬀect dominates the public consumption
eﬀect, the citizen’s utility decreases though local public goods are underprovided
in the uncoordinated equilibrium.2 However, policy makers unambiguously beneﬁt
2Recall, with symmetric regions and benevolent governments local public goods are under-
provided. In this case private consumption also decreases while public consumption increases in
110
from the tax reform as the net impact of all three eﬀects must be positive. If one al-
lows for the extreme forms of government’s behavior one arrives at clear-cut results.
With purely selﬁsh governments, tax coordination is harmful for the citizen. In
contrast, if one allows for wholly benevolent governments tax coordination enhances
the citizen’s utility.
Fuest and Huber (1999) analyze the eﬀect of tax coordination if both capital and
labor taxes are available to the government. Additionally, they allow for competitive
and non-competitive labor markets. As the results of tax coordination in the pres-
ence of competitive labor markets are presented in more detail in the next section
the current survey is restricted to the results derived with non-competitive labor
markets. In this setting unemployment exists and wages are determined by bargain-
ing between ﬁrms and unions. If the government takes the wage rate emerging from
the bargaining process as given, the uncoordinated capital tax is set at a negative
rate. The reason for this is that the government subsidizes capital to attract capital
and, thus, to reduce unemployment. A coordinated increase in all capital tax rates
lowers welfare. This seems to be surprising as any uncoordinated increase in the
capital tax rate (even if the tax rate is negative) causes an outﬂow of capital which is
needed to alleviate unemployment. A coordinated increase leaves capital allocation
unchanged. Therefore, one might expect welfare to rise. However, the higher capital
tax rate drives up wages. For this reason employment is reduced and, consequently,
private and public consumption as well. Hence, welfare is lowered. As shown by
Fuest and Huber (1999) a coordinated increase in the labor tax rate reduces wel-
fare, too. To understand this result a similar line of reasoning can be applied. In
contrast, if governments anticipate the eﬀect their tax policy has on the bargaining
outcome, the results are slightly modiﬁed. Now, both a coordinated increase in the
capital tax rate and a coordinated increase in the labor tax rate enhances welfare if
the wage elasticity of labor demand is suﬃciently high.
A large amount of literature on tax coordination deals with the issue of commodity
tax coordination. Mintz and Tulkens (1986) set up a general equilibrium model
of cross-border shopping (see chapter 2) and derive the welfare properties of tax
response to tax coordination. However, unlike the case of partially selﬁsh governments, tax coor-
dination is unambiguously beneﬁcial for the citizen since all additional tax revenues are spent on
public goods.
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coordination. Starting from the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium, tax coordination
either takes the form of a rise in the high tax region’s tax rate or an increase in
the low tax region’s tax rate. Since the initial situation is a Nash equilibrium, the
utility eﬀect of the region which marginally coordinates its tax rate is always zero.3
For this reason, the welfare eﬀect of tax coordination is solely determined by the
impact on utility of other regions. They show that a commodity tax increase in
the high tax region beneﬁts the low tax region. However, starting from a Nash
equilibrium the total eﬀect of a tax increase in the low tax region on the high tax
region cannot be signed as this policy measure involves a negative private and a
positive public consumption eﬀect (tax base eﬀect). Accordingly, the welfare eﬀect
cannot be unambiguously signed. De Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990) conclude
that the positive public consumption eﬀect dominates in the Mintz-Tulkens setting
indicating an ineﬃciently low equilibrium tax rate. However, Hauﬂer (1998) obtains
a diﬀerent result. He demonstrates that the welfare eﬀect in the high tax region
cannot be signed without making speciﬁc assumptions concerning the shape of the
utility function and the transaction cost function. Therefore, in the general setting
of Mintz-Tulkens the result derived in Mintz and Tulkens (1986) still holds.
Hauﬂer (1996) modiﬁes the framework of Mintz and Tulkens (1986) by introducing
further assumptions on the shape of the transaction cost function for cross-border
shopping. Additionally, in contrast to Mintz and Tulkens (1986) each region pro-
duces only one homogeneous good which is imported and exported at the same time.
Tax coordination is modeled either as a minimum tax rate or as an increase in the
cost of cross-border shopping. The analysis reveals that tax coordination generally
beneﬁts the high tax region. The result for the low tax region is ambiguous. For
example, the low tax region beneﬁts from this policy measure if the tax diﬀerential
in the initial uncoordinated equilibrium is suﬃciently high.
In contrast, Kanbur and Keen (1993) consider the case of commodity tax coor-
dination in a partial equilibrium setting where governments only care about public
consumption, i.e. they maximize tax revenues. In this model tax coordination
takes the form of a minimum tax as well as an increase in the cost of cross-border
shopping. Kanbur and Keen (1993) show that tax coordination is beneﬁcial for
3Note, the ﬁrst-order utility eﬀects are identical to the ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the
initial allocation.
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all regions. That is, the allocation implied by commodity tax competition can be
improved if private consumption eﬀects do not enter the objective function of the
government.
3.2.1 Capital Taxation
In the following two paragraphs the welfare eﬀects of capital tax coordination in
the presence of symmetric and asymmetric regions are derived. In both cases tax
coordination takes place under symmetric information.4
Symmetric Capital Tax Competition The welfare implications of a simulta-
neous increase in the capital tax rate are analyzed by deriving the total diﬀerential
of household’s utility evaluated at the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium. The un-
derlying model is given by the basic tax competition model presented in chapter 1.
Diﬀerentiating the utility function u = u(c, g) with respect to the capital tax rate t
gives5
du =
(
−uck˜ + ugk
)
dt. (3.1)
According to Eq. (3.1) du can be positive as well as negative. However, starting at
a uncoordinated Nash equilibrium characterized by
−uck˜ + ug (tkt + k) = 0, (3.2)
utility unambiguously increases in response to a simultaneous increase in all tax
rates. The intuition for this result is straightforward. The coordinated rise in t
reduces the interest rate on a one to one basis. Capital income and, thus, private
consumption is lowered by k˜. On the other hand capital tax revenues increase by k.
A negative eﬀect on tax revenues does not exist. The tax base remains unchanged
as the tax reform does not alter interregional capital employment. Therefore, the
tax reform results in lower private consumption and higher public consumption.
In general, one cannot determine which eﬀect dominates. However, if one starts
at the Nash equilibrium of the basic tax competition model, the positive public
consumption eﬀect outweighs the negative private consumption eﬀect. As private
consumption is too high and public consumption too low at the uncoordinated Nash
4For an analysis of policy coordination in a decentralized system and under asymmetric infor-
mation see Klibanoﬀ and Morduch (1995).
5As long as no confusion occurs regional superscripts are omitted.
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equilibrium relative to the eﬃcient consumption levels, the increase in public con-
sumption and decrease in private consumption is welfare enhancing. Due to the
symmetry assumption this result holds for all regions.6
Asymmetric Capital Tax Competition Furthermore, it is interesting to ana-
lyze if this result carries over to the case of asymmetric regions.7 Consider the model
of asymmetric tax competition due to taste diﬀerences presented in chapter 1. In
that framework capital tax rates are ineﬃciently low in equilibrium. Local public
good provision is also ineﬃciently low in high preference regions. However, in low
preference regions local public goods can be underprovided, overprovided as well as
eﬃciently provided. This result is due to capital reallocation from high preference
to the low preference regions. Although the capital tax rate is too low, tax revenues
may be suﬃcient to ﬁnance the eﬃcient or even a higher level of local public goods.
Furthermore, due to the positive tax diﬀerential th − tl capital allocation is inef-
ﬁcient. Recall, the latter ineﬃciency does not occur with symmetric regions since
equilibrium tax rates are identical.
Given these two sources of ineﬃciency a coordinated tax reform can be evaluated
with respect to its ability to increase the eﬃciency of local public good provision
and to achieve a more eﬃcient interregional capital allocation. The latter requires a
reduction in the interregional tax diﬀerential th−tl whereas the former can -a priori-
also be achieved by a comovement of regional tax rates leaving the tax diﬀerential
unaﬀected. The subsequent analysis adopts the latter concept of decentralized tax
coordination ﬁrst. In general, three policy options are available to narrow the tax
diﬀerential:
• the capital tax rate in the low tax region is marginally increased,
• the capital tax rate in the high tax region is marginally decreased, or
• both policy measures are applied simultaneously.
6Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) present a model of partial capital tax coordination in the basic
tax competition framework. A more general analysis of partial policy coordination is given in
Burbidge, De Pater, Myers, and Sengupta (1997).
7Capital tax coordination among asymmetric regions is also considered in Grazzini and Ypersele
(1998). In their model regions diﬀer with respect to their factor endowment.
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In the ﬁrst case a marginal increase in tl leaves utility in low tax regions unaﬀected.
The starting point is the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium where the ﬁrst-order con-
dition for tl holds.8 Thus, this form of tax coordination is neutral with respect to
utility in low tax regions and the welfare eﬀect of the tax reform is solely determined
by du
h
dtl
. In high tax regions the change in utility duh is given by
duh =
{
uhc
[
−fkk(kh)∂k
h
∂tl
kh +
∂r
∂tl
k˜
]
+ uhg
(
th
∂kh
∂tl
)}
dtl. (3.3)
Rewriting Eq. (3.3) yields9
duh =
{
uhc
[
fkk(k
h)
fkk(kh) + fkk(kl)
(
kh − k˜
)]
+ uhg
(
th
∂kh
∂tl
)}
dtl. (3.4)
Evaluated at the initial equilibrium the sign of du
h
dtl
is ambiguous. Interest income
decreases by
{
fkk(k
h)/
[
fkk(k
h) + fkk(k
l)
]}
k˜ whereas rents, i.e. income from the
supply of the ﬁxed factor, rise by
{
fkk(k
h)/
[
fkk(k
h) + fkk(k
l)
]}
kh. In the uncoor-
dinated equilibrium kh < k˜. Therefore, the negative interest rate eﬀect dominates
and private consumption is lowered due to the marginal rise in tl. Public consump-
tion unambiguously increases. Hence, the utility eﬀect in the high tax region cannot
be determined without putting more structure to the model. In sum, a tax coordi-
nation modeled as a unilateral increase in the capital tax rate provides no clear-cut
results concerning the incentive to agree to this form of tax coordination.
A second possibility to narrow the tax diﬀerential is to decrease th unilaterally.
Again, starting at the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium, a marginal decrease in th
8Note, at the initial equilibrium, tl is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
ulc
[
−fkk(kl)∂k
l
∂tl
kl +
∂r
∂tl
k˜
]
+ ulg
(
kl + tl
∂kl
∂tl
)
= 0.
Therefore, both a marginal increase and a marginal decrease leaves utility unchanged.
9For simplicity, consider an economy with one high preference region and one low preference
region. In this economy the reaction of capital demand, kh, and the interest rate, r, to a marginal
increase in tl are given by
∂kh
∂tl
=
−1
fkk(kh) + fkk(kl)
and
∂r
∂tl
=
−fkk(kh)
fkk(kh) + fkk(kl)
.
Inserting these expressions in Eq. (3.3) yields Eq. (3.4). Since at the initial equilibrium kh − k˜ <
0, the change in consumption is negative. In contrast, due to ∂k
h
∂tl
> 0 the change in public
consumption gh is positive. Thus, the sign of du
h
dtl
is ambiguous.
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has no impact on utility in high tax regions. The change in utility in low preference
regions dul is given by
dul =
{
ulc
[
fkk(k
l)
fkk(kl) + fkk(kh)
(
kl − k˜
)]
+ ulg
(
tl
∂kl
∂th
)}
dth. (3.5)
The derivation of this expression is equivalent to the derivation of Eq. (3.4). In this
case interest income increases due to dth < 0. On the other hand ﬁxed factor in-
come is lowered. Since kl > k˜ in the initial equilibrium, the latter eﬀect dominates.
Private consumption cl is reduced. A lower capital tax rate in the high tax regions
causes capital to leave low tax regions. For this reason, the capital tax base and,
thus, capital tax revenues shrink. Hence, both private and public consumption are
lowered in the low preference region in response to a decrease in th. Therefore, the
low preference region has no incentive to participate in this kind of tax coordination.
In contrast, the high preference region is indiﬀerent.
The third way of narrowing the tax diﬀerential is a simultaneous application of
the two unilateral tax coordination measures analyzed above. The eﬀect of this
form of tax coordination on utility can be inferred from the above analysis. Now,
utility is aﬀected by the tax decrease in th and the tax increase in tl. Thus, the
change in utility of the high preference region is given by
duh =
{
uhc
[
−fkk(kh)∂k
h
∂th
kh +
∂r
∂th
k˜
]
+ uhg
(
kh + th
∂kh
∂th
)}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dth (3.6)
+
{
uhc
[
−fkk(kh)∂k
h
∂tl
kh +
∂r
∂tl
k˜
]
+ uhg
(
th
∂kh
∂tl
)}
dtl.
Starting in the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium, the ﬁrst term is zero and only the
second term determines the sign of duh. This term is equivalent to Eq. (3.3). There-
fore, the above discussion of the welfare eﬀects for high preference regions in case of
a unilateral increase in tl applies here as well. That is, the sign of duh is ambiguous.
The impact on utility in low preference regions can be derived in a similar manner.
The impact of the marginal increase in tl on ul is zero and the impact of a marginal
decrease in th on ul is decisive for the sign of dul. Since the corresponding expression
coincides with Eq. (3.5), private consumption and public consumption decrease in
response to a lower th. Due to the reduced tax rate in the high preference regions
and the induced outﬂow of capital, low preference regions are worse oﬀ. Clearly,
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they have no incentive to participate in tax coordination. The result that low tax
regions are reluctant in agreeing to capital tax coordination is consistent with the
literature commodity tax coordination. For instance Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and
Hauﬂer (1998) show that in the case of commodity taxation low tax regions do not
always beneﬁt form tax coordination and, thus, they are more likely to be opposed
to tax coordination. The result is also reﬂected by practical tax policy within the
European Union where especially low tax regions do not agree to, e.g., corporate
tax coordination and capital income tax coordination.
The second form of tax coordination requires a coordinated change in both tax
rates in order to keep the tax diﬀerential constant. Clearly, this tax reform does not
aim at improving the eﬃciency of the capital allocation. The only potential alloca-
tive rationale for this policy measure is to reduce the ineﬃciency in local public good
provision. With respect to the rise in tl the utility eﬀects of this policy proposal are
equivalent to those derived above. That is, ul stays constant and the eﬀect on uh is
ambiguous. Furthermore, the rise in th still leaves uh unaﬀected. However, unlike
the previously analyzed tax reform, utility in the low preference region rises [see
Eq. (3.5)]. Both the tax base and the net consumption eﬀect are now positive. This
result indicates that the low tax region only agrees to a tax reform package that
entails either no change or a rise in th. This requirement constitutes a “participation
constraint” which restricts the set of implementable capital tax reforms.
In sum, the analysis shows that in contrast to symmetric regions where a coor-
dinated marginal tax increase is unambiguously positive the result is less clear cut
with asymmetric regions. Therefore, the incentive to participate in tax coordina-
tion is less obvious with asymmetric than with symmetric regions. That is, if du
is negative for one type of region it will be opposed to tax coordination measures.
Additionally, as the initial situation is a Nash equilibrium the other type of region
which beneﬁts from tax coordination does not unilaterally change the capital tax
rate. Thus, tax coordination does not occur unless compensation payments are
made.
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3.2.2 Capital and Labor Taxation
This subsection refers to the model of capital tax competition with multiple tax
instruments considered in chapter 1. Note, with capital and labor taxation local
public good provision is still ineﬃcient. The rationale for this result are positive
ﬁscal externalities, which imply that the capital tax rate is set too low. As shown in
chapter 1 this gives rise to distortionary labor taxation. In the following, the welfare
properties of tax coordination is brieﬂy analyzed within the model of capital and
labor taxation. Tax coordination is introduced in two ways. First, the impact of a
coordinated increase in the capital tax rates for given labor tax rates is analyzed. In
the second step, labor tax rates are marginally increased while holding the capital
tax rates constant.
Diﬀerentiating the indirect utility function v = v(t, τ) with respect to all capital
tax rates while holding the labor tax rate constant yields
dv
dt
= λ
(
ug
uc
− 1
)
k˜ (3.7)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the household’s optimization problem and
thus, by the envelope theorem represents the marginal utility of private income. A
derivation of Eq. (3.7) is given in Fuest and Huber (1999). As local public goods
are underprovided in the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium the term in brackets is
positive. This result is not surprising. If local governments are restricted to a
source-based capital tax the coordinated increase in the capital tax rate is utility
enhancing. This result carries over to the case where local governments have access
to both capital and labor taxes, as in both models the reason for the undertaxation
of capital are positive horizontal ﬁscal externalities.
It is more interesting to analyze whether this result also carries over to labor tax
coordination. Diﬀerentiating the indirect utility function v = v(t, τ) with respect to
τ in all regions while holding the capital tax rate constant yields
dv
dτ
= λ
(
1− ug
uc
)
∂r
∂τ
k˜. (3.8)
A formal proof of this result is given in Fuest and Huber (1999, appendix 1). Ob-
serve, the term in brackets and ∂r
∂τ
are negative. It turns out that, starting from the
uncoordinated Nash equilibrium, a coordinated increase in τ increases utility. The
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intuition for this result is presented in chapter 1. Recall, an uncoordinated rise in
τ reduces labor supply and, thus, lowers the marginal productivity of capital. The
latter implies a perceived outﬂow of capital which increases the marginal cost of
public funds of labor taxation to the region. The region equates the marginal rate
of substitution between private and public consumption to the perceived marginal
cost of public funds. However, the capital outﬂow is only perceived and does not
occur in equilibrium. Thus, the perceived marginal cost of public funds exceeds the
equilibrium marginal cost of public funds. For this reason, the equilibrium marginal
rate of substitution between private and public consumption is higher than the equi-
librium marginal cost of public funds. The level of labor taxation is lower than the
level which would prevail in the absence of capital mobility. In sum, due to the
horizontal ﬁscal externality, the labor tax rate is set too low. Since at the initial
equilibrium the marginal rate of substitution is higher than the marginal cost of
public funds, a coordinated increase in τ is utility enhancing.
3.3 Tax Coordination and Asymmetric Informa-
tion: An Overview
In general, policy coordination by centralization has received a lot of attention in
the literature. However, most of the early literature conducts policy coordination in
a symmetric information environment. For instance, in the context of redistribution
Boadway and Flatters (1982) derive an interregional transfer system which achieves
production eﬃciency and provides assistance to the poor. Moreover, Pﬁngsten and
Wagener (1997) determine a transfer mechanisms where the central government is
fully informed about the characteristics of each region. In that paper the centrally
mandated transfer system is designed as to ensure that each takes full account of
the eﬀects its redistribution policy has on other regions. Put diﬀerently, under sym-
metric information a transfer is determined that internalizes all ﬁscal externalities
resulting from redistribution at the regional level.
Asymmetric information is already implicitly considered in Oates (1972). Oates
(1972) states in the well-known decentralization theorem that in the absence of
cost-savings from centralized local public good provision and of interjurisdictional
externalities welfare with decentralized public ﬁnance is at least as high as with
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centralized public ﬁnance. The theorem contains an implicit assumption concerning
the reﬂection of interregional diﬀerences in centralized policy. Oates (1972) assumes
that centralized governments are constrained to supply a homogeneous local public
good, and that only decentralization of governments can accommodate for hetero-
geneity in local preferences. This behavior can be motivated in two ways. First, the
central government has full information about, e.g., regional preference diﬀerences.
However, it does not use the information to compute the ﬁrst-best levels of local
public goods for each type of region. It is only used to derive the level of local public
goods which is optimal on average. In this case, the central government is forced
to a uniform policy for some exogenous reasons. The second strand of explanation
bases on asymmetric information. Regional governments have perfect information
about regional preferences whereas the central government only knows the distribu-
tion of preferences. Now, in order to derive Oates’ result one has to assume that
a self-selection mechanism is not applied by the central government.10 That is, the
central government does not try to design regional policy packages which induces a
truthful revelation of private information. In the absence of any self-selection mech-
anism the central government is forced to apply uniform policies across regions. It
is the latter strand of explanation which is applied to motivate the decentralization
theorem. Given this motivation, the theorem can be stated in the following way.
In the absence of cost-savings from centralized local public good provision and of
interjurisdictional externalities decentralization is favored to centralization as a de-
centralized policy can be adjusted to regional characteristics.
It is only recently that asymmetric information has entered literature on policy co-
ordination in an explicit way. The assumption of asymmetric information between
the central and regional level has been introduced into the literature on centralized
policy-making in multiple ways. Raﬀ and Wilson (1997) examine the issue of in-
come redistribution across regions and to mobile workers. In that setting regions
diﬀer with respect to their productivity. Furthermore, regions choose an eﬀort level
which aﬀects the productivity-enhancing eﬀect of local public inputs provided by
regions. However, the eﬀort level is not observable by the central government. With
symmetric information the central government is able to coordinate regional policies
so as to achieve an eﬃcient allocation. However, with asymmetric information the
10Self-selection mechanisms are a standard tool of analysis in contract theory to mitigate prob-
lems arising from asymmetric information. For an overview see, e.g., Salanie´ (1997).
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optimal centralized policy requires a misallocation of labor across regions. Further-
more, the eﬃcient eﬀort level is not exerted in all regions. As a result, asymmetric
information hinders the central government in implementing the eﬃcient allocation.
In contrast to Raﬀ and Wilson (1997), Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (1996)
assume that the labor income tax base varies across regions. More speciﬁcally, labor
income in each region is subject to a productivity shock which results in distinct
labor productivities and, thus, labor income. The realization of the labor produc-
tivity shock becomes known to regions, but not to the central government. Thus,
the central government faces an adverse selection problem. Regions also collect tax
revenues where the amount of tax receipts depend on the eﬀort level of regional tax
authorities which in turn is private information of regions. Hence, in addition to
the adverse selection problem, the central level is also restricted by a moral hazard
problem. The aim of the central government is to design an interregional transfer
system for redistributing income from high income regions to low income regions.
With symmetric information local public good provision is equalized across regions
and the labor tax rate in the high income region is larger than in the low income
region. Additionally, as redistribution is lump-sum, regional tax enforcement deci-
sions are not distorted. Under asymmetric information the full information results
do not hold anymore. Local public spending is lower in poor regions though they
have a higher labor tax rate than rich regions. Moreover, as redistribution is no
longer lump sum, the regional tax enforcement is distorted. This implies that re-
distribution is incomplete and coordinated redistributive politics are restricted by
asymmetric information.
Unlike Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (1996), Boadway, Horiba, and Jha (1999)
investigate the structure of grants if the costs of producing public goods rather than
income is private information. Public goods are provided by decentralized agen-
cies. They are ﬁnanced by a labor tax determined by the central government. The
absence of perfect information causes local public goods to be overprovided (under-
provided) in the case of a low (high)-cost agency. Boadway, Horiba, and Jha (1999)
extend the model by allowing agencies to exert an unobservable eﬀort level. In this
case, the optimal grant must induce each agency to exert an optimal eﬀort level
in addition to revealing its private information. For the low-cost agency the above
121
mentioned result still holds. However, for the high-cost agency the deviation from
the full-information outcome becomes ambiguous.
Lockwood (1999) examines the design of intergovernmental transfers in a setting
where the stochastic shock hitting regions can occur in three ways. The random
variable of the regional economy can be income, the costs of producing public goods,
or preferences for public goods. In that sense, Lockwood (1999) provides a unifying
framework for analyzing centralized decision making under asymmetric information.
Other papers only consider one type of shock. Recall, Boadway, Horiba, and Jha
(1998) allow for regional diﬀerences in the cost of producing public goods. Raﬀ and
Wilson (1997) and Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (1996) allow for interregional
diﬀerences in income. Speciﬁcally, the former introduces diﬀerences in the marginal
productivity of public inputs while the latter considers the case of labor productiv-
ity diﬀerences. Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau (1998) introduce diﬀerences in
the marginal willingness to pay for the public good. In addition to the possibility
of multiple forms of shocks, Lockwood (1999) considers interregional externalities
from local public good provision. Thereby, the reason for establishing an intergov-
ernmental transfer system is explicitly modeled.11
In general, the optimal incentive-compatible policy is very sensitive to variations in
the nature of the shock. Since in the model examined in the next section, regions
diﬀer with respect to their preference for local public goods, the results in Lockwood
(1999) are only summarized for the case of stochastic demand for public goods. With
asymmetric information concerning the regional preferences for local public goods
and lump-sum taxation, Lockwood (1999) shows that an eﬃcient provision of local
public goods is an exception rather than the rule. Only for regions with the highest
and the lowest demand for local public goods the quantity is eﬃcient. But for all
intermediate types of regions local public goods are overprovided. In contrast, if
externalities are absent, the high preference region is assigned an ineﬃciently high
level of local public goods and regions with a low preference region receives an ineﬃ-
ciently low level of local public goods. There is only one intermediate type of region
where local public good provision is eﬃcient. At this preference type the overprovi-
sion result is turned into an underprovision result. If taxation is distortionary, the
11Lockwood (1999) assumes risk-averse agents which justiﬁes an intergovernmental transfer sys-
tem to provide insurance to regions. However, even with risk-neutral agents, the existence of
interregional externalities create demand for a transfer system.
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results derived under lump-sum taxation still hold.12
Common to all papers summarized above is the existence of an intergovernmental
transfer system. The transfer system is needed either to provide insurance, to redis-
tribute income across regions, or to internalize interregional externalities from local
public good provision. Dhillon, Perroni and Sharf (1999) analyze the coordination
of capital tax rates if a transfer system is not available to the central government.
Tax coordination is modeled as a centralization of capital taxation. The central
government chooses the source-based capital tax rates for each state. Regions se-
lect one tax rate out of the set of tax rates oﬀered by the central level. They use
the corresponding tax revenues to provide local public goods. Thus, the central
government does not only determine capital tax rates, but also chooses the level of
local public good provision in each region. The central government has imperfect
information about regional preferences for local public goods. Capital tax rates are
chosen as to maximize the sum of expected utilities across regions. Dhillon, Perroni
and Sharf (1999) characterize the tax rates, which are implementable by the central
government. They show that with two types of preferences the capital tax rate for
the high preference region must be higher than that for the low preference region in
order to be implementable. However, they do not characterize the eﬃciency of local
public good provision.13
12Persson and Tabellini (1996a) and (1996b) examine the optimal policy design in a federal
setting if both levels of government face shocks. The question considered in the papers is to what
extent insurance and redistribution is provided at the lower level of government and thus, to what
extent the central government can improve the decentralized outcome. However, in contrast to the
literature summarized in this section, central decision making is not analyzed under asymmetric
information as both levels have imperfect but symmetric information about the nature of the shock.
Only in Persson and Tabellini (1996b) does an information asymmetry arise due to the introduction
of a moral hazard problem at the lower level. Thus, the lower level possesses more information about
actions taken at that level than the central government. The information asymmetry becomes
relevant as the central level wants to provide insurance against random shocks.
13Other papers dealing with centralized decision making and asymmetric information are Cremer,
Marchand, and Pestieau (1996), Cremer and Pestieau (1997), and Cornes and Silva (2000). See
Gilbert and Picard (1996) for an endogenous determination of the optimal size of a region if policy
making is partly centralized and regions have an informational advantage.
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3.4 Tax Coordination and Asymmetric Informa-
tion: A Model
In this section, a model of centralized capital tax coordination under asymmetric
information is presented. The section is structured as follows. An introduction
is given in subsection 3.4.1 which relates the model analyzed in this section to
other models reviewed in section 3.3. After having described the model set-up in
subsection 3.4.2, the optimal policy under full information and capital mobility
is derived in subsection 3.4.3. To highlight the impact of capital mobility on the
optimal policy under asymmetric information the central government’s optimization
problem is solved for the case of asymmetric information and capital immobility in
subsection 3.4.4. The optimal centralized capital tax rates under capital mobility
and asymmetric information are characterized in subsection 3.4.5. Subsection 3.4.6
concludes.
3.4.1 Introduction
The model presented in this section is concerned with the eﬀects of centralized capi-
tal taxation on the interregional allocation of capital and the provision of local public
goods if the central authority is imperfectly informed about the regional preferences
for local public goods. This institutional framework (centralized capital taxation
and imperfect information) and the resulting allocative consequences are of interest
for two reasons.
First, a large amount of literature in public ﬁnance has been devoted to the welfare
eﬀects of tax competition. The simplest model with perfectly mobile capital, an
immobile ﬁxed factor, and a restriction on source-based capital taxes, has ﬁrst been
analyzed in the seminal papers by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), and Wilson
(1986). As shown in chapter 1, tax competition for mobile capital leads to ineﬃ-
cient outcomes. The reasons can be summarized by the concept of horizontal ﬁscal
externalities, which states that decentralized taxation of capital leads to positive
externalities on tax revenues of other jurisdictions. These eﬀects are not taken into
account by each jurisdiction when deciding on the capital tax rate. Consequently,
the resulting level of local public goods is ineﬃcient as the perceived cost of raising
public funds diﬀers from the marginal rate of transformation. Several proposals
have been made to circumvent the ineﬃcient outcome. Wildasin (1989) analyzes
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how an intergovernmental transfer scheme should be designed to internalize ﬁscal
externalities without explicitly modeling the central authority needed to implement
the transfer scheme. Another strand of literature explores capital tax rate coordina-
tion as a solution to ineﬃcient tax competition [see Keen (1989)].14 However, these
models also leave the question unanswered if there is a central authority for tax co-
ordination or if coordinated tax rates are the result of decentralized coordination. In
this section, the former view is followed by explicitly introducing a central authority
with tax setting powers.15 Second, however, a decentralization of local expenditure
policy is beneﬁcial as, stated by the decentralization theorem [Oates (1972)], local
decision makers have more information relevant for an eﬃcient decentralized public
expenditure policy than central decision makers.
There is an increasing amount of literature that assumes asymmetric information
between regions and centers which has been surveyed in section 3.3. However, the
interaction between factor mobility and centralized public policy under asymmetric
information has only been investigated by a few papers. Raﬀ and Wilson (1997)
examine the problem of redistributing income across regions and to workers if work-
ers are interregionally mobile. In contrast, Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau
(1998)16 consider the case of capital tax coordination in the presence of asymmetric
information and capital mobility among the member states of the federation. In
particular, it is the latter interaction which is of interest in the remainder of this
section.17
Speciﬁcally, this section aims at analyzing the allocative implications of informa-
tional imperfections if the central government is engaged in capital tax coordina-
tion. The information asymmetry is analyzed as a principal-agent problem. In the
subsequent model, regional authorities have perfect information concerning the pref-
14Other models analyze the case of tax rate harmonization which implies equal capital tax rates
across regions [e.g. Sinn (1990)]. This policy can be viewed as a special outcome of tax rate
coordination.
15More recent papers on capital tax competition analyze how political mechanisms may oﬀset
the ineﬃciency arising in the basic model; see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Hauﬂer (1997).
Here, one abstracts from these mechanisms.
16A corrigendum to this paper is presented in Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau (1999).
17For this reason, the subsequent analysis is based on Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau
(1998). Huber (1999) also analyzes capital taxation in the presence of asymmetric information
and capital mobility. However, his analysis is based on Stiglitz (1982) where the government is
imperfectly informed about the labor productivity of taxpayers. Thus, he does not address the
interaction between diﬀerent levels of government.
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erences for local public goods. However, the central decision maker only knows the
distribution of local preferences. The central state tries to overcome the informa-
tion asymmetry by a self-selection mechanism. It oﬀers diﬀerent contracts to the
regions consisting of a private and a local public good. Regions choose the con-
tract which gives them the highest utility. In order to ensure that regions do not
misrepresent their types, the contracts must satisfy the incentive-compatibility con-
straints. These constraints are imposed on the central government’s optimization
problem by the information asymmetry and, due to the assumed ﬁxed capital supply,
the requirement of incentive compatibility is the only potential source of ineﬃciency.
This institutional setting can be viewed as a special case of a general mechanism de-
sign game with the following typical three stages. At stage 1, the principal (here: the
central government) designs contracts specifying private and public consumption. At
stage 2 regions decide to participate in the tax coordination game, i.e. regions, that
are initially endowed with the right to choose the capital tax rate, decide whether
or not to transfer the right to the central government. At the third stage of the
game, regions simultaneously announce their types and, thereby, choose a contract
proposed by the central government. In the general formulation, the central govern-
ment’s behavior is constrained by the above mentioned incentive-compatibility and
the participation constraints. The latter guarantees that regions have an incentive
to participate in the tax coordination game. Here, it is assumed that the partici-
pation decision has already been made at some point in the past and that regions
are bounded to the participation decision. Hence, in this section the participation
constraint can be omitted. The implications of an endogenous participation decision
is highlighted in section 3.6.
The analysis shows that with full information the eﬃcient allocation is realized.
However, being restricted by the information asymmetry the central government is
unable to implement the eﬃcient allocation. Both the interregional capital alloca-
tion and local public good provision is ineﬃcient.18
18It should be noted here that centralized capital taxation under asymmetric information can
replicate the outcome of decentralized capital taxation. For this reason, the introduction of asym-
metric information does not limit the central government’s ability to outperform the decentralized
outcome. In that sense, this section does not provide a theory of decentralization. An attempt to
develop such a theory is made in section 3.5.
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3.4.2 The Model
The model considered here is based on Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau (1998).
The federation is assumed to consist of N regions. In each region, the representative
household is endowed with both factors of production: capital k˜ and labor. Labor
supply is exogenous and normalized to 1. The household income is given by
c = w + rk˜ − T k˜ (3.9)
where w is the wage rate, r the interest rate, and T a lump-sum tax on capital.
Households derive utility from private consumption c and from a local public good
g provided by the central state. Regional output can be transformed on a one to
one basis either in a private good c or in a local public good g. The utility function
is quasi-linear in private consumption
u(c, g) = c+ θv(g) (3.10)
with θ as a parameter measuring the preference for public goods which diﬀers across
regions. For simplicity, the distribution of θ is discrete. θ can take two values θh and
θl, θh > θl. Regions with θ = θh have a high preference for public goods whereas
θ = θl indicates that the region has a low preference for public goods. The number
of regions with a high and a low preference is denoted by Nh and N l, respectively.
The proportions of regions with θ = θh and θ = θl are, therefore, nh = Nh/N and
nl = N l/N with nh + nl = 1.19
The inequality θh > θl results in
−dc
h
dgh
=
∂uh
∂gh
∂uh
∂ch
>
∂ul
∂gl
∂ul
∂cl
= −dc
l
dgl
(3.11)
which is the well-known Spence-Mirrlees condition.20 It implies that any pair of
indiﬀerence curves (of θh- and θl-type regions) drawn in (g,c)-space intersect only
once. That is, for any allocation (g,c) the indiﬀerence curve of θh-type regions is
steeper than the indiﬀerence curve of θl-type regions.
19In Dhillon, Perroni, and Scharf (1999) the regions’ taste parameter is independently dis-
tributed. Thus, in contrast to the model considered here the regions’ types are uncorrelated.
20Alternatively, the expression is also called the single-crossing property or the self-sorting con-
dition.
127
Firms are assumed to be proﬁt maximizers. The production technology f(k) ex-
hibits constant returns to scale.21 The proﬁt is given by
π = f(k)− w − (r + t)k. (3.12)
Regional capital employment k is taxed at a rate t. Firms maximize Eq. (3.12) with
respect to k which leads to the ﬁrst-order condition
f ′(k) = r + t. (3.13)
Capital k is employed until the marginal productivity of capital equals the gross
price of capital r + t. Eq. (3.13) implicitly deﬁnes regional capital employment as
a function of the source-based capital tax rate t and the interest rate r. The wage
rate w equals f(k)− f ′(k)k. Regional consumption is thus given by
c = f(k)− f ′(k)k + rk˜ − T k˜. (3.14)
The conditions for a capital market equilibrium diﬀer depending on the mobility
of capital. Under capital immobility the ﬁrst-order condition (3.13) and the capital
market clearing condition, k = k˜, characterize the capital market equilibrium. Under
capital mobility, the ﬁrst-order condition is unaﬀected. However, the capital market
clearing condition changes to
nhkh + nlkl = k˜ (3.15)
with kh and kl as capital employment in high and low preference regions. The
central state taxes capital employment and recycles regional tax revenues tki to the
region by providing a local public good gi. Furthermore, the central government
pays a transfer si to each region which is ﬁnanced by the lump-sum tax on capital
T . The level of local public goods is chosen as to maximize the Benthamite welfare
functional
W (th, tl) = nhuh + nlul (3.16)
subject to the budget constraints
tiki + si = gi and nhsh + nlsl = T k˜ i = l, h. (3.17)
The constraints show that local public good supply in each region must be ﬁnanced
by regional tax revenues and an unconditional transfer. However, the budget con-
straints are not the only constraints (besides the non-negativity constraints) which
21The ﬁxed factor is omitted from the notation throughout the analysis.
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have to be considered by the central government. As mentioned above, it is assumed
that the central government does not know the realization of the parameter θ for
each region. The only piece of information available to the central government is the
distribution of the parameter in the federation, nh and nl. Therefore, the central
government oﬀers contracts (ci, gi) to the regions. They in turn choose the contract
which gives them the highest utility. In order to prevent regions from mimicking
types other than the true one, the contracts must satisfy the incentive-compatibility
constraints
(ICC l) : cl + θlv(gl) ≥ ch + θlv(gh) (3.18)
(ICCh) : ch + θhv(gh) ≥ cl + θhv(gl). (3.19)
These constraints ensure that a region chooses the contract which is designed for
it.22
3.4.3 Centralized Taxation, Capital Mobility, and Symmet-
ric Information
As a point of reference, the optimal tax policy is derived for the case of capital mobil-
ity and symmetric information. With symmetric information the central government
possesses the same information as the regions. Therefore, each region can be iden-
tiﬁed with respect to its preferences and the optimal contracts can be implemented
without having to rely on reports from the regions.
Capital Market The main diﬀerence between capital mobility and immobility is
that capital employment reacts to diﬀerent capital taxation. With capital mobil-
ity the reaction of regional capital employment of θh- and θl-type regions and the
capital market interest rate can be obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order
conditions f ′(ki) = ti + r and the capital market clearing condition (3.15). The
reaction of kh, kl, and r to a change in ti is given by
dkh =
−nl(−dth + dtl)
ϑ
(3.20)
dkl =
nh(−dth + dtl)
ϑ
(3.21)
22As mentioned in the introduction, the incentive-compatibility constraints are the only con-
straints imposed on the central government’s optimization problem. The participation constraint
can be neglected as the participation decision has already been made.
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dr =
−nhf ′′(kl)dth − nlf ′′(kh)dtl
ϑ
(3.22)
with ϑ := nhf ′′(kl) + nlf ′′(kh). (3.23)
Capital leaves the region in reaction to an increase in regional capital taxation ∂k
i
∂ti
<
0 and is attracted by higher capital taxation in regions with diﬀerent preferences
∂ki
∂tj
> 0; i = j. The interest rate is negatively aﬀected by a rise in the tax rate
ti. Therefore, an increase in the regional tax rate not only leads to an inﬂow of
capital in the other type of region, but also decreases capital income in both types
of regions.
Government In the case of symmetric information and capital mobility the cen-
tral government is only restricted by the response of capital to a tax diﬀerential
th − tl. The provision of local public goods and the corresponding tax rates may
therefore be aﬀected by capital mobility.
Before turning to the optimization problem it is useful to rewrite the objective func-
tion W (th, tl) = nh
[
ch + θhv(gh)
]
+ nl
[
cl + θlv(gl)
]
to
W (th, tl) = nh
[
f(kh)− f ′(kh)kh + rk˜ − T k˜ + θhv(thkh + sh)
]
(3.24)
+ nl
[
f(kl)− f ′(kl)kl + rk˜ − T k˜ + θlv(tlkl + sl)
]
= nh
[
f(kh)− thkh − nhsh − nlsl + θhv(thkh + sh)
]
(3.25)
+ nl
[
f(kl)− tlkl − nhsh − nlsl + θlv(tlkl + sl)
]
.
The ﬁrst equality has been derived by inserting Eqs. (3.14) and (3.17). The second
equality follows from the fact that f ′(ki) = r+ti, nhsh+nlsl = T k˜, and nhkh+nlkl =
k˜. The optimization problem of the central government is thus given by
max
th,tl,sh,sl
L = nlf(kl) + nhf(kh)− nltlkl − nhthkh − nhsh − nlsl (3.26)
+ nlθlv(tlkl + sl) + nhθhv(thkh + sh)
with the ﬁrst-order conditions
(th) : nhf ′(kh)
∂kh
∂th
+ nlf ′(kl)
∂kl
∂th
− nhkh − nhth∂k
h
∂th
− nltl∂k
l
∂th
(3.27)
+nlθlv′(gl)tl
∂kl
∂th
+ nhθhv′(gh)
(
kh + th
∂kh
∂th
)
= 0,
(tl) : nhf ′(kh)
∂kh
∂tl
+ nlf ′(kl)
∂kl
∂tl
− nlkl − nhth∂k
h
∂tl
− nltl∂k
l
∂tl
(3.28)
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+nlθlv′(gl)
(
kl + tl
∂kl
∂tl
)
+ nhθhv′(gh)th
∂kh
∂tl
= 0,
(sh) : −nh + nhθhv′(gh) = 0, (3.29)
(sl) : −nl + nlθlv′(gl) = 0, (3.30)
which gives proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1: With symmetric information and capital mobility,
(i) local public goods are eﬃciently provided, i.e. θhv′(gh) = 1 and θlv′(gl) = 1, and
(ii) the interregional capital allocation is eﬃcient, i.e. th = tl.
Proof: The ﬁrst assertion of proposition 3.1 can be proved by rearranging the ﬁrst-
order conditions (3.29) and (3.30) which yields
θiv′(gi) = 1 i = h, l. (3.31)
Inserting Eq. (3.13) and nh ∂k
h
∂th
+ nl ∂k
l
∂th
= 0, the ﬁrst-order condition (3.27) becomes
−nhkh + nlθlv′(gl)tl∂k
l
∂th
+ nhθhv′(gh)
(
kh + th
∂kh
∂th
)
= 0. (3.32)
Using Eqs. (3.20) and (3.21) yields
nhkh
[
θhv′(gh)− 1
]
+ nl
∂kl
∂th
[
θlv′(gl)tl − θhv′(gh)th
]
= 0. (3.33)
Now, for θiv′(gi) = 1, Eq. (3.33) reduces to nl ∂k
l
∂th
(tl − th) = 0 which can only hold
for th = tl. This proves the second assertion of proposition 3.1. ✷
Proposition 3.1 reveals that capital mobility and symmetric information does not
interfere with an eﬃcient allocation of resources if an interregional transfer is avail-
able to the central government. In each type of region capital endowment equals
capital employment. Thus, tax revenues which stem from the source-based capital
tax are identical in both types of regions. However, since θh > θl the provision of
local public goods according to the Samuelson rule requires gh > gl. At least in
one type of region source-based capital tax revenues are not suﬃcient to ﬁnance
the eﬃcient level of gi. The budget deﬁcit is ﬁnanced by a transfer from the center
to the region which is ﬁnanced by the lump-sum tax T . In sum, the central gov-
ernment has enough policy instruments to implement the eﬃcient allocation. For
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Figure 3.1: Resource allocation with a transfer scheme: symmetric information and
capital mobility.
the case Nh = N l = 1 the resource allocation drawn in (g, c)-space is depicted in
ﬁgure 3.1. The ﬁrst-best levels of gi and ci are denoted by gi∗ and ci∗, respectively.
For Nh = N l = 1 total tax revenues amount to T k˜ + thkh + T k˜ + tlkl. Given by
proposition 3.1, capital taxes are uniform across regions (th = tl = t) and, thus,
the regional tax base becomes kh = kl = k˜. Using this information total tax rev-
enues reduce to 2(T + t)k˜ which must be suﬃcient to ﬁnance aggregate spending,
i.e. (T + t)k˜ = g
h∗+gl∗
2
. This implies that tax revenues raised in the θl(θh)-type re-
gion exceed (fall below) local public good spending in the same region. The budget
surplus in the θl-type region amounts to (T + t)k˜ − gl∗ = −sl > 0 which is used to
ﬁnance the budget deﬁcit in the θh-type region, i.e. −sl = sh. As a consequence,
private consumption is equalized across regions and the contracts allocated to both
regions only diﬀer with respect to the level of local public good provision. This fact
already suggests that there may be incentive problems in implementing the eﬃcient
allocation under asymmetric information.
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3.4.4 Centralized Taxation with Capital Immobility
Before turning to the optimization problem under asymmetric information and capi-
tal mobility it is useful to derive the optimal contracts under asymmetric information
and capital immobility ﬁrst. Thereby, one is able to identify which eﬀects are due
to capital mobility and which one results from the asymmetry of information.
Under capital immobility the impact of taxation on the regional interest rate ri can
be obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition, f ′(ki) = ti + ri, and
the capital market clearing condition, ki = k˜, which gives
dri
dti
= −1 i = l, h. (3.34)
Capital taxation leads to a proportional reduction in the regional interest rate. With
a well-informed central government (full information concerning the regions’ taste
for public goods) and immobile capital the optimization problem could be solved
for each region separately. The outcome would be an allocation of regional public
goods according to the Samuelson rule. However, the information asymmetry does
not allow a separate determination of the local public good levels as the contract
choice of θl-type regions has to be taken into account when determining the contract
(ch, gh) and vice versa. Both contracts are connected via the incentive-compatibility
constraints23
(ICC l) : f(kl) − f ′(kl)kl + rlk˜ + θlv(tlkl + sl) ≥ (3.35)
f(kh)− f ′(kh)kh + rhk˜ + θlv(thkh + sh)
(ICCh) : f(kh) − f ′(kh)kh + rhk˜ + θhv(thkh + sh) ≥ (3.36)
f(kl)− f ′(kl)kl + rlk˜ + θhv(tlkl + sl).
Capital immobility implies that regional capital endowment k˜ equals capital em-
ployment ki which simpliﬁes the incentive-compatibility conditions to
(ICC l) : rlk˜ + θlv(tlk˜ + sl) ≥ rhk˜ + θlv(thk˜ + sh) (3.37)
(ICCh) : rhk˜ + θhv(thk˜ + sh) ≥ rlk˜ + θhv(tlk˜ + sl). (3.38)
The constraints (3.37) and (3.38), together with the Spence-Mirrlees condition, im-
ply lemma 3.1.
23Irrespective of whether capital is mobile or immobile the term T k˜ appears on both sides of the
incentive-compatibility constraint. Thus, the term can be omitted from further notation.
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Figure 3.2: Capital tax diﬀerential th − tl < 0 under capital immobility.
Lemma 3.1: The incentive-compatibility conditions and the Spence-Mirrlees con-
dition imply th ≥ tl.
Proof: If th < tl, private consumption in θl-type regions is lower than in θh-type
regions, i.e. ch > cl. In order to satisfy Eqs. (3.37) and (3.38) public good pro-
vision in θl-type regions must be higher than in θh-type regions. However, due to
the Spence-Mirrlees condition these contracts are not incentive compatible since it
is optimal for θl-type regions to mimic θh-type regions. ✷
Lemma 3.1 requires a non-negative tax diﬀerential th − tl. That is, the incentive-
compatibility conditions restrict the set of implementable tax policies. Coordinated
policies with a lower capital tax rate in θh-type regions than in θl-type regions are
ruled out by the incentive-compatibility conditions. The rationale of lemma 3.1 is
depicted in ﬁgure 3.2. Since ci is strictly decreasing in ti, private consumption in
θl-type regions is lower than in θh-type regions if th < tl. In general, with a trans-
fer system it is ambiguous which type of regions has higher local public spending.
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However, the incentive-compatibility conditions require gl > gh. Otherwise, the con-
tract designed for θh-type regions would contain both higher levels of private and
public consumption. Clearly, in this case θl-type regions do not have an incentive
to reveal their type. Thus, cl < ch and gh < gl. These contracts are depicted in
ﬁgure 3.2. Consider θh-type regions are indiﬀerent between both contracts. Implied
by the Spence-Mirrlees condition the indiﬀerence curves of both types of regions
intersect only once and at the intersection the indiﬀerence curve of θl-type regions
has a lower slope (in absolute terms) than the indiﬀerence curve of θh-type regions.
Thus, evaluated at the point (gh, ch) the marginal rate of substitution in θh-type
regions exceeds the marginal rate of substitution in θl-type regions. Observe, since
θh-type regions derive the same utility of both contracts, the willingness to pay for
gl− gh is given by ch− cl. However, given the Spence-Mirrlees condition the θl-type
regions’ willingness to pay for gl − gh is lower than ch − cl. For this reason, θl-type
regions strictly prefer the contract (ch, gh) to (cl, gl) which violates the incentive-
compatibility condition.
As mentioned above, the central government is assumed to maximize a Benthamite
welfare functional. The optimization problem is therefore as follows:
max
th,tl,sh,sl
W (th, tl) = nh
[
ch + θhv(gh)
]
+ nl
[
cl + θlv(gl)
]
(3.39)
subject to Eqs. (3.13), (3.14), (3.17), (3.34), the capital market clearing condition
k = k˜ and the incentive-compatibility conditions (3.37) and (3.38). The Lagrangean
is
max
th,tl,sh,sl
L = nh
[
f(k˜)− thk˜ + θhv(thk˜ + sh)
]
(3.40)
+ nl
[
f(k˜)− tlk˜ + θlv(tlk˜ + sl)
]
− nhsh − nlsl
+ µh
[
rhk˜ + θhv(thk˜ + sh)− rlk˜ − θhv(tlk˜ + sl)
]
+ µl
[
rlk˜ + θlv(tlk˜sl)− rhk˜ − θlv(thk˜ + sh)
]
.
Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangean with respect to th, tl gives the ﬁrst-order conditions24
(th) : (nh + µh)
[
−1 + θhv′(gh)
]
+ µl
[
1− θlv′(gh)
]
= 0 (3.41)
(tl) : (nl + µl)
[
−1 + θlv′(gl)
]
+ µh
[
1− θhv′(gl)
]
= 0 (3.42)
24For notational ease the complementary-slackness conditions are omitted.
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which gives proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2: With asymmetric information and capital immobility, public
goods are eﬃciently provided, i.e. θhv′(gh) = 1 and θlv′(gl) = 1. The ﬁrst-best
allocation is incentive compatib le.
Proof: See appendix A.1.
The economic intuition for this result is straightforward. With capital immobil-
ity, regional capital employment does not react to a change in the tax rate. The
regional marginal cost of public funds is equal to the marginal rate of transforma-
tion. Therefore, it does not matter which contract the regions choose the marginal
cost of public funds is the same for all levels of g. The decisive factor for the choice
of contract is the regional marginal rate of substitution. Note, the Spence-Mirrlees
condition guarantees that in both regions the marginal rate of substitution is diﬀer-
ent for a given allocation (g, c). The non-distortionary character of capital taxation
in combination with the Spence-Mirrlees condition is suﬃcient to separate both
types with a ﬁrst-best contract (gh∗, ch∗) and (gl∗, cl∗).
Proposition 3.2 has been derived without relying on the ﬁrst-order conditions for
sh and sl. Put diﬀerently, even if sh ≡ 0 and sl ≡ 0, proposition 3.2 holds. A
central government without access to an interregional transfer scheme is still able to
separate types by oﬀering ﬁrst-best contracts, which is illustrated in ﬁgure 3.3. For
the local public good level gl∗ the marginal rate of substitution in θh-type regions is
higher than the marginal cost of public funds. θh-type regions’ marginal willingness
to pay for an additional unit of local public goods is higher than the price they have
to pay. For the local public good level gh∗ both the marginal willingness to pay and
the price for an additional unit of local public goods are equated. Consequently,
the contract (gh∗, ch∗) lies on a higher indiﬀerence curve for the θh-type region than
the contract (gl∗, cl∗). This shows that it is optimal for θh-type regions to choose
the ﬁrst-best contract (gh∗, ch∗) which is designed for this type of region. Due to
the Spence-Mirrlees condition the marginal rate of substitution in θl-type regions is
lower than the marginal cost of public funds for the contract (gh∗, ch∗). Following
the same line of argument as above shows that it is optimal for θl-type regions to
choose the ﬁrst-best contract (gl∗, cl∗). Therefore, the incentive-compatibility condi-
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Figure 3.3: Resource allocation: asymmetric information and capital immoblity.
tions are not binding and the ﬁrst-best allocation can be implemented by the central
government.
3.4.5 Centralized Taxation with Capital Mobility
The crucial diﬀerence between subsection 3.4.3 and this subsection is the introduc-
tion of asymmetric information. Capital is still perfectly mobile among regions.
Therefore, the reaction of regional capital employment of θh-type and θl-type re-
gions and the capital market interest rate is given by Eqs. (3.20), (3.21), and (3.22).
Additionally, Eq. (3.15) constitutes the capital market clearing condition.
Perfect capital mobility and equal capital endowments imply that capital income rk˜
is identical in all regions. As a result, capital income does not aﬀect the regions’
decision whether to reveal their types or not. Hence, with asymmetric information
and capital mobility the incentive-compatibility conditions change to
(ICC l) : f(kl)− f ′(kl)kl + θlv(tlkl + sl) ≥ (3.43)
f(kh)− f ′(kh)kh + θlv(thkh + sh)
(ICCh) : f(kh)− f ′(kh)kh + θhv(thkh + sh) ≥ (3.44)
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f(kl)− f ′(kl)kl + θhv(tlkl + sl).
A ﬁnding similar to lemma 3.1 can be established for the case of capital mobility.
Lemma 3.2: The incentive-compatibility condition and the Spence-Mirrlees con-
dition imply th ≥ tl.
Proof: If th < tl, private consumption cl is lower than ch as ∂c
i
∂ti
= −f ′′(ki)∂ki
∂ti
ki +
∂r
∂ti
k˜ < 0, i = l, h. To maintain incentive compatibility it is necessary that gh < gl.
However, given the Spence-Mirrlees condition at least one incentive-compatibility
constraint is violated. ✷
The rationale for this result is similar to that underlying lemma 3.1. In contrast to
capital immobility, a tax diﬀerential causes a reduction in capital demand in high
tax regions and an inﬂow of capital in low tax regions. For this reason, a negative
tax diﬀerential th − tl leads to kh > kl making it even more preferable for θl-type
regions to choose the contract (ch, gh). Recall, under capital immobility kh = kl = k˜
an interregional capital reallocation in response to a tax diﬀerential does not occur.
Thus, in order to be incentive compatible the optimal contract for θh-type regions
must entail a capital tax rate at least as high as the optimal capital tax rate oﬀered
to θl-type regions.
The central government chooses the contracts (ch, gh) and (cl, gl) by solving the
optimization problem
max
th,tl,sh,sl
L = nlf(kl) + nhf(kh)− nltlkl − nhthkh − nlsl − nhsh (3.45)
+ nlθlv(tlkl + sl) + nhθhv(thkh + sh)
+ µh
{
f(kh)− f ′(kh)kh − f(kl) + f ′(kl)kl
+ θh
[
v(thkh + sh)− v(tlkl + sl)
]}
+ µl
{
f(kl)− f ′(kl)kl − f(kh) + f ′(kh)kh
+ θl
[
v(tlkl + sl)− v(thkh + sh)
]}
where µh and µl denote the Lagrangean multipliers of the incentive-compatibility
constraints. Capital demand is a function of the tax rates in both types of regions
and is given by Eqs. (3.20) and (3.21). Diﬀerentiating the Lagrange function with
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respect to th, tl, sh, and sl yields
(tl) : −nlkl + v′(gl)
(
kl + tl
∂kl
∂tl
)(
θlnl + θlµl − θhµh
)
(3.46)
+ v′(gh)th
∂kh
∂tl
(
θhnh + θhµh − θlµl
)
+ (µh − µl)
[
f ′′(kl)
∂kl
∂tl
kl − f ′′(kh)∂k
h
∂tl
kh
]
= 0,
(th) : −nhkh + v′(gl)tl∂k
l
∂th
(
θlnl + θlµl − θhµh
)
(3.47)
+ v′(gh)
(
kh + th
∂kh
∂th
)(
θhnh + θhµh − θlµl
)
+ (µh − µl)
[
f ′′(kl)
∂kl
∂th
kl − f ′′(kh)∂k
h
∂th
kh
]
= 0,
and
(sh) : −nh + v′(gh)
(
nhθh + µhθh − µlθl
)
= 0, (3.48)
(sl) : −nl + v′(gl)
(
nlθl + µlθl − µhθh
)
= 0. (3.49)
Using these ﬁrst-order conditions Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau (1998) prove
the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5 [Bucovetsky, Marchand, andPestieau (1998)]: If the central
government has access to a transfer system, the incentive-compatibility constraint is
only binding on θl-type regions. Furthermore, the equilibrium is separating, i.e.
th > tl, and local public goods are underprovided in θh-type regions and overprovided
in θl-type regions.
The proof of this proposition is given in Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau (1998,
p. 380). Proposition 3.5 shows that the ﬁrst-best allocation is not incentive compat-
ible. Recall, the implementation of the ﬁrst-best allocation requires uniform capital
taxation and, thus, private consumption which is equalized across regions. However,
since θh > θl local public good provision in θh-type regions exceeds the level of g in
θl-type regions. With asymmetric information θl-type regions have an incentive to
misrepresent their type if the central government oﬀers the ﬁrst-best contracts to the
regions. For this reason, the center deviates from the eﬃcient allocation to restore
incentive compatibility. This is done by distorting both levels of local public goods
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and the interregional capital allocation (th > tl). The result can be motivated by
the theory of second best which states that it is optimal to have multiple instead of
only one distortion in the economy. Applied to this model the theory of second best
predicts that a distortion, e.g., only in gh would require a higher welfare loss than
a simultaneous distortion in gh, gl as well as in the interregional capital allocation.
Exactly this result is implied by proposition 3.5.
In partial equilibrium principal-agent models, e.g., analyzed in Laﬀont and Tirole
(1993), the optimal deviation from the ﬁrst-best contract would be diﬀerent. There
is no gain in distorting the contract of the mimicker in a partial equilibrium model.
In general, the contract of that agent is distorted which is susceptible to being
mimicked. In this model, θl-type regions are the mimickers. That is, the contract
of θh-type regions would have to be distorted to make it less attractive to θl-type
regions. In contrast, the contract designed for θl-type regions would remain un-
changed. However, in a general equilibrium setting a modiﬁcation of one contract
implies a change in the other contract. For instance, starting from the ﬁrst-best
contracts (gl∗, cl∗) and (gh∗, ch∗) a rise in th induces a reallocation of capital since kh
decreases and kl increases. Consequently, gl rises above the ﬁrst-best level gl∗ which
translates into an overprovision of local public goods in θl-type regions. Therefore,
the optimal behavior derived in partial equilibrium models does not apply here.
Both contracts have to be adjusted though only θl-type regions have to be pre-
vented from mimicking.
The resulting allocation is depicted in ﬁgure 3.4. The ﬁrst-best contracts are not
incentive compatible. Given by proposition 3.5 the optimal response is to allow for a
tax diﬀerential th−tl > 0 implying a lower private consumption in θh- than in θl-type
regions. Additionally, local public goods are underprovided in θh-type regions and
overprovided in θl-type regions. Accordingly the optimal contract for θl-type regions
lies north-east of the ﬁrst-best contract. Conversely, the contract designed for θh-
type regions moves south-west until both contracts lie on the same θl-type regions’
indiﬀerence curve. The latter is required by the fact that the incentive-compatibility
constraint of θl-type regions is binding at the optimum (µl > 0).
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Figure 3.4: Resource allocation with a transfer scheme: asymmetric information and
capital mobility.
3.4.6 Conclusion
In this section, the allocative implications of centralized source-based capital taxa-
tion with asymmetric information are analyzed. This institutional setting is chosen
for two reasons. First, models of tax competition typically result in an ineﬃcient
outcome. As discussed in the literature one solution to circumvent the ineﬃciency
is to coordinate capital tax rates. Here, tax coordination is modeled as centraliza-
tion of capital taxation. Second, in the traditional literature on decentralization,
decentralized decision making is favored due to diﬀerent information structures. It
is assumed that local decision makers have more information relevant for decision
making than a central authority. Here, this approach is adopted by assuming an
information asymmetry between regional and central decision makers.
The analysis characterizes the implementable tax coordination policy with respect
to the tax rates and the level of local public good provision. Speciﬁcally, the analysis
shows that local public goods can be overprovided, underprovided, and eﬃciently
provided. The results are summarized in table 3.1. One can give more structure
141
ICC θh-type θl-type Tax rates
Capital mobility
Symmetric information θhv′ = 1 θlv′ = 1 th = tl
Capital immobility
Asymmetric information µh = 0, µl = 0 θhv′ = 1 θlv′ = 1 th > tl
Capital mobility
Asymmetric information µh = 0, µl > 0 θhv′ > 1 θlv′ < 1 th > tl
Table 3.1: Tax coordination: local public good provision and tax rates.
to this general result by analyzing the impact of capital mobility on the speciﬁc
equilibrium. With capital immobility and asymmetric information the ﬁrst-best al-
location is implementable. In this case incentive issues are of no concern. Each type
of region reveals its private information if the central government oﬀers ﬁrst-best
contracts.
To analyze the impact of the information asymmetry on tax coordination in the
presence of capital mobility the optimal tax coordination policy under symmetric
information has been derived ﬁrst. The analysis shows that with full information
centralized capital tax coordination yields the desirable eﬃcient allocation. More
speciﬁcally, since capital taxes are uniform across regions the allocation implies
identical levels of private consumption for both types of regions. However, given
by distinct preferences the eﬃcient level of local public goods is higher for θh-type
regions than for θl-type regions. Thus, the contract designed for θh-type regions is
also preferred by θl-type regions. This property of the optimal contracts does not
lead to incentive problems since information is symmetric and the contracts can be
directly allocated to the regions without having to rely on reports from the regions
to the center.
Crucial for the result is the availability of an interregional transfer system. Without
such a transfer scheme the ﬁrst-best allocation cannot be implemented. To see this,
suppose sh = sl ≡ 0. Now, if the central government wants to achieve an eﬃcient
interregional capital allocation, capital taxes have to be uniform. However, uniform
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capital taxes imply an ineﬃcient local public good provision at least in one type of
region. By contrast, an eﬃcient allocation of local public goods in both types of
regions requires distinct capital taxes and, hence, an ineﬃcient interregional capital
allocation. Consequently, in the absence of a transfer system the central government
faces a trade oﬀ between distortions in local public good provision and a distorted
interregional capital allocation.25
The analysis reveals that asymmetric information in the presence of capital immo-
bility and symmetric information in the presence of capital mobility do not involve
ineﬃciencies. If capital mobility and asymmetric information are simultaneously
analyzed the result no longer holds. The eﬃcient allocation is not implementable
since, as already noted above, θl-type regions prefer the ﬁrst-best contract of θh-
type regions to their own one. The optimal response of the central government is to
distort local public good provision as well as the capital allocation up to the point
where θl-type regions are indiﬀerent between both contracts.
At this point it is useful to relate this outcome to that attainable under capital tax
competition. As shown in chapter 1 capital tax competition with taste diﬀerences
imply distinct equilibrium tax rates (th > tl) and, consequently, an ineﬃcient in-
terregional capital allocation. Moreover, at least in one type of region local public
goods are ineﬃciently provided. That is, both institutional arrangements yield sim-
ilar qualitative results. However, more importantly, tax coordination as modeled in
this section is at least equivalent, if not even superior to capital tax competition,
since the outcome of the latter can be replicated by the central government. There-
fore, welfare under tax coordination cannot be lower than welfare under capital tax
competition. A more detailed treatment of this issue is relegated to the next section.
So far, eﬃciency considerations have been at the center of the analysis. However,
distributional issues are of importance as well. To see this, note that the central
government can always replicate the outcome under capital tax competition. Hence,
each region’s utility would be unaltered if the central government would do so. As
implied by the objective function the central government weighs utility of θh-type
regions against utility of θl-type regions. For this reason, optimality may require
the central government to choose contracts, which gives one type of region a higher
25A formal analysis of this institutional setting is provided in the next section.
143
utility level and the other a lower utility level than under decentralized capital tax-
ation. This is of particular importance if the participation decision is endogenized
since each type of region must beneﬁt from tax coordination. Section 3.6 provides
a brief analysis of tax coordination in the presence of an endogenous participation
decision.
One further remark should be made here referring to the introduction of house-
hold mobility. One may be tempted to assume that an informational restriction
on the central government’s optimization problem is irrelevant. In the presence of
household mobility, the self-sorting mechanism proposed by Tiebout (1956) is suﬃ-
cient to reveal information about the preferences for local public goods. This is not
a solution to the information asymmetry assumed here. The Tiebout mechanism
only reveals information to the local governments among which the household can
choose. If one allows for household mobility, local governments would know the
preferences for local public goods. Exactly this is assumed here. Hence, the model
in this section can be viewed as the allocation of households induced by the Tiebout
mechanism.
3.5 Tax Coordination and Commitment
In the previous section centralized capital tax coordination was analyzed with re-
spect to its eﬃciency properties. Though under asymmetric information and capital
mobility an eﬃcient allocation of resources cannot be achieved, tax coordination
yields at least the same welfare level as capital tax competition. This section demon-
strates that the unambiguous welfare ranking is closely connected to the Revelation
Principle. In general, by dropping the assumptions underlying the Revelation Prin-
ciple the welfare comparison becomes ambiguous. One of these assumptions is the
commitment assumption which is relaxed in the subsequent section. The modiﬁ-
cation has two important implications. First, the absence of the full-commitment
ability by the central government provides scope for decentralized capital taxation
to outperform centralized tax coordination.26 Second, a pooling equilibrium may
26In this section, the result is derived in an asymmetric-information environment. However, tax
coordination may be undesirable under symmetric information as well. Reasons for this result are
credibility problems [Kehoe (1989)], a private agenda by politicians [Edwards and Keen (1996)],
and the soft budget constraint syndrome [Qian and Roland (1998)]. See Maskin (1999) for a general
discussion of the soft budget constraint syndrome.
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occur which is more compatible with actual tax policies in federal states.
The section is organized as follows. Subsection 3.5.1 demonstrates the Revelation
Principle. Diﬀerent degrees of commitment are presented in subsection 3.5.2. The
optimal coordinated tax policy is derived in subsection 3.5.3. The welfare implica-
tions of a missing commitment ability and a general welfare comparison of diﬀerent
institutional settings of capital taxation are provided in subsection 3.5.4. Finally,
subsection 3.5.5 concludes.27
3.5.1 Revelation Principle
As stated above, the information asymmetry itself does not hinder the central gov-
ernment to outperform capital tax competition. Crucial for the central government’s
ability is the Revelation Principle. In general, if the Revelation Principle holds, cen-
tralization can replicate allocations resulting from decentralized decision making.28
That is, the performance under decentralization provides a lower bound for the per-
formance of a centralized system. Hence, as long as the Revelation Principle holds a
theory of decentralization cannot be developed. It is for this reason that the analysis
in section 3.4 and in the last chapter cannot provide an argument for decentraliza-
tion.
Due to the importance of the Revelation Principle for the welfare comparison of cen-
tralization and decentralization, the Revelation Principle is brieﬂy summarized in
the following paragraph. An emphasis is put on the commitment assumption which
is relaxed in this section and, hence, generates scope for a theory of decentralization.
Revelation Principle: Results Consider a central level (principal) which faces
multiple agents. The latter possess private information (their type). The center
only knows the probability distribution of each agents’ type. The center’s objective
is to assign an allocation to each agent which depends on the agent’s type. In this
setting the Revelation Principle is extremely helpful in solving the problem. To see
this, note that in general, many mechanisms are available to the principal and some
27The analysis in this section still rests on the assumption of benevolent governments. For a
political economy approach to the issue of centralization versus decentralization see Bolton and
Roland (1996, 1997) and Lockwood (1998).
28To be more precise, the term “replication” indicates that the value of the principal’s objective
function is identical under both centralization and decentralization. In this vein, centralization
outperforms decentralization if the value of the principal’s objective function is higher under cen-
tralization than under decentralization.
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of them can be quite complex. However, the Revelation Principle states that the
center, as the designer of the mechanism, can restrict attention to a simple class
of mechanisms. Speciﬁcally, the simple class of mechanisms is given by the class of
direct mechanisms. With a direct mechanism the agents directly send type reports
to the center and in turn receive an allocation based on their reports. Furthermore,
among all direct mechanisms the designer of the mechanism can conﬁne attention
to those mechanisms which induce a truthful revelation of private information [see
Myerson (1981)].29 Given the general form of the Revelation Principle it is instruc-
tive to demonstrate the implication of this result within the model of centralized
capital taxation.
The setting of section 3.4 is slightly modiﬁed to allow for continuous rather than
discrete types. Suppose the optimal capital tax rate for a given type parameter
θ ∈ Θ is given by t = t(θ) where Θ denotes the set of all possible parameters. That
is, for a given θ, t = t(θ) solves the optimization problem under asymmetric capital
tax competition presented in section 1.2.3. Implied by the incentive compatibility
of a Nash equilibrium
u(t(θ), θ) ≥ u(t(θ′), θ) θ, θ′ ∈ Θ (3.50)
holds. At the optimal tax rate t(θ) utility of a θ-type region, u(t(θ), θ), must be
at least as high as u(t(θ′), θ), where t(θ′) is the tax rate which is optimal for a
region of type θ′. Without knowing the regions’ type, the central government can
still compute the Nash equilibrium of the capital tax competition model. Let the
Nash equilibrium be denoted by the function t∗ = t∗(θ) which assigns each type
of region θ its optimal tax rate. By oﬀering this menu of contracts to regions the
central government can induce a truthful revelation of preference types. If a region
θ announces to be of type θ, the corresponding contract contains a tax rate which
brings it to its unique optimum. Thus, implied by the nature of the Nash equilib-
rium, the contract is incentive-compatible [see Eq. (3.50)]. Consequently, though
only knowing the distribution of types the central government can implement the
allocation which is implemented by capital tax competition.
Observe, this result is independent of the speciﬁcation of the central government’s
objective function. For any given speciﬁcation, the value of the objective function at
29For a text book treatment of the Revelation Principle see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and
Laﬀont and Tirole (1993).
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the tax competition outcome provides a lower bound for the value of the objective
function under centralized capital taxation. This result follows from the optimizing
behavior of the central government. If the central government decides to deviate
from the contract t∗ = t∗(θ), it can only be due to the fact that the value of the
objective function at the optimal contract is higher than at the Nash-equilibrium
allocation t∗ = t∗(θ).
Summing up, given by the Revelation Principle and the incentive compatibility of a
Nash equilibrium, the central government can replicate the tax-competition alloca-
tion by a direct mechanism. This property of the centralized solution is extremely
helpful in analyzing the welfare performance of diﬀerent institutional settings of
capital taxation presented in this section.
Revelation Principle: Assumptions However, the Revelation Principle rests
on a variety of assumptions. The most interesting one for the current analysis is
the assumption of full commitment. Roughly speaking, it enables the central gov-
ernment to stick to the announced contract. To provide further insight into the
importance of the assumption it is useful to recall the structure of the tax coor-
dination game. At the ﬁrst stage the central government announces a menu of
contracts. At the second stage of the game regions choose a contract. Thereby, they
reveal their types if the equilibrium is separating. At the third stage of the game
the contracts are executed. In a separating equilibrium the central government has
full information after the second stage of the game. Therefore, it could use the
information and implement the full-information outcome. However, this behavior
is ruled out by the assumption of full commitment. The central government does
not change the contracts once information has been revealed. In this section, the
assumption of full commitment is replaced by the assumption of no commitment.
With no commitment technology the central government uses all information once it
has been revealed. That is, the center cannot commit to not using the information.
Full commitment and no commitment are only the extreme forms of commitment.
Multiple forms of commitment exist in between. A short overview is provided in the
next subsection.
Other assumptions underlying the Revelation Principle are (i) unlimited commu-
nication, (ii) no collusion, and (iii) costless information processing. The assump-
tion of unlimited communication is necessary in order to report all possible prefer-
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ence parameters from the regions to the center. For a model where agents cannot
fully communicate their private information for contracting purposes see Melumad,
Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1992). The assumption of costless information pro-
cessing implies that the center can compute the optimal contract regardless of the
size of the computational task. Models with costly information processing are e.g.
Radner (1993), Dewatripont and Bolton (1994), and Van Zandt (1999).
Additionally, if agents are allowed to collude, the Revelation Principle does not
hold either. Under the Revelation Principle agents act noncooperatively. That is,
they do not merge to undermine the mechanism oﬀered by the center. The issue of
collusion is studied, e.g., in Tirole (1986) and Laﬀont and Martimort (1998). How-
ever, in contrast to the principal-agent model studied in Tirole (1986) and Laﬀont
and Martimort (1998) the principal’s objective and the agents’ objectives are not
strictly opposing in the model considered here. For this reason, the principal cannot
be exploited by collusion. Any form of collusion enhances rather than undermines
eﬃciency. Moreover, if collusion occurs at the regional level, decentralized capital
taxation does not result in ﬁscal externalities. Thus, no externalities have to be in-
ternalized and the purpose of the central level vanishes. Stated diﬀerently, collusion
implies that noncooperative decision making at the decentralized level is turned into
cooperative decision making at the lower level. Consequently, any gains from capital
tax coordination are already realized in a decentralized system.
3.5.2 Degrees of Commitment
So far, most of the literature has analyzed the commitment issue in a multi-period
model. Diﬀerent degrees of commitment are distinguished [see Salanie´ (1997) for a
survey]. To illustrate diﬀerent forms of commitment consider a T -period relationship
between a principal and an agent. With full commitment the principal can pledge
to stick to a contract. Therefore, a contract can be written at the beginning of the
relationship, which holds for all T periods. Any information revealed by the agent
after signing the contract is not used to alter the conditions of the contract. Thus,
the agent enjoys an information rent in all T periods.30 With full commitment the
30In a partial equilibrium model of the Laﬀont-Tirole type [see Laﬀont and Tirole (1993)] agents
receive a nonnegative information rent due to private information. In a general equilibrium model
this does not hold in all cases if information rent is computed as the diﬀerence between the agent’s
utility in the asymmetric information and the full information outcome [see e.g. Raﬀ and Wilson
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Figure 3.5: Coordination game: no commitment.
optimal dynamic contract is a T -fold repetition of the optimal one-period contract.
The second form of commitment is no commitment. In this case the principal cannot
commit to a contract, which covers more than one period. At the beginning of each
period a new contract has to be signed. More importantly, any information revealed
by the agent in previous periods enters the contract in subsequent periods. Suppose
in the ﬁrst period the principal oﬀers the optimal contract with full commitment
and the agent reveals its private information. Then the agent receives the informa-
tion rent only in the ﬁrst period. In all subsequent periods the principal oﬀers the
full information contract. Thus, the information rent is reduced to 0. Therefore,
the agent is subject to the so called ratchet eﬀect. The contract is adjusted (i.e.
ratcheted) to new information. This behavior is ex-post eﬃcient. However, when a
principal cannot commit to ignoring public information, the agent will be cautious
in revealing information. This in turn causes ex-ante eﬃciency problems.31
A third form of commitment is an intermediate case between the above mentioned
two extreme forms of commitment. If the principal is able to stick to a contract
whose duration is longer than one period but shorter than T periods, the principal’s
commitment ability is referred to as limited commitment.32
In contrast to the above cited literature, the current analysis restricts attention
to a static contracting environment. However, even within a one period model the
degree of commitment does not become irrelevant. To see this, note that with full
commitment the model presented in subsection 3.4.5 has the following structure. At
the ﬁrst stage of the game the contract is designed by the central government. At
the second stage regions announce their types and contracts are executed. If the
(1997)].
31Optimal contracting with no commitment is analyzed among others by Freixas, Guesnerie, and
Tirole (1985), Laﬀont and Tirole (1987) and Fudenberg, Holmstro¨m, and Milgrom (1990).
32See Chiappori, Macho, Rey, and Salanie´ (1994) for a model with limited commitment.
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central government is unable to restrict itself from using public information, a third
stage is introduced (see ﬁgure 3.5). After regions announce their types the central
government ratches the contract to incorporate the additional information into the
contracts. Consequently, the optimal contracts under full information are allocated
to the regions. However, anticipating this reaction, regions are reluctant to reveal
their types. A truthful revelation of types, which arises with full commitment, may
not occur with no commitment.33 The incentives for regions in this modiﬁed tax
coordination game are presented in the remainder of this section.
3.5.3 Optimal Tax Coordination
Before turning to the welfare implications of the missing commitment ability, it is
useful to derive the optimal uniform tax policy and the optimal tax policy under
symmetric information and in the absence of an interregional transfer system ﬁrst.
Optimal Tax Coordination under Uniform Capital Taxation The uniform
policy becomes only eﬀective in this setting if regions do not truthfully reveal their
types to the central government. Thus, without truthful preference revelation the
central government is forced to impose uniform tax rates even though it knows
there are two types of regions. In this case ti = t and, thus, capital employment
equals capital endowment, ki = k˜. Consequently, private consumption and public
consumption are identical in both types of regions, i.e. ci = c and gi = g. With
these modiﬁcations the objective function of a government with full commitment
nlf(kl) + nhf(kh)− nltlkl − nhthkh + nlθlv(tlkl) + nhθhv(thkh)
+ µh
{
f(kh)− f ′(kh)kh − f(kl) + f ′(kl)kl + θh
[
v(thkh)− v(tlkl)
]}
+ µl
{
f(kl)− f ′(kl)kl − f(kh) + f ′(kh)kh + θl
[
v(tlkl)− v(thkh)
]}
33A welfare comparison of centralization and decentralization in a static environment with lim-
ited commitment of the central government is given in Klibanoﬀ and Poitevin (1999). Common to
the assumption in this subsection, the central government cannot commit to ex-post ineﬃcient al-
locations in their setting. Additionally, see Strausz (1997) for a justiﬁcation of the no-commitment
assumption. Speciﬁcally, unlike Klibanoﬀ and Poitevin (1999) and the analysis in this subsection,
the government is not restricted in its commitment ability by assumption. In Strausz (1997) the
no-commitment ability is endogenously determined.
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reduces to f(k˜)− tk˜+nlθlv(tk˜)+nhθhv(tk˜). Hence, the central government chooses
the optimal contract (c, g) by solving the optimization problem
max
t
L = f(k˜)− tk˜ + nlθlv(tk˜) + nhθhv(tk˜). (3.51)
The ﬁrst-order condition is
(t) : −k˜ + nlθlv′(g)k˜ + nhθhv′(g)k˜ = 0. (3.52)
Dividing the ﬁrst-order condition by k˜ and rearranging yields[
nlθl + nhθh
]
v′(g) = 1. (3.53)
The optimal policy of the government is summarized in proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.4: With uniform capital taxation local public goods are underpro-
vided in θh-type regions and overprovided in θl-type regions.
Proof: First, the underprovision result in θh-type regions is proved. Eq. (3.53)
can be rewritten to θhv′(g)
[
nl θ
l
θh
+ nh
]
= 1. As θh > θl and nl + nh = 1, the term
in brackets is lower than unity. Hence, θhv′(g) > 1. To prove the second assertion
of proposition 3.4, Eq. (3.53) is rewritten to θlv′(g)
[
nl + nh θ
h
θl
]
= 1. θh > θl and
nl+nh = 1 ensure that the term in brackets is greater than unity. Thus, θlv′(g) < 1.
✷
If a government is forced to implement uniform policies, it oﬀers a contract to
the regions, which implies an ineﬃcient provision of local public goods. From the
perspective of the central government it is optimal to distort local public good provi-
sion in both types of regions. A contract which implies an eﬃcient provision of local
public goods in one type of region and an ineﬃcient provision of local public goods
in the other type of region leads to a welfare loss relative to the contract described
in proposition 3.4. The welfare gain by providing local public goods eﬃciently in
one type of region does not outweigh the welfare loss due to an even more ineﬃcient
level of g in the other type of region. Thus, it is too costly for the central government
to have only one distortion rather than two distortions in the economy. Note, this
rationale is consistent with the theory of second best. In contrast, the allocation of
mobile capital is eﬃcient. Uniform capital taxation results in an equalization of the
marginal productivities of capital in both types of regions.
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Optimal TaxCoordinationUnder Symmetric Information If regions truth-
fully announce their types, the center has full information. Since it cannot commit
to not using the information the truthful reports immediately enter contract design.
Thus, tax coordination occurs under symmetric information.
With symmetric information and an interregional transfer system optimality requires
to oﬀer contracts which contain the eﬃcient levels of gi and equal quantities of pri-
vate consumption. The latter follows from the fact that capital taxes are uniform
across regions which induces an eﬃcient interregional allocation of capital. This
result has already been derived in section 3.4.
In the following, it is also allowed for the possibility that the central government has
no access to an interregional transfer system. With this modiﬁcation the optimal
coordinated tax policy changes, which is subsequently shown.
Without an interregional transfer system capital taxes raised in each region must
be suﬃcient to ﬁnance the optimal amount of local public goods, i.e. gi = tiki. The
other parts of the model presented in section 3.4 remain intact. Thus, the central
government’s optimization problem is
max
th,tl
L = nlf(kl) + nhf(kh)− nltlkl − nhthkh + nlθlv(tlkl) + nhθhv(thkh).(3.54)
Capital demand is a function of the tax rates in both types of regions as given by
Eqs. (3.20) and (3.21). Diﬀerentiating the Lagrange function with respect to th and
tl yields
(th) : nhf ′(kh)
∂kh
∂th
+ nlf ′(kl)
∂kl
∂th
− nhkh − nhth∂k
h
∂th
− nltl∂k
l
∂th
(3.55)
+nlθlv′(gl)tl
∂kl
∂th
+ nhθhv′(gh)
(
kh + th
∂kh
∂th
)
= 0
(tl) : nhf ′(kh)
∂kh
∂tl
+ nlf ′(kl)
∂kl
∂tl
− nlkl − nhth∂k
h
∂tl
− nltl∂k
l
∂tl
(3.56)
+nlθlv′(gl)
(
kl + tl
∂kl
∂tl
)
+ nhθhv′(gh)th
∂kh
∂tl
= 0.
which gives proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5: Under symmetric information and in the absence of an interre-
gional transfer system local public goods are either
(i) overprovided in θh-type regions and underprovided in θl-type regions, i.e. θhv′(gh) <
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Figure 3.6: Resource allocation without a transfer scheme: symmetric information
and capital mobility.
1 and θlv′(gl) > 1, or
(ii) underprovided in θh-type regions and overprovided in θl-type regions, i.e. θhv′(gh) >
1 and θlv′(gl) < 1.
A proof of proposition 3.5 is given in appendix A.2.
Proposition 3.5 reveals that in none of the regions local public goods are eﬃciently
provided. Local public goods are either overprovided in θh-type regions and under-
provided in θl-type regions or vice versa. That is, in the absence of an interregional
transfer scheme the central government is forced to distort the local public good
provision since the remaining policy variables are not suﬃcient to realize an eﬃcient
allocation.34
34If th = tl, local public good provision is distorted at least in one type of region. By contrast,
an eﬃcient local public good provision in both types of regions requires th = tl and, thus, an
ineﬃcient allocation of capital.
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Figure 3.7: Preference revelation: no commitment.
A possible equilibria is depicted in ﬁgure 3.6 where local public goods are under-
provided in θh-type regions and overprovided in θl-type regions. With this type
of equilibrium private consumption is not identical in both types of regions unless
th = tl which, however, does not correspond to ﬁgure 3.6, but cannot be excluded
on the basis of the ﬁrst-order conditions (3.55) and (3.56).35 Recall, with an interre-
gional transfer system at hand the central government equalizes private consumption
in both types of regions. The allocations depicted in ﬁgure 3.6 underlie a positive
tax diﬀerential th − tl. Consequently, cl > ch.
3.5.4 Welfare Implications
In this subsection, the impact of a lack of commitment on the policy outcome is
characterized. As shown in the last subsection, the uniform capital taxation results
in an underprovision of g in θh-type regions and an overprovision of g in θl-type
regions. However, this policy only becomes eﬀective if regions do not reveal their
type. If they do reveal their preference type, the center has full information and is
able to implement the full information outcome. Hence, the revelation decision of
regions has to be analyzed in more detail. The purpose of the subsequent analysis
is to identify model constellations for which regions separate or pool.
The revelation decision of regions is depicted in ﬁgure 3.7. In the revelation game
35To see this, insert θhv′(gh) > 1 and θlv′(gl) < 1 in the modiﬁed ﬁrst-order conditions presented
in appendix A.2 which yields θlv′(gl)tl − θhv′(gh)th < 0. Thus, the Nash equilibrium at the
second stage of the game is compatible with th = tl, th > tl, as well as th < tl. However,
subgame perfection requires th ≥ tl. The latter is an immediate implication of the condition
ui(ci, gi) ≥ ui(cj , gj) which must hold in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
154
the strategy space of each region is given by {h, l}. Either they announce to be of
type θh or θl. The utility of diﬀerent strategy combinations is determined by the
resulting allocation. Let A (B) denote the allocation a region receives if it pretends
to be of type θh (θl) and the other region of type θl (θh). P denotes the outcome if
regions do not separate.
If θl-type regions reveal to be of type θl and θh-type regions to be of type θh,
the central government has full information. With no commitment technology the
central government uses this information and computes the optimal contracts under
full information. As shown in section 3.5.3 the optimal contract under full infor-
mation depends on whether or not the central government has access to a transfer
system. If the former applies, optimality requires to choose the eﬃcient levels of gh
and gl, respectively. However, if the latter applies, gh and gl are set at an ineﬃcient
level. By contrast, if both regions claim to be of the same type, the central govern-
ment has no additional information concerning regions’ types. In this case, the only
piece of information available to the central government is nh and nl. Consequently,
incentive-compatibility constraints are not imposed on the optimization problem.
Optimization of the Benthamite welfare functional subject to capital mobility con-
straints yields the outcome described in proposition 3.4.
By anticipating the reaction of the central government to their announcement re-
gions choose the best response. Hence, the strategy choice, i.e. the regions’ an-
nouncement of types, depends on the utility levels associated with diﬀerent type
announcements. Therefore, the impact of the missing commitment technology is
reduced to the question of whether the utility of the no-commitment outcome is
suﬃcient to induce truthful revelation. As it will be shown below the availability of
a transfer system plays a crucial role in answering this question. First, the revela-
tion game is solved in the absence of a transfer scheme, which is done in the next
paragraph.
Tax Coordination without a Transfer Scheme For illustration, consider the
allocation depicted in ﬁgure 3.8 where P denotes the optimal allocation in the case
that both regions pool. The optimal allocation under full information is given by B
(for θl-type regions) and Ai (for θ
h-type regions). B and Ai are only speciﬁc out-
comes compatible with proposition 3.5. However, what matters for the subsequent
analysis is the fact that at least one type of region is better oﬀ under full information
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relative to the pooling outcome.36
The Nash equilibrium of the announcement game depicted in ﬁgure 3.7 depends
on whether θh-type regions prefer allocation A to allocation P or vice versa. If the
former holds (A = A1  P ), the Nash equilibrium of the game is that both regions
truthfully reveal their types. To see this, suppose θh-type regions announce their
true type. The best response of θl-type regions is to announce θl since allocation
B is strictly preferred to allocation P . For the given strategy of θl-type regions
it is optimal for θh-type regions to announce θh (A1  P ). Therefore, the central
government can induce truthful revelation though not being able to commit to its
policy.
In contrast, if P is preferred to A (P  A = A2) by θh-type regions, the optimal
strategy for θl-type regions is to still reveal their type. But for θh-type regions it
is optimal to pretend to be of type θl. Again, if θh-type regions announce θh, it is
optimal for θl-type regions to choose θl. However, for given announcement θl it is a
best response for θh-type regions to choose θl (P  A2). A best response of θl-type
regions to this announcement is still θl as P  A2 by θl-type regions. In this case,
the central government cannot induce truthful revelation. Thus, tax rates cannot
be diﬀerentiated across regions. Uniform capital taxation results in allocation P .
The analysis reveals that with no commitment the outcome of centralized capi-
tal taxation depends on the allocations A and P . Speciﬁcally, the utility for θh-type
regions associated with both allocations is the decisive factor for the outcome of
the game. At this general level of the model one cannot determine a priori whether
A  P holds or the contrary. However, one can analyze the responsiveness of the
interregional capital allocation to an increase in the tax diﬀerential th − tl. To do
this, consider P  A holds at a low degree of capital responsiveness. A rise in the
latter implies a lower level of private and public consumption for θh-type regions.37
Hence, the allocation A moves south-west. That is, A becomes less favorable to
θh-type regions. However, this change does not aﬀect the preference relation as P
36This must be the case for any allocation underlying proposition 3.5. Otherwise, it would be
optimal to choose the pooling equilibrium even under full information. In this case, the central
government does not try to induce truthful information revelation and the revelation game does
not have to be played.
37For a given tax diﬀerential th − tl > 0, a rise in the responsiveness of the interregional capital
allocation implies a rise in kl and a reduction in kh. Accordingly, ch and gh are lowered.
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Figure 3.8: Tax coordination without a transfer scheme: no commitment.
is already preferred to A.
Things change if A  P at the initial degree of responsiveness. As mentioned above,
a higher responsiveness makes allocation A less attractive to θh-type regions. For
this reason, there is some degree of capital responsiveness for which the preference
relation A  P is turned into P  A. Consequently, the higher the capital respon-
siveness the more likey the preference relation P  A.
Tax Coordination with a Transfer Scheme With an interregional transfer
system the outcome of the announcement game is unambiguous. The resulting allo-
cations are illustrated in ﬁgure 3.9. If regions separate, the full information outcome
can be implemented which entails equal private consumption and the eﬃcient level
of gi for both types of regions (bundle B for θl-type regions and bundle A for θh-
type regions). The pooling equilibrium P remains unaﬀected by the modiﬁcation
of the game. Returning to the announcement game depicted in ﬁgure 3.7, the Nash
equilibrium is given by the pooling equilibrium. θh-type regions reveal their type.
However, θl-type regions beneﬁt from mimicking and, thus, do not truthfully reveal
their type. More speciﬁcally, if θh-type regions pretend to be of type θl, a best
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Figure 3.9: Tax coordination with a transfer scheme: no commitment.
response of θl-type regions is to mimic θh-type regions since A  P . Now, it is
optimal for θh-type regions to reveal their true type (P  B). Given this strategy
choice of θh-type regions, θl-type regions do not change their strategy (P  B) and,
therefore, continue to mimic θh-type regions.
Analogously, starting with truthful revelation by θl-type regions a best response of
θh-type regions is to reveal their type truthfully as well. However, since P  B it is
optimal for θl-type regions to deviate from the initial strategy and to mimic θh-type
regions. For θh-type regions being mimicked it is still optimal to reveal their true
type. Thus, the allocation P constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the game.
In contrast to a situation without a transfer scheme, the introduction of this pol-
icy instrument unambiguously implies a pooling equilibrium. If regions separate,
θl-type regions would have to transfer resources to θh-type regions which makes
θl-type regions worse oﬀ. Anticipating this behavior θl-type regions pretend to be
of type θh. In this case the loss of commitment forces the central government to
choose uniform capital tax rates. The transfer scheme cannot be used to implement
a diﬀerentiated policy.
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W cnc −W cfc W cnc −W d
Transfer < ambiguous
No Transfer
A  P ≥ 0 > 0
P  A ≤ 0 ambiguous
Table 3.2: Welfare comparison: full commitment versus no commitment.
A Welfare Comparison To complete the welfare analysis it is necessary to de-
rive the welfare implications of the commitment inability. This is done in two ways.
First, the sign of the welfare diﬀerence between full and no-commitment outcomes
is derived. In both cases the capital tax rate is coordinated at the central level. It is
also instructive to compare welfare under centralized capital taxation with no com-
mitment and decentralized capital taxation. This welfare comparison is conducted
in the second part of this section. All results are summarized in table 3.2.
First, the welfare change due to commitment inability is derived. Formally, the
sign of the term W cnc−W cfc is analyzed where W cnc denotes welfare under centralized
capital taxation with no commitment and W cfc denotes welfare under centralized
capital taxation with full commitment.38 The welfare analysis is conducted sepa-
rately for each institutional setting (with or without a transfer scheme).
In the absence of a transfer system the implementable allocations under full com-
mitment and asymmetric information have not been characterized in this analysis.
However, some reﬂections are suﬃcient to sign W cnc − W cfc. If A  P , the ab-
sence of a commitment technology enables the central government to implement the
full information outcome. With a commitment technology two cases can be dis-
tinguished. If both incentive-compatibility constraints are not binding, the asym-
metry of information imposes no restriction on the central government’s decision
problem (µh = µl = 0). The optimization problem is equivalent to that under
no commitment. Consequently, the solutions to both problems are identical and
W cnc − W cfc = 0. In contrast, if at least one incentive-compatibility constraint is
38The superscript c refers to centralized capital taxation whereas the subscript represents the
form of commitment (fc for full commitment and nc for no commitment).
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binding (µh > 0 and/or µl > 0), the central government is constrained by the asym-
metry of information implying a lower welfare level, i.e. W cnc −W cfc > 0. Thus, in
general W cnc −W cfc ≥ 0.
If P  A, regions pool due to the lack of commitment and the uniform policy
is implemented. Since the latter satisﬁes the incentive-compatibility constraints for
both types of regions as an equality it also belongs to the set of implementable allo-
cations under full commitment and asymmetric information. Provided the central
government chooses the pooling equilibrium under asymmetric information and full
commitment, welfare is identical in both settings, i.e. W cnc −W cfc = 0. However,
if it deviates from the pooling equilibrium, welfare under a separating equilibrium
must exceed welfare under the pooling equilibrium. For this reason, W cnc−W cfc < 0.
Combining both cases yields the welfare ranking W cnc −W cfc ≤ 0.
With a transfer system the welfare comparison is unambiguous. In the absence
of a commitment technology the central government cannot separate regions. It is
forced to apply uniform policies. By contrast, with full commitment and asymmetric
information the equilibrium is separating since th > tl [see proposition 3.3]. How-
ever, using the fact that a pooling equilibrium belongs to the set of implementable
allocations under asymmetric information and full commitment, but is not chosen
by the central government, yields W cnc −W cfc < 0.
Thus, the welfare analysis reveals that with a transfer the lack of commitment
decreases welfare. Without an interregional transfer system the welfare ranking is
ambiguous. The absence of a commitment technology can improve as well as lower
welfare. The decisive factor is whether only one type of region or both types of
regions are worse oﬀ under a pooling equilibrium.
In the remaining part of this subsection the sign ofW cnc−W d is analyzed, whereW d
denotes welfare under decentralized capital taxation. This welfare comparison is of
interest since the aim of the whole analysis is to approach the issue whether other
institutional settings, diﬀerent from decentralized capital taxation, are superior in
terms of welfare. As already mentioned above, under asymmetric information and
full commitment the central government can replicate the outcome under capital
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tax competition. However, with no commitment the welfare ranking is less obvious
in advance.
If A  P and a transfer system is not available, the full information outcome is
realized, which is chosen by taking all eﬀects of capital taxation into account. In
contrast, decentralized capital taxation is subject to ﬁscal externalities. Using this
information and the fact that the central government can at least replicate welfare
under capital tax competition gives W cnc −W d > 0.
If P  A, the welfare comparison cannot be conducted at this general level of analy-
sis. With decentralized capital taxation regions can choose distinct capital tax rates,
but the tax decision causes ﬁscal externalities. In contrast, the central government
internalizes all eﬀects of capital taxation but is restricted to uniform policies.39 Ac-
cordingly, the sign W cnc −W d is ambiguous. A similar line of reasoning applies if
an interregional transfer system is available. The additional policy instrument does
not result in higher welfare under tax coordination since, due to the occurrence of a
pooling equilibrium, the transfer system is not used. Consequently, with a transfer
system the welfare comparison W cnc −W d is still ambiguous.
3.5.5 Conclusion
In this section, the model of section 3.4 is restricted by not allowing the central
government to credibly commit to its policy. This modiﬁcation has striking implica-
tions for the set of implementable policies and, consequently, aﬀects welfare under
centralized capital taxation.
The welfare performance of centralized tax coordination can be summarized as fol-
lows. With full commitment the central government can replicate the outcome under
capital tax competition. However, if the full commitment assumption is relaxed, this
ability may be lost. Centralized capital taxation does not necessarily yield a wel-
fare improvement relative to decentralized capital taxation. Therefore, from a pure
welfare-theoretic point of view this my create a demand for decentralized capital tax-
ation. The welfare comparison between both forms of commitment crucially depends
on whether the central government can induce a truthful revelation of preferences
though not being able to commit to any policy. If it can do so, the full-information
39As shown in chapter 1 a replication of the capital tax competition allocation requires th > tl.
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levels of g are implemented. In general, this requires diﬀerentiated tax rates across
regions. However, if truth telling does not occur, the central government is forced
to apply uniform tax policies.
With truthful preference revelation the loss of commitment does not result in a
welfare loss. Either it stays constant or rises. The intuition for the result is that
the central government implements the uniform allocation if regions do not sepa-
rate. Thus, this allocation can be interpreted as a default option, which becomes
eﬀective if separation does not occur. In contrast, with full commitment the central
government is able to induce truthful revelation. However, once it receives private
information it cannot be used to implement the optimal policy under full informa-
tion unless it is incentive compatible.
In the absence of commitment the central government can credibly threaten re-
gions with this default option. Hence, if both regions are better oﬀ under truthful
revelation than under the default option, they reveal their types. Since the central
government cannot commit to not using the information, the full-information policy
is implemented. If one region is better oﬀ under pooling than under separation,
the uniform policy is applied. In this case the analysis shows that welfare cannot
exceed the level achieved under full commitment. That is, the policy can at best
achieve the same welfare level. Speciﬁcally, if the full commitment policy calls for
a diﬀerentiated policy, the loss of commitment decreases welfare. In contrast, if the
full commitment policy is uniform, welfare is identical.
Furthermore, the welfare comparison between centralized capital taxation with no
commitment and decentralized capital taxation demonstrates that the superiority
of the centralized solution does not necessarily hold in the absence of commitment.
With truthful revelation it still holds. But if regions pool, the welfare diﬀerence
becomes ambiguous unless optimality under full commitment also requires pooling.
There is one result worth receiving special attention. In the existing literature a
centrally-mandated transfer system is welfare enhancing relative to a situation with-
out such a policy variable given the benevolent behavior of the central government.
Under full commitment this ﬁnding can be recovered in the analysis presented in this
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section. With full commitment the introduction of a transfer system either leaves
welfare unaﬀected (if the transfer system is not used by the central government)
or enhances welfare (if the central government makes use of the transfer system).
However, a transfer system available to a government not being able to commit to
its policy is no longer welfare improving. As shown in this subsection, welfare either
stays constant (in the case of a pooling equilibrium in the absence of a transfer
system) or even deteriorates (in the case of a separating equilibrium in the absence
of a transfer system). Thus, reducing the set of policy variables at the central level
is weakly welfare increasing if a commitment technology is not available to the center.
Uniform capital taxation seems to be consistent with actual tax policies in federal
states. In federal systems with centralized taxation, tax rates are not diﬀerentiated
across regions to reﬂect, e.g., taste diﬀerences. This empirical observation is proba-
bly the reason why in most of the literature on government decision making central-
ized policy is uniform by assumption. The analysis in this section demonstrates that
the issue of uniform taxation is closely connected to the Revelation Principle. By
dropping the assumption of full commitment non-diﬀerentiated capital tax rates can
be endogenously derived. Accordingly, the results obtained with capital taxes being
coordinated by a central government which has access to a transfer scheme but is
unable to commit to its policy are supported by the empirics of federal taxation.
Therefore, the analysis provides an explanation of actual tax policy.
3.6 Extension: Tax Coordination and Participa-
tion
Section 3.4 analyzes how contracts have to be designed to be implementable, i.e. to
satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraints. In general, the resulting allocation is
characterized by distinct utility levels for each type of region. At the general level of
analysis it cannot be excluded that one type of region is worse oﬀ under coordination
relative to the non-cooperative outcome analyzed in chapter 1. This observation
plays an important role for the outcome under centralized capital taxation for the
following reason. So far, the analysis has been conducted by assuming that regions
can either be forced or have already agreed to participate in the tax coordination
game. However, in practice this assumption is hardly fulﬁlled. For instance, in the
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European Union tax coordination is decided unanimously. Hence, each member of
the European Union must be better oﬀ due to tax coordination, otherwise it will not
participate. In this section, the assumption of compulsory participation is relaxed
and an endogenous-participation decision in tax coordination is considered. The
problem is not solved here. The purpose of this section is solely to provide some
intuition why an endogenous participation decision may aﬀect the outcome of tax
coordination and, therefore, why this is a useful extension of the model analyzed in
section 3.4.
Participation Constraint With compulsory participation the only restrictions
which have to be imposed on the central government’s optimization problem are
the incentive-compatibility constraints. However, if local governments are initially
independent, they cannot be forced to participate in tax coordination. Regions are
free to join or not to join a tax coordination agreement. The regional autonomy
can be formalized by the introduction of a participation (individual rationality)
constraint which the central authority must respect. Put diﬀerently, in addition
to incentive-compatibility constraints, participation constraints restrict the central
government’s optimization problem. The constraints ensure that regions have an
incentive to participate in tax coordination activities regardless of their type. For-
mally, the participation constraint takes the form
ui(ci, gi) ≥ u¯i i = h, l. (3.57)
The l.h.s. shows the utility a θi-type region can attain under centralized capital
taxation. The r.h.s. gives the reservation utility of a θi-type region, i.e. the util-
ity a θi-type region can attain if all regions reject the tax coordination proposal.
In this case the capital tax competition outcome is realized. Eq. (3.57) diﬀers from
those participation constraints used in standard adverse-selection models40 since the
reservation utility u¯i is type dependent. This diﬀerence makes it diﬃcult to derive
clear-cut conditions for Eq. (3.57) to be satisﬁed or not.
As given by proposition 3.3, local public goods are ineﬃciently provided in both
types of regions if capital taxes are coordinated, whereas under capital tax competi-
tion local public goods are ineﬃciently provided at least in θh-type regions.41 Thus,
40See, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), ch. 7.
41From the discussion of asymmetric tax competition in chapter 1 it is known that an overpro-
vision or even eﬃcient provision of local public goods in θl-type regions cannot be excluded. Note,
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in general the allocations under both institutional settings are distinct. Recall, the
outcome of uncoordinated tax competition is incentive compatible and, therefore,
belongs to the set of incentive-compatible allocations which can be implemented by
the central government. Thus, if the uncoordinated tax policy is chosen, utility for
each type of region is identical under both regimes. In this case, the participation
constraint (3.57) is binding for both types of regions. However, it cannot be ex-
cluded that a diﬀerent implementable allocation exists, which is preferred by the
central government as it yields a higher value of the welfare functional. The fact
that a higher weighted sum of utilities can be achieved by deviating from the capital
tax competition outcome is compatible with a higher utility in one type of region
but a lower utility in the other type of region. Note, the central government weighs
utilities of both types of regions in its objective function. Therefore, at least at
this general level of analysis, it cannot be excluded that the participation constraint
is binding for one type of region and, thus, constitutes an eﬀective constraint for
centralized policy implementation in the presence of voluntary participation.42 This
observation does not violate the Revelation Principle which merely states that the
central level can replicate the non-coordinated outcome. The Nash equilibrium of
the tax competition game is incentive compatible as well as individually rational.
Informational Rent One important concept in information economics is that
of an informational rent. The informational rent measures the impact of privately
held information on the agent’s utility. More precisely, it is deﬁned as the diﬀer-
ence between the agent’s utility under asymmetric information and under symmetric
information. In the standard principal-agent model the agents’ utility under sym-
metric information is given by the reservation utility. This is due to the fact that the
principal and the agents have strictly opposing interests in the standard framework.
Thus, under symmetric information the principal oﬀers a contract to the agent which
gives agents only the reservation utility. In contrast, under asymmetric information
some types of agents enjoy a utility level higher than their reservation utility. That
is, the principal cannot suppress utility of all types of agents to their reservation
the tax rate th and tl are too low compared with the case of capital immobility. However, th > tl
and, consequently, kl > kh. Therefore, it is still possible that tax revenues in θl-type regions are
suﬃcient to ﬁnance an eﬃcient level or even a higher level of local public goods gl.
42There are diﬀerent papers emphasizing the crucial role of the participation constraint in hinder-
ing eﬃcient allocations. See, e.g., Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Buchanan and Faith (1987),
Klibanoﬀ and Morduch (1995), Gru¨ner (1999), and Klibanoﬀ and Poitevin (1999).
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utility. Consequently, some types of agents receive an informational rent. From the
perspective of the principal the informational rent enjoyed by the agent are costs
due to asymmetric information.
The rest of this section draws a parallel between the standard principal-agent model
and the model analyzed in this chapter. The purpose of this comparison is to ana-
lyze whether the above outlined results carry over to capital tax coordination.
In the general equilibrium setting considered here the sign of the informational rent
is ambiguous. With compulsory participation the informational rent can even be
negative. However, unlike the standard principal-agent framework the introduction
of the participation constraint does not restrict the informational rent to be non-
negative. The informational rent may increase. But it can still be negative. The
underlying reason is the following. The interests between the center as the prin-
cipal and the regions as agents are not perfectly opposed. The center cares about
both types of regions whereas regions only care about their own well-being. This
accounts for the fact that under symmetric information a region’s utility does not
necessarily equal its reservation utility, i.e. the full information outcome may not be
identical to the capital tax competition outcome. Both the utility level under full
information and under asymmetric information can exceed the reservation utility.
Thus, the diﬀerence between the latter and the former can be positive as well as
negative and is not restricted to be non-negative by the participation constraint. In
the general equilibrium setting the constraint only ensures that one type of region is
not worse oﬀ under centralized tax coordination relative to capital tax competition.
Therefore, in contrast to the standard model the endogenous participation decision
does not exclude the possibility that one type of region is worse oﬀ due to privately
held information.43
TheFull OptimizationProblem With voluntary participation the optimization
problem becomes
max
th,tl
W (th, tl) = nl
[
cl + θlv(gl)
]
+ nh
[
ch + θhv(gh)
]
(3.58)
subject to
(ICCh) : ch + θhv(gh) ≥ cl + θhv(gl) (3.59)
43This observation is also made in Raﬀ and Wilson (1997).
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(ICC l) : cl + θlv(gl) ≥ ch + θlv(gh) (3.60)
(PCh) : ch + θhv(gh) ≥ u¯h (3.61)
(PC l) : cl + θlv(gl) ≥ u¯l. (3.62)
The endogenous participation decision enters the optimization problem through the
participation constraint for θh-type regions PCh and for θl-type regions PC l. As
mentioned above, the purpose of this section is only to motivate one extension of the
tax coordination model rather than to solve the extended model. Such an analysis
is left to future research.
3.7 Summary
The discussion in this chapter tries to evaluate the potential of capital tax coordi-
nation to mitigate the ineﬃciency of capital tax competition. Two forms of capital
tax coordination are considered. The ﬁrst approach assumes that capital taxes are
still determined at the regional level. In this case, regions agree to change their
tax rates simultaneously where the starting situation is the capital tax competition
equilibrium. With symmetric regions the decentralized form of tax coordination un-
ambiguously improves global welfare as well as welfare in each region. The regional
welfare change becomes ambiguous if one allows for asymmetric regions. The reason
for this result is that in the initial equilibrium distinct levels of local public goods
are provided. Thus, a higher level of local public goods due to an increase in the
capital tax rate is evaluated diﬀerently by distinct types of regions. For this reason,
capital tax coordination in the presence of asymmetric regions does not yield clear
cut results. The ﬁnding has important implications for actual tax coordination since
the asymmetry of regions may imply that at least some regions have no incentive to
participate in tax coordination though being globally welfare enhancing.
The second form of capital tax coordination requires a reassignment of capital taxes
to the central level. That is, regions lose their tax autonomy and capital taxes
are chosen at the central level. This approach to tax coordination seems to be a
promising alternative as the ineﬃciency of capital tax competition rests on ﬁscal
externalities. Thus, a centralized tax coordination is an appropriate institutional
setting to internalize ﬁscal externalities (at least ﬁscal externalities among regions
within a federation). In chapter 2 a central government was also introduced. How-
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W cnc −W cfc W cnc −W d W cfc −W d
Transfer < ambiguous > 0
No Transfer
A  P ≥ 0 > 0 > 0
P  A ≤ 0 ambiguous > 0
Table 3.3: Welfare comparison: summary.
ever, in that setting capital is still taxed at the regional level. The central level can
only indirectly inﬂuence the regions’ decision by taxing labor income and paying
unconditional grants to the regions. With centralized tax coordination the capital
tax rate is under direct control of the central government.
Welfare under centralized tax coordination and full commitment is at least as high
as under tax competition. If information is symmetrically distributed between the
center and the regions, centralized tax coordination results in an eﬃcient allocation
of resources. However, the eﬃcient allocation is not incentive compatible inducing
an ineﬃcient local public good provision under asymmetric information.
So far, the central government is assumed to have full commitment. If one drops
this fundamental assumption, the comparative performance of centralized capital
tax coordination and capital tax competition becomes ambiguous. A summary of
the results is presented in table 3.3. With full commitment the Revelation Prin-
ciple applies. For this reason, capital tax coordination is preferable to capital tax
competition. By contrast, with no commitment welfare can be lower relative to tax
competition. However, it can also outperform the full commitment outcome. Thus,
centralized capital coordination may lose its desirable property to outperform capital
tax competition once the central government cannot credibly commit to its policy.
In particular, the comparative performance is negatively aﬀected by the presence of
a centrally-mandated interregional transfer system.
With compulsory participation it cannot be excluded that some regions are worse
oﬀ due to tax coordination. If participation is compulsory, this ﬁnding is of no
further consequence. However, if regions are initially autonomous, capital tax coor-
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dination must be utility enhancing for each region. The regions’ autonomy results
in a participation constraint. In this case tax coordination is restricted by the par-
ticipation constraint only to the extent to which compulsory participation implies a
lower utility level at least for one region relative to the tax competition outcome.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Depending on which incentive-compatibility constraint is binding, four cases can
be distinguished:
(1): Both incentive-compatibility constraints are binding (µh > 0 and µl > 0).
(2): ICCh is binding and ICC l is not binding (µh > 0 and µl = 0).
(3): ICCh is not binding and ICC l is binding (µh = 0 and µl > 0).
(4): Both incentive-compatibility constraints are not binding (µh = 0 and µl = 0).
Case 1: By lemma 3.1 th ≥ tl. If th > tl, cl > ch and gh > gl. However, due
to the Spence-Mirrlees condition, both incentive-compatibility constraints do not
simultaneously hold as an equality for these allocations. The remaining case is
th = tl and, therefore, ch = cl and gh = gl. For this allocation Eq. (3.41) reduces to
v′(g) =
−(nh + µh) + µl
−θh(nh + µh) + θlµl . (A.1)
Since θh > θl this can only hold if θlv′(gl) < 1 and θhv′(gh) > 1. However, for a given
(ch, gh) a marginal reduction in gl relaxes both incentive-compatibility constraints
and increases ul(cl, gl) and lowers uh(cl, gl) while leaving uh(ch, gh) and ul(ch, gh)
unaﬀected. Therefore, the central state will not choose the pooling equilibrium and
case 1 can be ruled out as an optimal policy.
Case 2: With µl = 0 and µh > 0 the ﬁrst-order condition (3.41) becomes
(nh + µh)
[
−1 + θhv′(gh)
]
= 0, (A.2)
which only holds for θhv′(gh) = 1. The ﬁrst-order condition (3.42) changes to
nl
[
−1 + θlv′(gl)
]
= µh
[
−1 + θhv′(gl)
]
(A.3)
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which implies θlv′(gl) > 1. With capital immobility (ki = k˜) and θhv′(gh) = 1,
ICCh can only be binding if ch = cl and gh = gl. This contradicts θlv′(gl) > 1.
Case 3: If µh = 0 and µl > 0 the ﬁrst-order condition (3.42) yields
(nl + µl)
[
−1 + θlv′(gl)
]
= 0. (A.4)
The equation only holds for θlv′(gl) = 1. Eq. (3.41) becomes
nh
[
−1 + θhv′(gh)
]
= µl
[
−1 + θlv′(gh)
]
(A.5)
which gives θhv′(gh) < 1. Again, with capital immobility (ki = k˜) and θhv′(gl) = 1,
ICC l can only be binding if ch = cl and gh = gl. This contradicts θhv′(gh) < 1.
Case 4: With µh = 0 and µl = 0 Eqs. (3.41) and (3.42) reduce to
nh
[
−1 + θhv′(gh)
]
= 0 and nl
[
−1 + θlv′(gl)
]
= 0. (A.6)
Therefore, θhv′(gh) = 1 and θlv′(gl) = 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.5
In this part of the appendix proposition 3.5 is proved. First, the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions (3.55) and (3.56) are rewritten to
th
[
θhv′(gh)− 1
]
− kh,th
[
θlv′(gl)tl − θhv′(gh)th
]
= 0 (A.7)
tl
[
θlv′(gl)− 1
]
+ kl,tl
[
θlv′(gl)tl − θhv′(gh)th
]
= 0 (A.8)
where Eqs. (3.20) and (3.21) have been inserted and ki,ti :=
∂ki
∂ti
ti
ki
< 0.
If θhv′(gh) = 1 and θlv′(gl) = 1, Eq. (A.7) reduces to −kh,th(tl − th) = 0 which
can only hold for th = tl. Since, θh > θl and, thus, gh > gl the regional budget
constraints cannot hold simultaneously for th = tl.
If θhv′(gh) = 1, Eq. (A.7) implies θlv′(gl)tl = th. Inserting the result in Eq. (A.8)
yields th = tl and, therefore, θlv′(gl) = 1. However, this violates the regional budget
constraints. The same line of argument can be applied for θlv′(gl) = 1. Hence,
neither level of local public goods is eﬃcient.
If θhv′(gh) < 1 and θlv′(gl) < 1, Eq. (A.7) implies θlv′(gl)tl − θhv′(gh)th > 0.
However, using Eq. (A.8) implies θlv′(gl)tl−θhv′(gh)th < 0 which is a contradiction.
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The same holds for θhv′(gh) > 1 and θlv′(gl) > 1.
If θhv′(gh) > 1 and θlv′(gl) < 1, both Eqs. (A.7) and (A.8) require θlv′(gl)tl −
θhv′(gh)th < 0. Thus, θhv′(gh) > 1 and θhv′(gh) < 1 satisfy the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions. An analogous argument holds for θhv′(gh) < 1 and θlv′(gl) > 1.
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Concluding Remarks
The question of the current study, whether the negative eﬀects of capital tax com-
petition can be mitigated in a federal system, cannot be answered unambiguously.
As shown in chapter 2, a federal system with capital taxation at the lower level
and labor taxation at the upper level yields higher welfare than purely decentralized
source-based capital taxation. The exact welfare improvement in turn depends on
the behavioral assumptions (Stackelberg or Nash) underlying federal and regional
decision making. However, chapter 3 showed that capital tax coordination may not
yield the desired welfare improvement. More speciﬁcally, the analysis in chapter 3
revealed that with decentralized capital taxation regions may not have an incen-
tive to agree to tax coordination unless regions are symmetric. Furthermore, with
centralized tax coordination the eﬃcient allocation cannot be implemented even if
a transfer is available to the central government to distribute the beneﬁts of tax
coordination among regions. More importantly, however, if the central government
can commit to its policy, welfare is unambiguously higher than under capital tax
competition. By contrast, if the central government cannot credibly commit to its
policy, the unambiguous welfare ranking no longer holds. In this case capital tax
competition may even outperform centralized capital tax coordination.
In sum, even with benevolent governments tax coordination may not always yield
the desirable eﬀects, which are attributed to this policy measure in practice. With
respect to the European Union the following policy implications can be derived.
First, decentralized capital tax coordination may not work since member countries
are asymmetric rather than symmetric. The ﬁnding that the asymmetry among
regions is critical to the success of policy coordination is supported by the latest
eﬀorts to agree on a minimum tax on capital income or only an exchange of tax rel-
evant information among the member states of the European Union. In particular,
Great Britain and Luxembourg with the common characteristic of being important
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European ﬁnancial markets have been opposed to these policy measures. They fear
that given the asymmetry they will be worse oﬀ due to the tax reform.
Second, in general a fully centralized European capital tax system cannot be rec-
ommended. Only if the European level has full commitment can centralized capital
taxation be supported by welfare theoretic considerations. However, implied by
the nonneglegible inﬂuence of national interests on European policy formation, the
assumption of full commitment is questionable. If the European level cannot credi-
bly commit to its policy, member states will be reluctant to reveal information (for
instance to have a low preference for public goods) which may be used to adjust
European policy against their national interest. In particular, this holds if the Euro-
pean level has access to a transfer system. In this situation, a delegation of capital
taxes to the member states may be preferable, which is the current form of capital
taxation within the European Union.
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